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In geography, maps are a tool of placement which locate both the cartographer and the 
territory made cartographic. In order to place objects in space, the cartographer inserts his own 
judgment into the scheme of his design. During the Early Modern period, maps were no longer 
suspicious icons as they were in the Middle Ages and not yet products of science, but subjects of 
discourse and works of art. The image of a cartographer’s territory depended on his vision—both 
the nature and placement of his gaze—and the product reflected that author’s judgment. This is 
not a study of maps as such but of Early Modern literature, cartographic by nature—the 
observations of the author were the motif of its design. However, rather than concretize 
observational judgment through art, the Early Modern literature discussed asserts a reverse 
relation—the generation of the material which may be observed, the reality, by the views of 
authors. Spatiality is now an emerging philosophical field of study, taking root in the philosophy 
of Deleuze & Guattari. Using the notion prevalent in both Postmodern and Early Modern 
spatiality, which makes of perception a collective delusion with its roots in the critique of Kant, 
this thesis draws a through-line across time, as texts such as Robert Burton’s An Anatomy of 
Melancholy, Thomas More’s Utopia, and selections from William Shakespeare display a 
tendency to remove value from the standard of representation, to replace meaning with cognition 
and prioritize a view of views over an observable world. Only John Milton approaches 
perception as possibly referential to objective reality, by re-inserting his ability to observe and 
exist in that reality, in a corpus which becomes less generative simulations of material than 
concrete signposts to his judgment in the world. 
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Introduction: The Will to Cartography 
 
Literature is cartographic in the sense that texts are concrete maps to the author’s 
cognitive judgments. Such judgments require volition—namely, that man’s art recreates or re-
presents, not only a reaction to reality, but the aspects of it which reflect his perception of 
existence on Earth. Therefore, literature requires both an observable reality and the artist’s ability 
to normatively judge his perceptions, from which he may select the fundamentals and impart 
them to his art. Without that ability, there would be no will to art. Without that reality, there 
could be no stable referents for symbols in art, no consistent reference for value judgments. As 
such, value judgments would lose all value—observable concretes are the gold standard to which 
works of art are only paper bills. Without them, “cartography” would be a vastly different 
phenomenon: not a re-creation of real space by art but a creation of a form of perception of some 
“real” based on the author’s perspective, like a shadow without a body or a mirror facing another 
mirror. Art in this case would not be a result of one’s cognitive functions but the arbiter of them, 
not the realization of normative judgments but a testament to the impossibility of having them in 
a cognitive desert.  
The contrary force to this combination—of objective reality and authorial observation in 
art—is collectivist space, or any theory which asserts that reality is a byproduct of human 
consciousness. In The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre defined “(social) space [as] a (social) 
product” (26). His parentheticals imply that space is always-already social or relative, space 
which individuals not only produce but which produces, identifies, isolates, and observes those 
individuals as a “means of control” and of “power” (Lefebvre 26). In this sense, artists would 
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have no power to judge their reality—all judgments would be relative, as all authors themselves 
would be made by their view of views. By Lefebvre’s assertion, reality itself would be relative, 
not an a priori condition of the institutions and individuals which inhabit it (85), but an accident 
of perception. Thus, for Lefebvre cartography is the nearest to reality there is, as it most clearly 
represents the mind of the viewer in his cognition-centric universe.  
He received that notion from Kant who said, “Space is not objective and real” … “time 
and space are necessary constructs of the existence of conscious beings” (qtd in Tally 29). This 
primacy of perception over reality separates the world we perceive, the “phenomenal” world, 
from the “organic whole” called the “noumenal” world; for Kant “things in themselves” exist but 
they are ultimately unknowable. By situating the space we perceive as a collective delusion, a 
“construct” structured by the whims of consciousness, objectivity in observation becomes a 
supposed definitional misnomer. Kant’s notion is the source of collective cartography as 
described by Lefebvre’s space, wherein the author can only perceive that which he has created 
by perceiving, and can never know the “true reality” beyond the stars. This is a contradiction in 
terms, which places material at the mercy of its being perceived, reality at the request of its 
societies. Maintaining this contradiction places the author on an Earth which does not exist, 
which seems concrete to him only because he deserves or is unable to perceive anything more. 
Maintaining this contradiction reverts art back even beyond its precepts. The world would be as 
impossible as a statue made only with the wish for clay; as Kant relates, “I have therefore found 
it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith” (29). The degree to which any 
art exists as such is exactly proportional to the degree to which it denies Kant’s theory.  
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The intent of this thesis is to take Early Modern literature as the center of a new theatrical 
experience which examines its visual schemes in the context of this notion of space perception, 
using the concept of cartographic literature as the axis of a new, trans-historical discourse. 
Dramatic visual schemes from that period will serve as a through-line which can be traced 
forward to contemporary spatial theory—these schemes in Renaissance drama will be viewed as 
the concrete of epistemology proposed by Kant and practiced by modern theorists. The notion 
under scrutiny is the rejection of individuality in spatial philosophy, which results in the 
reducibility of the individual identity into a function of social space, rather than an identity as it 
is in itself, what Kant calls the unknowable “noumenal ego.” Echoing this notion, Deleuze & 
Guattari begin their seminal work, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, with the 
assertion that “it is no longer of any importance whether one says I” (3). According to this new 
field, the segmented effects of exterior influence coalesce into what the ancients called “the 
individual ‘I’” living in what only fools would call the “real world.” The removal of individual 
volition in the perception of space is a systematic repurposing of the human consciousness as a 
function of a flow, of transcendent “spontaneous” emotion. Deleuze & Guattari and their 
contemporaries would have authors conscious before they ever existed, affected by the 
simulations of experiences which draw together their systemic pronouncements, but never with a 
choice in their own consciousness. They become shadows or, as will become relevant later, 
mirror reflections of minds. 
This study takes the collectivist epistemology of Kant and Lefebvre, especially as it is 
spatialized by Deleuze & Guattari, as a through-line which can link sources traced back to the 
Early Modern stage. This meeting of minds results in a new corpus which utilizes the Early 
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Modern concretization of contemporary spatiality as the perfect dynamic of interaction and 
exchange, as it in turn offers a new reading of Early Modern texts which takes into account their 
own spatiality. Though the Early Modern Period practiced reason in its science—observing 
concretes in the real world and making determinations from them—its literature was unable to 
validate inductive science. Instead, authors such as Burton, Moore, and Shakespeare let slip an 
epistemological error—they proactively empowered Kant by placing the means of consciousness 
summarily at the mercy of its content. Their philosophies form maps with referents dissociated 
from stable reality, with shifts in viewing trajectories that place primacy on perception rather 
than on material.  
The result of their cartography is a human body which exists after its thoughts, a space 
which is like Kant’s a construct of the human imagination. Like the Early Modern authors 
discussed, Kant acknowledges the world humans perceive as real but imposes a system of 
consciousness—a collective epistemology—which imposes its design on how individuals 
perceive the world which is composed of, according to him, not real things but things as they are 
(perceived). He proclaims men blind by the nature of their sight, a notion which Shakespeare’s 
plays make all the more concrete. Through the shift in representation which Early Modern drama 
here represents that proclamation will be examined in the chapters individually. First, this 
introduction seeks a revised cartography, re-evaluated as a selective re-creation of objective 
reality, in which an author’s observation becomes possible. In other words: art as a re-
presentation of an author’s fundamental ideals by his normative judgments of his existence. This 
definition of cartography requires an understanding: cognitive function is a choice only because 
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existence is not.  This recognizes the author’s volition to be cognitive, while denying the Kantian 
idea that this is all he, and thus his world, can be.
1
  
The author’s ability to produce works which represent his own judgment cannot be 
separated from his ability to perform observations in reality. Without this faculty, what would 
literally be the material in his concepts? If the mind really were as Kant suggests subordinate, 
even non-existent, compared to its thoughts, how would it think? Could a computer perform data 
analysis without being built? Could a man digest food without eating it first? Cartographic 
theory—much, in fact, in modern literary analysis—fabricates non-selectivity in knowledge 
generation, a mental process which simply “works” without the context of a reality to provide it 
stable referents or precepts that could be judged by cognition. A reflection without a face, a map 
without a world—Kant made literature nothing more when he stated that “space is subjective and 
ideal …”  
Therefore the first question is: how does spatiality, or this study of the philosophy of 
spaces, relate to cartography? 
Modern imaging techniques make cartography a representational duplicate of the world. 
To David Spurr however, and to the philosophers of the Early Modern Period, cartography is a 
presentation merely of a possible reality—cartographers identify a territory, “systematically … 
qualifying and spatializing” (qtd in Griffiths 96) the landscape as a body in infinite detail, 
complete with marks, features, parts, colors, and textures, to present a literary simulation of the 
world they perceive. They do not, however, perceive the world as containing values, but the 
reverse—they see their values as containing reality. Spurr’s cartographer identifies geography 
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 Of Kant in his simply titled, Kant, William Wallace stated that “he had treated man as an exclusively 
cognitive being” (190). 
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not as real but as a simulation of his beliefs, dislocating it from its nature and relocating it as the 
image of his art. Deleuze & Guatarri describe this as territorialization. Through this process, all 
viewers become cartographers of their own space, as it defines geography not as a representation 
of reality by an irreducible consciousness, but as a simulation of affects generated by the 
collective delusion of consciousness. With its two parts—de- and re-territorialization—the 
theory identifies strident or demarcated space, removes it from its identifiable fixtures, and 
generates new “social space,” as Lefebvre stated. Space, as we understand it, becomes 
synonymous with its enclosures; identity becomes the disqualifying element of consciousness. 
Meaning, to this line of thought, is not referential as much as inferential, not signaling a 
subject in the world, but creating one out of thought. Thus for these philosophers of the 
simulated globe, territories conform to maps and maps conform to values. Values themselves are 
said to just happen—it is to philosophy as what to science would be an experiment which placed 
primacy on results rather than observations. Spurr owes his concepts to the work of Christine 
Buci-Glucksmann, who viewed the map as a “form of perception of the real” (61), an image in 
conflict with its referent, a plurality of views clashing on the separate planes of the observer and 
observed. Glucksmann’s clash supports Spurr’s qualification that cartography only represents 
perception, and not the fundamental reality on which it is based. Rather than a selective re-
creation of reality, art becomes an autonomous reaction to a Platonist hyper-real, a projection of 
shadows.
2
 More exactly, the diffusion of any reality to be surveyed places the weight of 
existence on the consciousness to accept it as such, taking the floating idea of data analysis and 
demanding that the idea itself construct a computer. This primacy of consciousness over 
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existence, of essence over substance, forces cartographers to move in-between “customary 
paths,” simultaneously making and being made by territory (Deleuze & Guattari 380). In other 
words, the man which accepts the Glucksmann/ Spurr map projects his reality as a product of his 
cognition—he lets the society make the man. 
Glucksmann spins the cartographer on the praxis of perpetually becoming and un-
becoming territory. Being as such becomes liminal, the cartographer’s view, transcendent—“a 
place that has left the Earth” (Deleuze & Guattari 510). From there, territory may be observed 
and reduced to a presentable cartographic emblem, a demarcated space brought to order through 
art. Meaning, however, loses its reference and thus its value. Glucksmann’s cartographer 
presents a paradox: the Icarian observer must be present and un-locatable, separate and engaged, 
in a “plural view of distance and of nearness” (1) which becomes, as Spurr relates, the complete 
concept of the “cartographic eye” (qtd in Griffiths 96).  Rather than re-create concepts of reality, 
through a paradoxical lens Glucksmann settles into an eccentric center which denies them, a 
deconstructive horizon of expectation and liminality which refracts perception across the plane 
of art. This denies art the ability to reflect perception. The result is an irreducible plural, an 
amalgam of subjectivity which according to Lefebvre’s philosophy creates social spaces out of a 
collective mind. 
As such, Glucksmann and Spurr present the individual not as an observing agent, but as 
an essence simultaneously producing and being produced by his own gaze. The act of creation 
enshrines space to present a form of some sense of some real produced by the perception of it. 
The Icarian gaze defined by Glucksmann treats the individual’s form as a response to its space, a 
reflection of its pilgrimage through a collective mind, and in that vacuum perceptually inert. A 
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perceptual zero, such as the world becomes under this philosophy, declares to create individuals 
out of light and shadow without a perceivable form, like a sunspot off its collective eye. Under 
Glucksmann and Spurr, existence itself becomes vicarious, an individual which paradoxically 
takes for its precept the whims of collectives, of “social spaces.” This is the very definition of an 
“omniperspective” (Nechvetal 198) — an ability to create all by seeing all, yet being nowhere 
and possessing no mind. Therefore the “all” transcribed by this method can only be seen because 
it exists only in the mind. The final result of the collectivist space which Lefebvre took from 
Kant: the mind becomes its own God.  
 Making reality a collective phenomenon gives philosophical primacy to simulation, 
eschewing substance with essence and the individual with the imperial enclosure. Existence no 
longer exists, subjectified while simultaneously placed as an identified body-scape, always 
shifting, controlling, and striding. The cartographer becomes an appendage of his own 
observation, a relative mirror form in the Icarian regime of surveillance, a second-hand replay of 
the imperial space in which he is enclosed. Reaffirming the author as a re-creator rather than 
creator of reality, such a reality—external, objective, observable—becomes possible to observe 
and approachable in art. As Averroes made clear: “being … is that which signifies the essence of 
a thing” (14) (emphasis added). The reverse, namely, that essence signifies the substance of 
being, assigns primacy to consciousness. This primacy—the power to reterritorialize—unbinds 
space from its material, which in turn absolves symbols of their referents, and the map of any 




To reject the ability of signifiers to represent their referent rejects the essence of 
signification, and thereby the ability of texts to signify essence by observing substance—the 
basic premise of art. From Aristotle: “being is predicated absolutely and primarily of substances” 
(15). This is taken as the true cartographic precept to replace Kant’s critique, which makes the 
specific means of man’s consciousness the disqualifying element of his knowledge, or, that 
reality is made fake by perception. Using Aristotle, time and space become necessary pre-
requisites to the existence of conscious beings as substance primarily, and secondarily as 
essence. Cognition is a choice; existence is not. 
Out of context, Sartre’s statement succinctly describes this amendment: “existence 
precedes essence” (22) identifies, at least in rhetoric, the primacy of objective reality over sense-
perception. With the reinstatement of reality external to the perception of individuals or regimes, 
a primacy of existence over consciousness, the author may be re-established in real space, thus 
re-enfranchised in the motive re-creation or idealization of it in his (cartographic) art. The Early 
Modern text will be viewed as a battleground for this philosophy, as it first promoted the 
characterization of epistemology by the dissection of the human body as a territory—the seed of 
cartographic literature. Cartography will be viewed simultaneously as an approach and a distance 
from reality, meaning that idealization requires observation. It will not take space itself as 
subject to the whims of ideals, however. Therefore, what is the role of literature vis-a-vis reality? 
It is precisely: to re-create reality, exactly as Aristotle relates, as it ought to be, and not to create, 
as Lefebvre implied, a space which is inevitable or always-already made or strident by the 
demarcation of it in itself. The premise that an author can respond to his observations in the 
world, and make concrete his judgments on them through art, in this case as a map, illuminates a 
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central premise of scientific induction in Renaissance science—that observations in reality can 
yield conceptual fundamentals. 
The examination of cartographic identity, ergo, the role of the author vis-à-vis his work, 
will serve to explicate the body in/ of text—through Robert Burton’s dissection of the individual 
flesh in An Anatomy of Melancholy, Thomas More’s dissection of society in Utopia, 
Shakespeare’s tragic dichotomies and conflicts of representation in Hamlet, King Lear, and 
Macbeth, the Early Modern Period shows its tendency to disrupt the paradigms of representation 
and portray the individual as a flawed, doomed, tragic being in a perceptual malaise. Finally, 
however, John Milton’s historiographic acquisition, or the desire to be first on his new map of 
Christian history in On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity and his affirmation of authorial identity 
in Paradise Lost: Book III and Samson Agonistes, will be used as an approach to the philosophy 
thus far described. Utilizing the spatial theory presented by Lefebvre, Tally, Deleuze & Guattari, 
Buci-Glucksmann, and Bloch, the metaphysics of cartography will be re-examined to revitalize 
the author in a newly objectified reality as described. 
In the first chapter, Robert Burton’s corpus will be explicated as primarily cartographic in 
focusing on the dissection or mapping of the individual body, as a social body. For Robert 
Burton maps the “disease” of man’s folly in his seminal work, An Anatomy of Melancholy, by 
first considering man’s life on Earth as an object of observation, and then professing his own 
ability to observe it. This places him with an aerial view complete enough to dissect 
melancholy—its attributes, aims, symptoms—and prescribe it as the source of man’s woe.  The 
focus is this aerial view, in Burton’s words, the “high place above you all” (1577) from which he 
surveys the world below. This is the place of observation, Deleuze & Guattari’s “above the 
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Earth,” and Buci-Glucksmann’s Icarian gaze. This situates Burton’s view as one which is 
generative by his beliefs, rather than re-presentative by his observations. 
Burton transgresses the limits of an anatomy to offer more than a mere dissection—he 
generates a holistic map from which the reader may be guided to his root of human woe. He 
transgresses even the traditional humoral nature of melancholy itself when from his high gaze he 
describes, not a fleeting bad humor or pitfall of the body, but a constant and irrepressible state 
which derives every misfortune, transgression, and disdain on Earth, the solution for which he 
gives only in the words “be not idle” (1574). From his height Burton may see, according to his 
own testament, what it means to be idle and not and judge for all mankind which is preferred—
this vision is his panorama of the globe, and his position, the Icarian gaze. In being observable, 
Burton identifies the territory as powerless. He thus invokes Deleuze & Guatarri’s concept of 
deterritorialization in diagnosing the observed cipher of human interaction with its ailment, and 
reterritorialization by mapping his prescription on its space. 
In considering the downward-glancing, or Icarian, perspective, Joseph Nechvatal 
described an “omniperspectivist ideal” (198) from which a whole worldview may be achieved 
from a distinct height, a place separate from reality. Burton stabilizes this view with his 
emblematization of the human body. Significantly, Burton includes himself in his prognosis, as 
he by his own relation admits to “walk abroad, look into the world, and could not choose but 
make some little observation” (4). From his obsession with the state of man on Earth and his 
tendency to so walk, Burton might have affirmed his power in, not over, reality. However, 
through his insistence on ubiquitous descriptions based on a moment’s observation he consigns 
man on Earth to madness, and his own observations to Kant’s subjective ideal. For even as he 
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describes his observation “privus privatus,” a “solitary life and [his] own domestic discontents” 
(3) (italics mine) he admits both his transcendence and his terrestriality—both, and therefore 
neither. His gaze is simultaneously fixed on Earth and dis-located high above it; despite the fact 
that he desires to lead readers, he proclaims that all leaders must be mad. 
He describes reality as a place as beyond material as his representation are from any 
possible referents, becoming as he describes, a “remote God on the other.”
3
 He believes in his 
own judgment—otherwise he would not prescribe treatment. Yet, his prescription being 
madness, he undermines his own volition on the side of Lefebvre’s (social) universe. Where the 
world is to Burton only a mirror on mad artists, his anatomization reveals his utter-sight, the state 
of things as he sees them, with no shred of will to project fundamental ideals into them, or 
display man as anything but one of Kant’s fools.  
In the second chapter, this paper will analyze another anatomization by Thomas More, 
focusing on his emblematization of human existence through shifted value representations in 
Utopia. The speaker, Hythloday, earns his name—the “speaker of nonsense”—by mapping the 
“Utopia” on the horizon of More’s expectations. His nonsense however is etymological: u-topos, 
“no place,” is not locatable as such. This is conscious, as Marin argues, Utopia is “there, but 
without place … In brief it is a Utopia, at once present and absent, a present which is the ‘other’ 
of space” (Marin). Why name the river Anydrus (“No-water”), or the prince Ademus (“No-
people”)? Why set the island in space but not place? As Marin insists, the key is acknowledging 
that the space in which Utopia inhabits is the textual space, and the island does not exist 
                                                 
3






 In other words, it does not refer to reality—by design, it 
linguistically debases it. 
Therefore, More re-asserts Lefebvre’s social space and the possibility of reforming or 
reterritorializing value representation itself through his map-making. As Blanchot argues for 
surrealist wordplay, such as that present in More’s corpus, he describes “A space which is 
always only the approach to another space … without transcendence as it is without 
immanence.”
5
 More’s corpus believes in divinity neither here nor there, on Earth or heaven. Yet 
he assigns divinity all the power of representation in art, for in the absence of divinity, More robs 
stable reality of its referential power by re-forming symbolic constructs to mean their opposites. 
For More, without God nothing means anything.  Blanchot treats More’s work as a transit station 
between moral poles, neither one nor the other, what Marin calls “le neuter.” As such, More does 
not profess to describe anything seen or seeable, nothing which could be judged objectively by 
an author on Earth. Instead his words possess a “kinship with the fictional and the interrogative, 
but not with the imaginary, the doubtful or the possible” (20-21). The speaker in Utopia affirms 
this with his own musing of this “Utopia that I rather wish, than hope, to see” (183). More 
imposes beliefs without accepting the possibility of their realization—his paradox is Kant’s, as 
he strips symbols of their referential skins to reveal subjective ideals, the conflict between which 
he makes into a society, so-called. 
Thus Utopian texts make space within discourse which discourse itself cannot examine or 
receive. They create supplemental appendages of examination in which truth and falsity are 
equivalents in their maintained contradiction—the place of water called so for having none. With 
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 See Marin, 72; cf. Hill, 173. 
5
 See Hill, The Place of the Future; cf. Blanchot, 600, 605, 618. 
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these texts, Glucksmann’s Icarian disturbs absolute referents and examines their plural clash; 
from this place, Burton conducts his dissection. Maintaining this contradiction comes at a cost—
as the conscious mind requires an objective reality of which to be consciously aware of, without 
stable referents not consciousness, therefore no art, is possible. Thomas More’s society, whether 
by parody or purpose, denies that reality by deeming a civilized no-place as the solution to social 
problems, a non-symbol as the resolution of all symbols. His cartography becomes benign, 
merely an “other” of meaning—or, no-meaning. 
More championed reason, but in much the same way that Kant supposed to champion 
reality: by making of it all that men in their weakness are capable of perceiving, reserving the 
true reality or the perfect reason for a transcendental plane in Kant’s case, and in the case of 
More, the no-place of utopia. His Utopia re-assigns primacy in value judgments to perception, 
rather than existence. He stabilizes his worldview through emblems, the perception of which 
changes their material effect, through his vision of money, marriage, land, and war. Such 
symbols are to Bloch those which “have for content precisely a possibility realized only in 
themselves by way of intimation.”
6
 More does not associate objective content with his symbols, 
transplanting his own beliefs onto age-old emblems, re-territorialized by Deleuze & Guattari’s 
specifications into his own beliefs. Such symbols veil their representation and thus render 
themselves meaningless—More’s territory becomes steeped in ultimate, non-manifestable 
meaning, a “moral-metaphysical incognito” (Bloch 172). More’s Earth thereby becomes an 
unfound, ever-forming cipher, the result of which is an ultimately mystagogic pronouncement: 
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 Qtd. in Hill; cf. Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, I, 275-77.  
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the defacement of realty/ reality into “unlimited contradiction” (Marin 21), centered on the “no-
place” of Utopia. 
What is the place of the individual in this contradiction? From distanced, dis-placed 
observation Hegel consigns the individual to “a nullity and [an] entit[y] to be sacrificed.”
7
 The 
“propelling negations” (Hill) of the deconstructed Utopian text enforce Glucksmann’s plurality 
of views, the de-constitution of the identity in space by the consequent creation of the space 
which supposedly intimates its form. Under Hegel, the collectivity of such space becomes 
clear—when reality is subjective, the individual, no longer with any material to observe, 
becomes an entity sacrificed in equal proportion to the extent to which he acknowledges his 
individuality. Therefore the result, if not the goal, of Kant’s cartography is to raise collective 
perception on a moral pedestal, denying the individual the power to testify on a material reality 
which Kant proclaims does not exist beyond his consciousness; what really exists, the “true 
reality,” is for Kant beyond men’s grasp (hence the plea to replace “knowledge” with “faith”). 
For More and Burton, supporting this view transforms their texts into figurative mirrors, a 
subject which will be handled more literally in the chapter on Shakespeare. They purport to 
create themselves through text, by invoking a common place of text creation Marin asserts “out 
of which emerges the hero who constitutes himself as Temple by his discourse” (qtd in Hill 
169).
8
 The Early Modern author becomes a shadow of his own sight. Thus the end of this 
cartography is an author’s reflective passion, with a simultaneous intellectual denial of anything 
real that could be reflected. This leads to the final goal—the individual’s ultimate destruction. 
                                                 
7
See Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, Part III: The Philosophy of Spirit, iii: Absolute Spirit, 
1817, 554. 
8
 See John 2:21 for reference, i.e., “… the temple of his body.” 
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 The primacy of collective perception over material, of consciousness over existence, 
supplants the transcendental in God with the temple of the mind as the generative force. The 
author becomes, in Bloch’s words, one who “can not itself take over the portfolio of production, 
of artistic responsibility, of prescriptive supervision for the experiential world” (Bloch 175). This 
renders the Early Modern text as an enactment of cartography contra reality—one may follow 
the Icarian gaze, seeking ever downward, to the site of the author’s judgments, but with Kant and 
his disciples at the helm that site is only a man bound to his own cognition to create the world in 
which his ideas make sense. Thus torn between his desires and actions, his body and mind, the 
man in the Early Modern map, next evidenced by Shakespeare in Hamlet, King Lear, and 
Macbeth, amounts to little more than a collective dream of his audience. 
Shakespeare attends to the world while displacing his gaze away from it, actuating the 
stage as the location of value determination. In other words, by shifting the vanishing point of the 
play (as an image) into the audience itself, Shakespeare uses the stage as a platform to 
reterritorialize visual representative meaning onto a kind of uber-real made of his on-stage 
reflections. He does so, as Valerie Traub describes in “The Nature of Norms in Early Modern 
England: Anatomy, Cartography, King Lear,” to follow the lead of Renaissance anatomy and 
collapse the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology. Most evident in King Lear, 
Shakespeare utilizes anatomy to “express the hope, not only that bodies and behaviors ultimately 
will be rendered intelligible by reference to a nature ordained by the gods, but that previously 
unknown truths of human nature might be revealed by the empirical procedures of human 
dissection” (Traub 42). Shakespeare’s identification and tragification of the individual occurs 
through a visual shift, evident in Hamlet through “The Mousetrap,” the play within the play, and 
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in King Lear by the graphic revelation on the cliffs of Dover. The result is a caricature of the 
individual spirit which consigns all men to the natures Shakespeare observes and as they are seen 
by his audience, into a space which is like to Kant’s, “subjective and ideal.”  
Shakespeare evidences what Jonathan Sawday calls the “culture of dissection” (qtd in 
Traub 43) through a consciously cartographic response to historiography, land ownership etc. in 
King Lear, e.g., “Give me the map there” (1.1.35). In substantiating the Icarian’s view—as such 
a view attests to perceive the human body in a state “beyond representation”—readings of 
Shakespeare deal with the individual in ever-moving states of becoming and unbecoming, a body 
with what Deleuze & Guattari’s called “nomadic essences” (510). Shakespeare’s characters 
become emotional emblems which the stage view contextualizes into the forms of reality, but 
which then re-focuses on the view of them as all that is real. His discourse views reality as a 
formless reflection of the mind beyond representation, in which man has only a will over his 
response, and not his fundamental beliefs. For instance, Lear says, “I have full cause of weeping, 
but this heart/ Shall break into a hundred thousand flaws,/ Or ere I’ll weep” (2:4:281-283). He 
resists the philosophy of mandatory individual sacrifice (Hegel’s), but acknowledges that 
philosophy as the primary force in his existence, even if he resists it. He fears his own “terrors of 
the Earth” (2:4:292) and emblematizes his grief as downward-glancing tears, which reign from a 
point on high—in keeping with his cartographic tendency, Lear’s crying becomes the act of an 
Icarian, thus, a cartographic act. This seeming omnipotence grants him the power to observe his 
own actions, but not to alter them to suit his true desires, as he implodes with the contradiction 
between his eye’s sights and the missteps of his worldly hands.  
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Such is Shakespeare’s view of all men, a prescription which amounts to a single 
conclusion in each work: misery, contradiction, and failure. Lear can stop himself from crying, 
but he cannot save his eyes from the inevitable shift in representation which makes them useless. 
Blindness in Shakespeare becomes evidence for the reterritorialization of representative 
meaning, where graphic events are used to place the audience’s view of the play with primacy 
over the author’s intention. This becomes the dramatic abstract to Shakespeare’s contradictive 
individual. As for Macbeth, his observations grant him only contradictive actions, as his hands 
and eyes conjoin over the “masterpiece” of their chaos. Through Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind 
and Goldberg’s article, “Dover Cliff and the Conditions of Representations: King Lear 4:6 in 
Perspective,” this chapter will examine the placement of the audience through the loss of sight/ 
site and the reduction of the individual into a state as beyond consistency as without reality.  
In the final chapter, John Milton’s corpus announces the final phase of Early Modern 
(cartographic) literature: to identify, stratify, and “justify” the ways of God to man, as an 
individual on Earth capable of judgment. Whereas Burton and More “notate the orders of the 
world spirit, transform[ing] and translat[ing] reason into nothing but mandates from on high, 
with a certain trump” (Bloch 181) Shakespeare introduces a world-centricity. It would announce 
objective reality except for its insistence on failure and contradiction as the only result of living 
in it. Milton’s corpus establishes the efficacy of the author to re-present his fundamental values 
through cartographic texts, working from the assumption that no contradictions are possible in 
reality. Indeed, Milton reconstructs the history of Christian doctrine with his own metaphysics, 
as evidenced in On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity, as he runs to prevent the “star-led wizards” 
with his “humble ode” (ln. 23-24). This early work first evinces the indomitable authorial 
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identity which separates John Milton’s volition from the self-pity and resignation of his 
contemporaries. 
Thus inserting himself, not only into his work but into religious history, Milton’s Nativity 
Ode prescribes his poetic-prophetic voice—he “runs” to “have the honor first, thy lord to greet” 
(ln. 26), beating not only his contemporaries to the literary quick, but also the span of history 
which he asserts treated the child-king unjustly. Milton communes with the Christian doctrine by 
closing a distance not in time but in space, as though it were a physical journey to his 
enlightened prose which he must physically traverse over the literary space. Thus he invokes the 
essence of cartographic texts, “purging the scene” (Evans 16) of traditional witnesses to access 
the reader directly—Milton’s new map is viewed for the first time in reading, for the conscious 
direction of his moral judgments, though new. As Dante relates, “L'acqua ch'io prendo giammai 
non si corse.”
9
 This landscape appears as Milton’s own philosophy which concretizes his beliefs 
in an assertion their non-contradictive nature. 
Actualizing his identity within the stories he transcribes, Milton re-maps the space of 
Christian discourse. In his ode, he accomplishes this by laying an anachronistic bed for his Christ 
as when, “The babe lies yet in smiling infancy/ That on the bitter cross/ Must redeem our loss” 
(151). The reduction of the nativity to the emblems of Christ’s life and death, validating not 
merely his birth but his entire existence as an observable, relatable whole, allows Milton to place 
himself at the center of the anachronism—the solution to the pagan inadequacy of the last 
centuries to present a gift worthy of the infant god. Indeed, pagan symbols—from the all-seeing 
Oracles to the mourning nymphs—gather round in Milton’s ode, constructing a non-linear 
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 See Paradiso, 2:7: “The sea I sail has never yet been passed.” 
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conflation of faiths emblematic of his own response to time, the better to purge the idols he 
desires gone and raise those he deems as scaffolding for his new vision. Milton conflates all 
these idols across time spatially, such as when Mount Sinai (Nativity Ode ln. 158) enters the 
nativity scene as the presence of holy declaration, in what might have been a humble beginning, 
now an announced plurality of judgment that reveals his cartographic identity. 
Yet if The Nativity Ode serves to assert/ insert Milton into his own body (of work), 
subtextual uses of the word “light” in Book III of Paradise Lost preface an even greater shift 
towards realizing his own volition. As a preface to his blindness, God in Paradise Lost presents 
an image heretical in its fleshiness, but Milton does so in order to dissect and justify the ways of 
such a being as God in such a place as Earth. Milton’s corpus acts as his own literary Eucharist, 
to affirm the reader’s faith in his re-vision on the premise that the learned cartographer reserves 
judgment on his work space, much as it did in his ode. 
At the final attenuation of his own blindness, where Milton might have descended into 
darkness, he instead rises into his authorial identity. However, the difference is that the shift does 
not come from the renunciation of value representation but its realization through the judgment 
of John Milton. Through Samson Agonistes, Milton reveals himself as a sensual conqueror—
though his contemporaries and modern critics would assign the predetermined despondency of 
the title character to Milton’s own autobiography, they are mistaken. Rather than leave purpose 
and meaning behind, Milton finds them through blindness. Despite the fact that his content is a 
corpus from faith, the means by which he discovers his purpose are objective, and inherently 
cartographic. He builds a map to his revelation out of his judgment, and to him even God 
becomes identifiable, reasonable, and real.  
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Thus, Early Modern literature will be examined in sections, namely, Burton on the body, 
More on society, Shakespeare on the representation, and Milton on the represented. Though 
Renaissance literature was mapped in the service of the divine, divine essence does not make 
cartography possible. Burton relates, “He who is everywhere is nowhere” (1577). To follow the 
opening remarks of this introduction, mapping cannot be accomplished from nowhere. Though 
Burton writes in the voice of someone who is everywhere he himself is not by his own 
admission, even if he aspires to be. In addition, More may dis-locate the site of his moral 
reckoning, but he may not dis-place himself from his own judgments—he must accede to them to 
put even one word on paper.  
Kant’s rationale to re-assign space and time as constructs, rather than as pre-requisites, of 
existence, denies the real referents to which judgments apply; Kant’s organic whole is traced 
through the dramatic concretes discussed wherein since the “real” world is only the “surface,” 
objectivity is impossible from the ground (hence, the need for the Icarian). More follows his 
reasoning, focusing on the Icarian as a metaphysical precept for the world it supposedly creates, 
and the cartographer which inhabits it as a nomad in the territory of his own mind. In art this 
appears as Bloch relates by echoing Deleuze & Guattari, as an “enchantment of construction all 
too remote from the self” (181). Thus these philosophies may be distant, but they intertwine 
around a desire for collectivity, in existence and in art. Shakespeare redirects the trajectory of our 
gaze from up-down to down-out, centered on his “terrors of the Earth” (2.4.305-9) as viewed by 
his audience—now the subject of a purely visual discourse. Collective interpretations by that 
audience become his representational and moral ideal—whatever he intends, the audience 
becomes the focal point of the visual devices, the representation of the blind man’s new site. I 
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conclude with John Milton’s corpus to contrast this ideal, and accentuate one Early Modern 
author’s belief in his own metaphysical autonomy, and thereby, to an extent discussed, of the 
objective reality which makes it possible. Milton experiences a validation of his consciousness; 
where Kant would have made of the seeing Milton a man blind due to his sight, Milton makes of 
his blindness a seeing man due to his existence. Milton places man in reality as a “lover … a 
founder of true liberty,”
10
 rather than a vessel for despair and stagnancy (Burton), a nomad 
directed by his territory (More), or a darksome moral deficit bound to tragedy (Shakespeare). 
As such, this analysis requires a constitutive and substantial precept—an existence which 
exists a priori to the perception of it. Only with this addendum to the study of cartographic gazes 
can Kant and Deleuze & Guattari be successfully compared to Early Modern cartography, both 
presented as opposition to that precept. For the author to be re-enfranchised in the normative 
valuation of his work, this argument places the cartographer in reality with the express ability, 
having accepted his consciousness in that reality, to effect normative value judgments on it and 
transcribe those judgments as selective re-creations of his perception. Towards this conclusion 
these works progress, culminating with Milton’s audacious and typological discourses, which of 
the evidence presented most clearly identify the application of objective cartography—namely, 
the re-structuring of the doctrine of literature in space through the judgmental cartographic 
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Unveiling Burton’s Corpus: The Anatomy of Melancholy and Mapping Reality 
 
In the scheme of art, maps occupy the same position as a doctor’s charts in the scheme of 
his diagnosis—while not themselves knowledge, they manifest the space in which knowledge 
may be found (or cures administered). In the Early Modern Period, maps were neither 
scientifically nor geographically precise, but rather “Curious artifacts that resemble[d] works of 
art more than they d[id] the mathematically precise productions of our time” (Chappele 99). If 
limited in usefulness as scientific presentations of territories, if as Blundeville stated 
cartographers “Knowe not with what manner of lines they [maps] are traced, nor what those lines 
do signifie, nor yet the true use of Mappes in deed,”
11
 what did maps represent? 
As artistic re-presentations, maps suggest the moral demeanor of their age manifested by 
the demeanor of the viewer. Platina writes that Charles the Great delighted in dominating the 
world by viewing it holistically from the maps in his study (Burton 2:86-87). Immediately then, 
map-viewing becomes an Icarian pastime—one in which the whole territory may be viewed from 
a single vanishing point high above it. The Early Modern map then, including literary maps, is a 
semblance of reality over which the viewer perceives to have power. Not so differently, Robert 
Burton in his seminal work An Anatomy of Melancholy (1660) reveled in being of the world, yet 
seldom visiting it. Rather, through a mosaic of astronomical, geographical, and historical images 
and pedagogies Burton transcribes the world in essence with a geographical stance, employing 
the map not for any cartographic end as we understand it but for his own metaphysical end, not 
despite the fact he felt above the world but because of it. E. Patricia Vicari stated that 
“Geographical learning—indeed, any knowledge of the natural world—is not pursued for its own 
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sake but for its usefulness in curing melancholy” (31). Therefore, Burton’s map does not profess 
to mark territories scientifically, but metaphysically. He maps with the eye of a physician, ready 
not to discover but to mark territories in preparation for his cure.  
However, the space Robert Burton observes is not real, any more than are the emotions 
he observes controlling it. Madness is his ultimate diagnosis, madness in all learning and from all 
leaders, in all lies and all truths. The power he exerts over his observed world becomes direct and 
generative with this prescription—while he calls it a dissection, it is like Kant’s a study of things 
as they are perceived, not things as they are extant. As both the ailment and the cure, his 
observation acquires a professed power to generate matter in the observance, such power which 
he acquires proactively from Deleuze & Guattari’s theory of de/ reterritorialization. This theory 
presumes that the object—“world”—is relational, as “a new type of unity triumphs in the 
subject” (6). By the proposed unity of perception, Burton is able to simultaneously identify and 
transcribe his ailment/ cure, observing the entire world at once in the confines of his maps, but 
re-articulating that world as an imprint of his own mind. Burton’s observation and socialization 
of melancholy will be explored first in the context of his own work with definitional context 
from Drew Daniels’ The Melancholy Assemblage, examining why Burton chose cartography as 
his point of departure and what “melancholy” actually means.  Deleuze & Guattari will offer 
insight into what he actually achieves, with their theories of territorialization from A Thousand 
Plateaus offering definitional context for this chapter’s conclusion—that Burton as an individual 
cannot exist under the epistemological pressure of his own prognosis. 
The view which Burton takes to do so will be the next point of discussion. The assertion/ 
insertion of the melancholy which he observes will take place from Sawday’s work, The Body 
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Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture. It offers an effective 
explication of the literary tools, the knife and mirror, with which Burton first dissects and then 
reflects his social melancholy, identifying it as matter of sorts in the social bodily system and 
giving it a context in the human spirit. Thus, it becomes necessary to draw out the perceptions of 
the social pseudo-reality which make much of Burton’s anatomy seem material, and which yet 
reject that material in equating it, or professing to generate it, with observation itself. This will 
occur through a proactive comparison between the elements of cartographic idealization in 
Burton with Deleuze & Guattari’s theory of territorialization and Kant’s views on space.  
However potent, Burton’s text cannot create reality scientifically or artistically, as the 
prevalence of illusions of the first have given way in recent theory, such as that offered by 
Deleuze & Guattari’s echo of Kant, to a pronouncement of the second. Composite in the 
argument for re-presentative (rather than generative) art will be a declaration of the reality to 
which it refers, not in multiplicity but objectivity. Objectivity may be more accurately termed 
externality, as much in art as in the senses, a reality which exists beyond and without the human 
capacity to perceive it. By examining Burton’s perceived role in his corpus, we find a madman 
proclaiming himself the sanest of all men by virtue of knowing his own madness. When he maps, 
he thus makes of his mad world a subjective product of consciousness, a “multiple … made” 
(Deleuze & Guattari 6). For him, the most learned are the maddest—no possibility for sanity 
exists in his presentation of the world. Contrarily, should he believe in reality a priori his own 
viewing, he could not exclude all possibility for sanity. He must for the sake of his prognosis’ 
ubiquity proclaim the construct of his reality mad in itself—therefore, a product of his own mind 
and the minds of the fools who inhabit it. Art by design is a product of the known. Space is not. 
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This chapter will approach Burton’s corpus as a territorial examination of art which implodes on 
itself by its series of paradoxes which proclaims all truths lies, all cures ailments, and all re-
presentations “realities.” 
Spatial Desire: Burton’s Proclivity to Map 
  
The first examination concerns Burton’s motivation for map-making, in other words, 
what characteristics of cartography would promote such a highly philosophical venture. 
According to Skelton, Burton was from an early age “Drawne by a natural love of Pictures and 
Mappes, Prospective and Chorographical delights.”
12
 Geographic discoveries afforded him a 
“fruitful ground for exploration” (Chappele 2) which would seem to preface the demeanor of his 
age. Yet contrary to the hopeful, potential-laden tone of his contemporaries, Burton assumed a 
conservative stance in his geography, mapping ailments rather than goals, emotions rather than 
territories. Maps were not to Burton the revelatory ciphers opening worlds of discovery and 
revelation, but sign-posts to his own melancholic beliefs and the tradition of the interior of his 
mind, which he ruthlessly set about the task of curing the world of its ailment without the 
distraction of actually participating in it. 
Burton never sought out sites or experiences in the world, never considering these 
incumbents to his declarations. As Vicari states, Burton considered “The study of geography and 
even travel as vain cureuisity and weariness of the flesh” (41). Burton himself verified this view 
with his pronouncement that the “World it selfe to some men is a prison” (2:173-174) and thus 
he “Never travelled but in Mappe or Card, in which my unconfined thoughts have freely 
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expatiated” (1:4). Importantly, Burton does not consider himself outside the prison, but only that 
his acknowledgment of humanity’s ubiquitous sentence permits him to become a self-appointed 
warden. The location of the prison then becomes clear and the same as the location of his 
territory—the hills and grooves of his own mind. 
He discounts the ancient philosophers with vehemence, pronouncing them not merely 
wrong by error but by nature, that those who teach wisdom must have it in least supply. He calls 
the observers and reasonable men of the past those “Veriest dizzards, harebrains, and most 
discontent” (714) of men, who in vain sought science through patience and patience through 
knowledge. These men—beginning with Aristotle—insisted on an observable reality which 
Burton rejects for a social network of madness. Rather than observing and thus knowing, Burton 
professes that by knowing his self as depraved he is the first qualified to observe on behalf of 
those who do not. This reversal begs how he may ask the reader’s trust as a guide, with his own 
generalized depravity as his only credentials. He considers himself the first sensible enough to 
see that the world has no sense at all, that “If thou shalt either conceive, or climbe to see, thou 
shalt soone perceive that all the world is mad” (1:24).  Burton’s assessment is based on a 
proposed reduction of reality into the pattern of his own expectation—for him, the sign (map) 
and signified (world) are sewn from the same tattered cloth, on which is the immutable image of 
melancholy. 
 It now becomes significant to describe melancholy itself in more detail. It persisted for 
the humoralists as a “black bile” with the suspicion of observability, though it was of course 
never actually observed, affected, afflicted, or removed. Drew Daniel recognized this in The 
Melancholy Assemblages, stating that 
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Humoralism projected the subject matter of melancholy as a received classical theory 
onto the physical surround of the material, substantial world of bodies and symptoms 
through ongoing assemblages of ascription, projection, and diagnostic ‘recognition’ 
(239). 
Recognizing that melancholy does not physically exist, Burton realizes Daniel’s assertion by 
arranging melancholy onto the physical world. For Burton, the physical world does not merely 
contain melancholy, however, but is made of it. As Daniel continues, “Melancholy names 
therefore a historically specific early modern epistemology effect within and upon what can 
show up affectively as matter” (239). As the title of the work suggests, Daniels postulated what I 
have already called a “social network of illness” and which he terms an “assemblage” of the 
melancholic concept projected onto social space, and thus turned “elemental” and Earthly (229), 
even observable in its social systems through “the diagnostic labors of others through 
solicitation, display, or self-disclosure” (239). Burton presents the melancholic assemblage 
through a “defining rhythm or grammar of presentation,” which “manifest[s] a melancholic form 
of negative authority” (230). The madness Burton proscribes is of his own making, born not of 
evidence but emotion. 
Burton approaches the world with neither a desire to love or experience it, as a physician 
does not desire to experience the ailing body in his charts and does not (indeed must not) love his 
patients. Rather, Burton seeks to define from afar the afflicting melancholy he presents in his 
system to illuminate the territory of the world and enact his cure. The process of identifying 
melancholy is for Burton as Derrida relates in Plato’s Pharmacy simultaneous and inseparable 
from the process of identifying its cure; he proclaims the learned academics mad with a work of 
literature that is mostly quotations and historiographic references. He not only seeks a cure, but 
first a disease.  
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While Burton names a cure (“be not idle”) he initiates the disease with his discourse. 
Melancholy, as Derrida stated, “This pharmakon, this ‘medicine,’ this philter, which acts as both 
remedy and poison, already introduces itself into the body of the discourse with all its 
ambivalence” (70). Burton speaks the thing into existence, the abstract into concrete. His words 
are intended to be as a world for his readers. “And if thou vouchsafe to read this Treatise,” he 
writes to the reader in his preface,  
it shall seeme no otherwise to thee, then the way to an ordinary Traveller, sometimes 
faire, sometimes foule; here champion, there inclosed; barren in one place, better soyle in 
another: by Woods, Groves, Hills, Dales, Plaines, etc. I shall lead thee. (1:18) 
By his assessment, the reader alone is equipped to see neither the disease nor the solution. 
Though he himself is malcontented, he observes maps to trace their source visually—for Burton, 
the map is a microcosm of folly for the social macrocosm of vain human beings presuming 
knowledge. An examination of Burton’s epistemology thus implodes his attack on erudition, as 
his entire discourse takes as its subject the microcosm of his own mind and the historical 
references of which it is composed. Any man who presumes sanity is the maddest of all, 
according to Burton. Thus he denies outright the concept of an observable reality—he does not 
leave his enclave, does not observe the world, for according to him knowledge and world are 
unobservable. Thus he views his version of reality from a view which is a paradox, at once of 





A Portrait of a View: Burton’s Icarus 
 
A curious map of speculative date and origin called traditionally the “foolscap map”
13
 
serves as a metaphorical example for Burton’s perception of madness. A jester whose face is 
supplanted with a wood-carved map of the world advises the viewer, as Cyprian advised Donat, 
that the seen world is to be “either laugh[ed] at, or pitt[ied]” (1:24). While certainly a testament 
to Burton’s aforementioned malcontented view of the world, it serves, for Burton as for the 
present work, as a premise for his geography. He utilizes his agency as a cartographer, as 
William Cunningham relates, for “the imitation, and description of the face, and picture of 
th’Earth.”
14
 The map is for Burton a microcosmic signifier above/ within which he may 
simultaneously observe and transpose his cure—a portrait based not on his observations but on 
his beliefs. 
Burton inserts the human body into the cipher of his map. He claims to be “sequestered 
from those tumults and troubles of the world … in some high place above you all” (42), yet 
“where” he is exactly becomes in Glucksmann’s words a “generalized trajectory” which only 
exists in relation to the social territory he creates below. Therefore, Burton becomes in Deleuze 
& Guattari’s term “deterritorialized” at the “loss of the being-there particular to the geographical 
here and now” (63). He surrenders the meaning of being Robert Burton, along with his power as 
a human being and artist to observe reality when he, in his words, “mount[s] aloft to those 
aethereall orbes and celestiall spheres” (2:33). He assumes the ideal cartographic eye as 
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 to transcribe his ailment on his reduction of mankind, or “to so descend to my former 
elements againe” (2:33). This descent completes Deleuze & Guattari’s viewing cycle, for Burton 
on prescribing his cure reshapes or reterritorializes the social assemblage in his own image. His 
gaze he describes himself as the view of a “long-winged Hawke” (2:33) by which the reader will 
be led, this view which is explicitly established for its height, not unlike the doctor’s oversight of 
an operating table. In considering the “detection and measurement of individual anatomical 
features” (Griffiths 96) Burton inlays the science of anatomy into the geographic arts, the 
melancholy into the matter. He accomplishes what Sawday referred to in The Body Emblazoned 
as a “confrontation between an abstract idea of knowledge, and the material reality of a corpse,” 
(3). Cartography becomes a physical task for him, as real as sculpting. He imagines his disease 
into material, and onto a body on which its signs, even post mortem, are observable and made by 
his gaze from above. Through his veil of malcontent, that signs Burton observes, linked as 
Daniels stated by the “scene of symptomatic presentation” (239), direct him to create and cure 
melancholy, to create and cure the world of itself. Burton thus responds to David Spurr’s concept 
of the body-as-landscape through his identification of the world as a body, and that body as the 
“seat” of melancholy (“of black choler to see”). 
 He makes melancholy a paradigm with a color and nature observable in the human form. 
While immaterial, the space around the effects of melancholy for Burton generates the disease 
into matter, exactly as he imagines the thoughts which surround his anatomy generate the body. 
Burton relates the shape of the man to his malady, his exterior appearance to his interior essence, 
observing, “As a fat body is more subject to diseases, so are rich men to absurdities and 
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fooleries, to many casualties and cross inconveniences” (241). He clearly cannot see melancholy 
itself, rather, observers its manifold presence through dissection. By thus qualifying the physical 
condition of the body through his stratification of the humors, Burton asserts the melancholic 
spirit as observable, material, dissectible.  
Burton sees the sum of men as a system, as a body itself. In describing his own 
experience he descends, as he frequently does, into historical anecdote:  
Charon in Lucian, as he wittily faignes, was conducted by Mercury to such a place, 
where he might see all the World at once, after hee had sufficiently viewed and looked 
about, Mercury would needs knowe of him what he had observed: He told him, that hee 
saw a vast multitude and a promiscuous, their habitations like Mole-hills, the men as 
Emmets, hee could discerne Citties like so many hives of Bees. (1:32) 
 
Through his observation of systems or assemblies of men, working to some productive purpose 
as throbbing organs or capillary nodes, he professes to transplant the madness of the world onto 
its components; to him the foolscap fits perfectly. “We are the begetters of [the world’s] 
inanities,” Shirley remarks, “and we are made mad by its follies. Epichthonius Cosmopolites
16
 is 
each one of us.”
17
 Having located his gaze and underscored his fool in the tone of his own 
pessimistic vision, Burton establishes himself as god of the world he makes. Then, he sets about 
the task of anatomizing the melancholic body, as revealing as it is equivalent to the task of 
mapping. The exact nature of dissection in Early Modern terms is not self-evident, nor 
inseparable from Burton’s study in his own time, and becomes our current subject. 
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Mapped Dissections: Burton’s Social Anatomy 
 
Brandishing his work with a medical term, Burton achieves a tone of precision and 
erudition. In the Early Modern Period, “anatomy” was not merely autopsy, nor was it as 
interpretive or distant as geography—it was an exploration and transcription of the bodily 
territory which, once mapped, could be examined and partitioned systematically by active 
investigative means.
18
 Burton’s obsession with maps stems from an understanding that map-
making is simultaneously a dissection which fits this description by the seemingly generative 
view which it affords him. He administers his means of observation as the tools of an anatomist: 
“the knife and mirror” to which Sawday refers in The Body Emblazoned when he states, “I will 
first address the knife, the probing or intraspective tool which the personification of Anatomia 
holds as a form of “reductive division” (Sawday 184). For Sawday, “To blazon a body is also to 
hack it into pieces, in order to flourish fragments of men and women as trophies” (ix). Burton 
invokes the Renaissance most clearly when his own trophies come on display. 
Yet for what ends does this fragmentation occur? As Sawday remarks, the Renaissance 
was “the culture of dissection” which attempted to break ancient taboos of the sanctity of the 
corpse by illuminating the “mystery” of the human body, breaking it up “in order to render 
powerless the structures within which the dissector’s knife is probing” (1). This removal and re-
insertion of power is central to Deleuzian territorialization, as deterritorialization could be 
renamed “dissection,” and reterritorialization, “anatomy.” Though once possessed of “unique 
organic integrity” (Sawday 3), bodies in Burton’s cartography in this way become partitioned 
and reassembled as his vision. Renaissance science would have him “reduce one body in order to 
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understand its morphology, and thus to preserve morphology at a later date, in other bodies, 
elsewhere” (2). Having denied reality its material however, Burton makes this general 
prescription on the metaphysical, not physical, whole—thus, his dissection does not afford him 
constants of knowledge, which he rejects, but ubiquitous madness. He removes material from its 
seat of power and re-inserts it into the view he has from his sequestration.  
Burton identifies the body as a landscape and, reversely, the land as a body. “Strabo,” he 
relates “in the 9
th
 Booke of his geography, compares Greece to the picture of a man” (1:24). 
Bakhtin expresses his map as “the concrete resemblance of man to the natural landscape” 
(355).
19
 He sees the world in terms of the fool’s cap, the head of the world, the disease of 
madness splayed onto a physical cipher. The map is as Burton’s child, and owing to certain 
characters in him is itself of a particular melancholic demeanor. His imagination, as Sawday 
asserts, is not merely investigative but “panoptic, telescopic, proto-scientific” (3) in an age which 
deigned to throw the veil off nature, devoted to the mystery of the human body as explorers 
conquering the dark centers of their maps. Locating the body fuels the endeavors of Renaissance 
science, while viewing it takes precedence in its art. 
Anatomy must be viewed as a discipline of its age, distinct from modern medical 
connotations. To that end Francis Glisson, Professor of Medicine at Cambridge University, 
offers insight in his 1654 publication which includes this definition: 
Anatome and Anatomia: the words signify as much a dissection. But being taken for an 
art and applied to a certain object, they signify an artificial dissection of that object in 
such manner as may most conduce to the perfect knowledge of the same and all its parts 
… The end of artificial dissection is not to mangle and cut the object it takes to hand 
rudely into shreds, but to gain perfect knowledge of the same and all its parts thereby.
20
 
                                                 
19
 cf. Chappele, 122. 
20




Glisson’s “artificial dissection” prefaces Burton’s geographical anatomy, for Burton searches 
above all else, in both senses—this “perfect knowledge” is clearly that to which Burton refers in 
his view and his transcription, his presence and his absence. His purpose evidences itself in his 
clinical preface when he relates a diorama, Hippocrates finding Democrates in his garden at 
Abdera where 
about him lay the carcasses of many several beasts, newly by him cut up and anatomized; 
not that he did contemn God’s creatures, as he told Hippocrates, but to find out the seat of 
this atra bilis, or melancholy, whence it proceeds, and how it was engendred in mens 




In order to prescribe a cure, Burton must possess this perfect knowledge—he achieves it by 
means of the knife, the autopsy itself. He meticulously divides the very structure of his text into 
parts, sections, members, subsections, as though glancing all at once at his work from on high, 
prior even to its conclusion. As a concluding note to this, or Burton’s motivation for achieving 
the state of the anatomist the better to make his cartography of the human condition, I will 
preface the conclusion of this chapter by turning briefly to Aristotle, the first anatomist, who 
stated that “The fittest mode, then, of treatment is to say a man has such and such parts, because 
the conception of a man includes their presence, and because they are necessary conditions of his 
existence, or at any rate of his perfection” (45). Wielding Anatomia’s knife, Burton finds not 
perfection in men but a perfect knowledge of madness.  He employs the means of geography, not 
to study the world and all that’s in it, but to make of the world his own end.  
Burton’s anatomization includes generalization—removing the territory from its seat of 
power to quantify the body holism. In fragmenting the body, Burton’s man becomes an emblem, 
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even a trophy, which he may remove and then relocate in the natural world with his metaphysical 
prognosis—this is the de/ reterritorialization which situates his whole territory of mankind. For 
as observed in A Thousand Plateaus, what is “deterritorialized in relation to the exterior 
necessarily reterritorializes on its interior” (Deleuze & Guattari 5). In other words, the human 
body, identified and quantified by Burton’s view, is dis-placed from its territory and presented by 
Burton as a transcription of its outer form on the cipher of its inner being. This is his conclusive 
prognosis, the spatialization of human folly through the identification of its interior cause by its 
exterior symptoms, or, his anatomy of melancholy. This is how he may invoke such disparate 
philosophers as Deleuze & Guattari and Kant—by asserting that the body is removed/ relocated 
by its social exterior, Burton creates an interior which can only know itself by reflecting this 
sociality, and a pseudo-real which is only around for the viewing beneath a higher “true reality” 
which can never be known. Though he begins as a prescriptive physician, he ends as a generative 
cartographer, who through the identification of melancholy deterritorializes the body through the 
cartographic gaze and presents it as a landscape plotted by melancholy, transcribed onto the 
reterritorialized cipher of the mapped corpse of his individual, whose material has been disbursed 
by his vision, whose mind has been sacrificed to his body. 
As de/ reterritorialization occur in tandem, Burton makes his anatomy a coming-into-
being. Structures breaking down occur simultaneously with new ones being built, as when 
Aristophanes describes Zeus’ creation and reprimand of the human body through the explication 
of man’s parts. He proclaims: “I will cut each of them in two … and [if] they will not keep quiet, 
I will bisect them again” (60).
22
 Dissection becomes a means of control, as Zeus commands the 
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body of his children, and as Lefebvre asserts of space. With each part acknowledged and 
controlled, the individual body becomes separated from itself, as Mieke Bal relates, “in order for 
the ‘other half’ of what will then be left to come into existence” (320), recalling again the 
“bisection,” the act of killing the mind for the visual elements of the body. Burton makes of the 
beyond-form body an opportunity for perfect knowledge, which when mapped may become a 
metaphysical cure for his ailment; he makes of a brain-dead man, an ideal. 
With the term “territorialization,” Deleuze & Guattari describe Burton’s process of 
dissection. A single view sees a territory as “defined by the outside,” taking it as an emblem to 
de-territorialize its significance. Deleuze & Guattari grant Burton great generative power to 
create a new territory based on his Icarian view. Accordingly, his view occurs from a “line of 
flight … according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities” (30). 
Therefore, for Deleuze & Guattari an author’s judgment is generative, even all that exists, as it 
de- and re-territorializes reality by its demeanor or whim. Thus, the philosophy which Burton 
proactively invokes to transcribe his cure on mankind’s holistic body makes of reality a 
semblance or form of some real which emanates from an author’s gaze by his own reflections of 
social space. In other words, Burton views the means by which mankind lives and proclaims this 
observation as his final end; his cure does not concern the fundamentals of existence on Earth, 
but the incidentals. Kant represents the intellectual ammunition both for Burton and for Deleuze 
& Guattari—by proclaiming reality to be a product of the minds within it, “subjective and ideal” 
(397), Kant grants efficacy to Burton’s cure. Burton uses the non-objective social assembly 
under his gaze to justify his illusion of territorialization, the cartographic power which he 
employs to repair man’s ailing body on the cipher of the world.  
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Thus, Burton emphasizes the material element of man as final, in order to blanket his 
prescription on humanity en masse. He avoids a fundamental truth of existence on Earth—that 
reality does not depend on man’s mind to exist.  He presents an image underscored by futility 
and depravity, a foolscap which Burton’s man believes himself into through a veil of madness. 
As such, Burton assesses the material of the body as the determinant of the form—where fat men 
may only be duplicitous, rich men only officious, a man in material only so in form. The 
bifurcation, then, occurs for Burton at the expense of the possibility of a wholly good man, for as 
his cure for melancholy is non-idleness, he believes that parts of the man must be amputated or 
certain practices refused in order to reach a final and passable material man. This generalization 
is how he may conflate ailment and cure, and propose to generate material through the viewing 
of metaphysics.  
Burton explicitly unwinds the work of ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, an example 
followed by German Romantics such as Kant and modern theorists such as Deleuze & Guattari. 
The result is art contra art, art without the real concretes by which observation may form rational 
judgments. Despite the scientific progress in the Early Modern Period, the semiology of its 
literary proponents denies reality through cartography. As Aristotle relates, “The examination of 
material elements and means is not regarded as final, but as preparatory to the conception of the 
total form” (50). In Aristotle, the material receives primacy over the formal, with matter 
composing the prerequisites of formal arrangements in art.
23
 From his absent observation, his 
distance from reality, Burton assesses the formal arrangement of the man as the determinant and 
thus the indicator of his material. The result in metaphysics is a man doomed to the madness of 
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believing that he can avoid the melancholic material of his “man-ness.” The result in morality is 
the necessity of immorality. The result in art is a symbol which has no referent. Burton himself is 
never distracted by his prognosis or asserting his own goodness, but merely offers as his 
credentials the distance of his view and his self-prognosis of madness. For Aristotle the man may 
acquire perfect knowledge to approach “perfection”—which for him was a matter of completion, 
of having nothing to add or take away (Tatarkiewicz 77).  Burton seeks knowledge only to know 
that perfection is impossible. 
In this way, Burton betrays the possibility of a man choosing his form: in Burton’s case 
the material of a man is antecedent to his form rather than invocative in it. He observes character 
in the body’s anatomy and not as it would have been for Aristotle: that the material of the man is 
antecedent to his disposition. From Burton’s precepts for map-making, the possibility of a 
desired form becomes the current subject. From the knife to the mirror in Anatomia’s other hand, 
Burton’s porous reality generated in the viewing prefaces the metaphysical result of Early 
Modern cartography—the destruction of the individual intellect. The first anatomist
24
 
acknowledged objective reality, an existence which exists. This knowledge makes art possible in 
the world—in order to determine the extent of the damage caused by Early Modern philosophy,  
I must isolate the specific and innate interiority of the human body, which Burton wields as the 
incision in his autopsy and the motivation in his geography, and which is abused into a 
prescription of madness, with his own pessimism in tow. 
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Enunciating Burton’s Individual: Dissection to Autopsy 
 
To glimpse one’s own interior anatomizes the features of one’s existence, making one’s 
body an observable concrete in reality. Such an event is rare—usually one must expect such 
knowledge to exist, rather than hope to see it. Early Modern anatomy views self-sight as an 
ultimate dissolution, as prior to viewing, the body had been represented only in mirror-forms of 
“representation and transformation” (Sawday). In other words, represented by depictions of the 
body, rather than the body of the individual—photographs of the body, a textbook drawing of the 
body, a gored visage of war. The notion that viewing the body disperses the identity of the 
viewer is a logical metaphysical assumption in Burton’s literature, where the body is not 
observable in reality, as I have related. Rather, for Burton reality is observable in the body. Thus, 
he approaches autopsy as a means to proactively prove Kant’s assertion that space emanates 
from the conscious mind. Burton would not, after all, be distracted by real sights in his 
prognosis, trading them for the conclusions formed in the space of his secluded mind, which 
maps the space that conforms to those conclusions. 
The nature of autopsy becomes a significant issue. Burton presumes to remove the body 
from its reality by viewing it, thus implying paradoxically that the signs equal the signed—he 
does this in his cartography, when he makes his map equal the world. To approach the body 
objectively is to acknowledge its reality. From the Oxford English Dictionary, the definition of 
autopsy reveals such an acknowledgement:  
AUTOPSY 1. Seeing with one’s own eyes (OED). 
The pre-modern era made the body’s interior abstract by building a platform of fear on a 
prerequisite blindness—one could not know the body’s interior, it preached, because one could 
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not be party to the sacred knowledge of divine creation. Not knowing the nature of the body’s 
functions hid, as an organ one does not know exists, that same body’s nature. Caroline Bynum 
regarded this fear in its multiplicity, citing the “stigmata … mystical lactations … catatonic 
pregnancies … miraculous inedia … visions of bleeding hosts,”
25
 which plagued the early 
observers of the human form and draped a veil of religious mystery over the body through the 
impossibility, even blasphemy, of its observation, to them as perverse as a desecration.  
Yet, fascinated with anatomy, Early Modern science assigned new rules to the study of 
bodily systems—at once performing an invasive corruption and an interior revelation through 
geography. Science thus unveiled the body’s physical nature. Its semiotic nature, however, 
remained unknown to its literary theorists. Burton emulates Sawday’s description of a surgeon, 
whom he said “seems to share the iconic status of the artist (or the visionary) within our culture, 
since both are held to be in possession of a privileged gaze which is able to pass beyond common 
experience, through surface structures, to encounter a ‘reserved core of reality’” (12). Burton’s 
Icarian gaze comes to the foreground in Sawday’s description as the means by which he 
synthesizes a new reality from the sum of his expectations, beliefs, and observations. As he 
theorizes that the body does not exist until it is viewed—by taking its physical and metaphysical 
nature solely as a measure of appearances and not essentials—such reality becomes a 
hierophantic interpretation of cultural geography, a patterning of images to which Burton applies 
rigorously his “stream of history” consciousness in The Anatomy of Melancholy.  
For Burton, such a reality occurs through an impossibility of sanity—he sees only the 
madness of others through his own. His analysis is less a study of man in the universe, and more 
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akin to Caroline Bynum’s theory of “body behavior,” for as discussed the physical form is for 
Burton productive of the body’s nature and not invocative of it—men do not appear as they are, 
but become into their mind’s appearance, melancholy becoming matter by the observance. 
Burton invokes his body’s being by observing it, where the tarnished mirror of his mind patterns 
material by virtue of its inescapable madness. When Deleuze & Guattari state that the body 
“becomes into itself,” or “reterritorialize[s] on the interior,” they invoke Burton’s reduction of 
that interior into the patchwork amalgam of its exterior. Burton’s cure is social because he, like 
the Lefebvre, views the world as social in itself. 
However, if the exterior is only the loosely-joined consciousness of everyone else in it, 
the true casualty in the territorialization of the mind is the mind. It has become an accepted 
premise of cartographic study that the map invokes the space of reality at the viewer’s discretion, 
with the individual in it a stick figure to be mapped at a social whim. Burton’s constructs amount 
to something less than consciousness by utilizing identity as its dissembling element, as 
knowledge is proclaimed the climax of madness (a concept which Kant would solve by a call to 
have faith). By identifying the world body which conditions itself to its own existence by a pre-
extant consciousness, Burton attempts to invalidate the possibility of knowledge. This is his 
prescription of madness. Therefore, to address the metaphysical result of Burton’s prose, I must 
analyze the conclusions on space implicit within it, conclusions which became the axioms of 
literary cartography guiding Kant to feed the post-modernists variations on his anti-
consciousness conscience. Burton’s age championed reason. What Burton himself dictates is a 
consciousness folded on itself, which deigns to perceive while remaining conscious of nothing. 
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What men may exist under this philosophy? The answer becomes clear, as this chapter comes to 
a close. 
Only Fools are Real: Burton’s Anatomy Lesson 
 
Reality is that which is external to the human mind, which is governed by natural laws 
independent of perception. What does it mean to accept such an axiom? It means to separate the 
consciousness from the world. It means distinguishing between existence and nothingness by 
making existence that which is extant, and nothingness that which is not. Burton blurs this line 
by denying observation in the world, by pronouncing knowledge madness, by proclaiming the 
world to be contingent on his whims. He makes of his corpus a sculpture which lacks the 
existence of clay, preparing for Kant to further it by degree and ask that such clay not only be 
lacking by nature, but fervently rejected by choice. With not only the impossibility but the 
irrelevance of the mind’s capacity to accept reality, Burton’s foolscap map tells him that the 
entire world is intransigently mad. “Be not idle” names his only cure, as if moving for 
movement’s sake is the best the body (or what he deems fit to call “body”) can do.  
Burton’s prescription depends on his contradictive interpretation of existence. To him, we 
exist in the world as a “scene of symptomatic presentation, in which a potentially melancholic 
body is made available for the diagnostic labors of others through solicitation, display, or self-
disclosure” (Daniels 230). This socialization of reality denies the body its existence—he makes 
of man’s consciousness a sculpture which refuses to believe in its clay. Burton would turn all 
men into a narcissus, or even worse—not merely men who cannot exist beyond their reflection, 
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but who did not exist before it either. He himself becomes a tour-guide in a court of reflections, a 
concept which will become literal in the Shakespeare chapter. 
If Burton professes to partake of the domestic, observe, and prescribe a cure, such a cure 
can only come at the acknowledgment of the body interacting with reality. If the body forms its 
own space, or “becomes itself” by viewing its own dissolution, Burton extends a contradiction 
into his metaphysics, proper for his conclusion that all men are mad. Yet as Aristotle observed, 
“If a house or other such final object is to be realized, it is necessary that such and such material 
shall exist” … it is for the sake of this final that ‘each prior thing is produced and exists’” (44). 
Therefore, consciousness is emergent in its flesh—for Burton to gather the precepts necessary to 
diagnose mankind, he must exist as an absolute in reality. Rather, his eyes fix proactively on 
Kant. In being unable to accept the possibility of sanity in the world, or indeed, the space of the 
world itself, Burton ascribes to a space which is only as real as his observation permits, and of a 
nature which hitchhikes on his own disposition. For Kant, 
Space is not objective and real, nor is it a substance, nor an accident, nor a relation; it is 
rather, subjective and ideal; it issues from the mind in accordance with a stable law as a 
scheme as it were, for co-ordinating everything sensed externally (397) 
 
Similarly, Burton construes his space on the emotional subscript of his cartography. He brings 
his own reality to order on imagistic categorizations which he dissects and organizes in 
accordance with his own pessimism into an “organic whole” (Kant 29) which like Lefebvre’s 
social space praises the dissembling of separate identities by a great consummation from an 
obliterating, transcendent, other real. Such a bringing to order connects him to Deleuze & 
Guattari’s territorialization, as he asserts his spirit as a viewing device with which he may re-
transcribe the world with his expectations. His world in turn becomes an image of his own self—
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with his knife, he reveals his mirror. By taking the reality out of reference, he reduplicates his 
own body as a foreign element, to echo Hegel. He becomes at once in and beyond his own self—
a madman.  
 Asserting the self’s distance from itself—thus destroying it—takes Burton’s prognosis to 
its conclusion. His means of procuring this conclusion—namely, by attributing reality to his own 
consciousness—cannot be separated from its ends, any more than the means of sculpting can be 
separated from theirs. Therefore, Burton’s cartography results in the dis-individuation of the self, 
which Kant in turn revels in with his own subjective ideals, and which found Deleuze & 
Guattari’s structures of meaning and re-meaning. The degree that one accepts Burton’s 
conclusions equals precisely the degree to which one ceases being “one,” and becomes an 
assembly of social gazes in a cognitive desert. Likewise, rejecting Burton’s so-called innate 
foreignness of one’s own body re-enfranchises the author in his own judgment, and re-enlivens 
the text as an indicator of real values in reality, by re-asserting that reality as stable, objective, 
and real. Burton invokes Sawday’s principle that “we can only explore others in the hope (or the 
fear) that this other might also be us” (8), for he assigns primacy to his own view in discovering 
the nature of his own mind and the space in which it thinks. He makes of man’s spirit a result of 
his appearance, as he relates that a rich man is more subject to fraud—he could not conceive the 
reverse, that a man’s appearance issues from the posture of his own soul. To do so would re-
enfranchise the individual over his own functions, a decidedly sane attribute in a world he 
proclaims mad. Thus, he makes the nature of reality a result of his own viewing, betraying the 
fundamental premise of existing on Earth: that existence is that which exists.  
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Thus goes the unproductive logic of Burton’s own lifestyle, which harnesses the futility 
of acting on one’s knowledge to achieve a desired form through a reclusive and sequestered 
benignity. By making the body antecedent to human nature, the material of the world antecedent 
to its form, Burton makes of space merely a floating dream of art. Yet, what precedent in science 
could support Burton’s cartographic theory—what reaction is catalyzed from “elsewhere” or 
from “above the world?” In order to conduct any anatomy at all, reality must be objective and 
real; in order for Burton to possess any consciousness at all, reality must be objective and real. It 
must be prerequisite, contra Kant, to be applied to art. Burton would see the body of man split by 
a fear of dissolution on the altar of its observance,
26
 and thus art undone by the throes of 
madness. Having dissected this single aspect of Burton’s corpus, question is not whether the 
body is real, but if there are constants which may be observed in the formal universe, from which 
the presence of reality becomes inescapable. There are, if one obeys nature, if one acknowledges 
the existence of existence with the consciousness only possible when one does. Such a discovery 
hinges on the primacy of existence, as surmised by Satre (though perhaps not for these same 
philosophical ends which I claim fully as my own): “existence precedes essence” (22).  
Modern reflections on the Early Modern period view anatomy paradoxically as a 
paralyzing glimpse of oneself and a self-dissolution; anatomia herself becomes both an incision 
and a metaphysical anesthesia, a force of unveiling the “hidden geography of the body,” while 
simultaneously “render[ing] blind the presumptuous eye” (Selzer) of whoever deigns to master 
his own image. This simultaneity, this two-fold enacting of the anatomy, is for Sawday 
“structured by the mirror-effect of representation and transformation” which as he relates “Hegel 
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associate[s] with the fabrication of the work of art” (12). Rather not to re-present reality, Sawday 
follows Deleuze following Kant/ Hegel to say that the vision of the body is also its 
transformation into the form of the real, the multiplex configuration which as near as can be told 
from a lofty Icarian in sequestration, is as near a reality as any could be. So Robert Burton 
observes the systemic space and creates an ailment for his prose to cure; so cartography becomes 
the mode by which he removes value from reality and makes it the premise of his madness.   
As one of Burton’s “dizzards,” proposing the possibility of knowing reality through a 
lens other than madness, I respond to Roland Barthes’ question of authentic location
27
 simply: in 
the world. Though Barthes does not refer to Burton, the inescapable conclusion Burton makes 
from his two-fold anatomy is the same, gauged by his view and rendered by his geography, to 
defile or condemn the world with itself by displacing the body from its “authenticity.” “Who is 
not brain-sicke?” Burton asks, for “Delirium is a common name to all” (1:25). He does not see 
man as Aristotle in the perfection of completion, of existing in acknowledged reality, but in self-
sustained madness rendering superficial spaces, or uber-real, which Kant insists upon, in 
subscribing any law which appears stable to the multifarious perceptions of those subjected (or in 
his case predilected) to them, causing reason to assume a role a priori to its observations. Burton 
makes the body the spirit’s burden; then he alleviates it by removing the context for all burdens. 
Yet, as there is not consciousness without something to be conscious of, there is no anatomy 
without an authentic body preceding it, no house without the mortar on which it is built (whether 
or not it is acknowledged).  
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Existence must be acknowledged as such if any cure is to be administered to a 
“domestic” humanity, as Burton professes to do through his seminal anatomy. What he denies 
along the way through historical conflations and interpellations cannot change the fact that if as 
Kant one accepts that the mind makes its space, if as Sawday that the man is blinded by the view 
of his own body, there can be no mind at all. Consciousness cannot be born of nothing; without 
object it is as flesh without a skeleton. So with the consciousness conscious only of itself—it is 
as a skeleton that tricked itself to see flesh by pretending to be conscious before it was conscious 
of anything.  
Whatever the differences between Deleuze & Guattari, Kant, Burton, in their proposed 
methods or supposed conclusions, their cartographic philosophies intertwine around the same 
result: to reduce the individual human mind into the patchwork monster of its social influences. 
With the mind both cure and ailment, Early Modern cartography observes and dissects it through 
mirror and knife, through the absences generated by an active social hive-mind which denies the 
possibility of a reality with which the mind may inter-act. However, the map is not a precedent 
for the material in reality, as sociality is not a generator of space but only a subtext of its existent 
material, a thing in the world. Cartographic literature then may not present but only re-present 
reality based on the judgment of its author based on their observations in the world. No 
consciousness, and therefore no art, can occur in dissolution on the social altar of the reflected 
self, just as one cannot feed a reflection. The foundation for this argument has thus far been a 
connection between the space identification of cartographic literature such as Burton’s to the 
reality-generating suppositions of “subjective idealists” such as Kant and Deleuze & Guattari. 
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The next question however is where cartography actually takes place, if the mirror does 
not dissolve the author in the viewing. If Deleuze & Guattari make of maps the script of the 
material, if cartography does not take place in the world (which does not yet exist), where does it 
take place, if not “no-place,” if not shackled in a cave? Addressing the Utopia becomes the focus 
of the next chapter, as the defining result of acknowledging cartography’s generative power. To 
summarize the current chapter—not having acknowledged reality, the body would be left 
lifeless, idle, benign. Art would be left the same. Burton uses his gaze to map a social territory, 
and does so with a prescription that its form makes its material. He may only address the former 
with his judgment, however, and must accept the latter a priori his observation if he is to have 
any consciousness at all. In other terms, as propounded by Deleuze & Guattari and Kant, 
Burton’s subjectivism, his territorialization, permits him to generate the reality he observes. It 
does not. He may as Derrida equate cure with ailment, but what is a house when equated with its 
own destruction, a man with his own starvation, art with its own dissolution? Each is as the 
figure in Bartolomeo’s “The Anatomy Lesson”—obscured by the tumult of observation, by the 
collective musings of its audience. Thus, a figure in the foreground, an existence which exists, is 
the primary metaphysical adoption of the present corpus, lest art itself become as possible to a 
man as food to a reflection, as flesh to a shadow. “Is corporeality itself a constant?” Sawday 







Utopia Out of Place: Thomas More’s Symbolic Non-Symbolism and Value 
Degeneration 
 
In order to anatomize his metaphorical body of mankind, Burton observes the world as a 
body itself, one generated by the Icarian view of its madmen. Thomas More takes this method 
literally in his Utopia by inserting humanity into an actual literary space—an island, which he 
generates as a literal cartographer. Where Burton finds inevitable corruption based in the futility 
of knowing, More finds futility based in the inevitability of corruption. More’s space cannot be a 
cross-examination of real values in a real world, but only the impossibility of either. Since 
Utopia is explicitly a space beyond space with values beyond value, More demonstrates that an 
art which rejects real space cannot fashion judgments from observations, but only the reverse: a 
simulation of perception from pre-existing prejudices. 
As such, Utopia does not profess to be real. “Where is Utopia?” Marin asks in his 
Utopiques. According to Eugene Hill, it is “there, but without place … In brief it is a Utopia, at 
once present and absent, a present which is the ‘other’ of space.”
28
  Thus More writes Utopia 
seemingly without the intent to reveal its location or give it one at all, calling it “Utopia” from 
the Greek, οὐ τόπος, or, “no place.” He creates an ideal social order out of place which Marin 
cites as both present and absent. However, this clouds the issue. Marin’s quantum space, in 
which things can both be and not be, implies that the simulation is as good as the real. In order to 
reassert the possibility of an author’s judgment in reality, “both present and absent” must be 
understood as only one: absent.
29
  
                                                 
28
 See Marin, Sémiotique de la passion, 75 ; cf. Hill, 169. 
29
 A thing is that which it is; A is A. 
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The belief in “perceived human reality as linguistically constructed” (Yoran 19) makes 
space a product of language, which is a product of consciousness. Reality then, becomes a 
product of consciousness, and Kant’s subjective ideal, in which knowledge of reality is 
unknowable, creeps into a discussion of the Early Modern Space.  As a result, Early Modern 
literature demonstrates Robert Burton’s notion that it becomes the artist’s job to observe values 
pre-existing in the world, rather than observing the world as the world, in which values are 
possible. In other words, according to Burton anyone who believes their work reflects their own 
values is a disillusioned dizzard, as forming and representing those values is impossible in the 
moral cul-de-sac we call “society,” in the linguistic melting pot we call “reality.” In the space of 
just such disillusionment, More creates a society on the cipher of no-where, identifying an island 
by releasing it from geography as such and relating it to real space only through a great distance. 
He acknowledges reality only to make it clear that this is not it. He gives Utopia symbols but 
nominalizes their meaning, converting the simulation into the reality. Burton “constitutes himself 
as Temple by his discourse”
30
 and in his sovereign seclusion observes and transcribes his world; 
More explicitly unravels reality on the cipher of his ideal. On More’s “body” of work, Marin 
describes “a subject of discourse whose sole possibility of acceding to being in the narrative text 
is to assign himself a point of space which he can occupy only by pronouncing its effacement.”
31
 
He invokes space, to destroy space; he promotes the self, to destroy the self. More than to be a 
temple, More must be the defacer of the individual which considers itself prerequisite to his 
discourse.  
                                                 
30
 Hill spoke of More in this manner (169), however, I believe More takes it even further, to constitute 
himself the better to destroy himself; see also John 2:21: “He spake of the temple of his body.” 
31
 See Louis Marin, Semiotique de la passion: topiques et figures, p. 18, 79; cf. The Semiotics of the 
Passion Narrative: Topics and Figures, trans. Alfred M. Johnson, Jr., 1980; cf. Hill, 169. 
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The centrality of Marin’s and Bloch’s texts to this chapter depends on Eugene Hill’s 
article, “The Place of the Future: Louis Marin and His ‘Utopiques,’” as those texts are 
untranslated and unobtainable in the West. Additionally, the insights of Yoran will be integral to 
understanding More’s spatial and cartographic foundations. Finally, Deleuze & Guattari’s 
concepts of territorialization and nomadology will be instruments to dissect More’s suspended 
series of contraries. More does not merely territorialize space but meaning as well, reflecting his 
proposed centrality of consciousness in the development of spatial fragments, which never 
become real. Through Utopia he takes symbols and rends them from their value, proclaiming 
value itself a statist institution. Nomadology then, the roaming essences of meaning which 
Deleuze & Guattari describe in A Thousand Plateaus, is an opportune concept to describe 
More’s value (de)generation as it makes meaning in-absolute. The philosophy of Utopia 
accomplishes one end:  to take real space through a contradictive ringer and proclaim it not only 
impossible, but along with one’s individual judgment, unreasonable to desire in art and in reality. 
Text Out of Location:  More’s Placement of Utopia 
 
The question which Marin asks in his Utopiques is presented in Utopia itself: “Where is 
Utopia?” The listeners to Hythloday’s story ask this question, but someone coughed, it relates, 
and neither Giles nor the reader is ever filled in. A better question might be, “Where is Thomas 
More?” The choice which he makes through his art to unravel reality on the cipher of Utopia, to 
undo space with itself, makes the answer clear: he is homeless. By refracting the material of his 
ideal through the cracked mirror of his own disillusioned artistic forms, More comes to assign 
Hythloday, whose name means “God’s speaker of nonsense,” as the orator of his “ideal.” The 
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processes and systems which he describes are at once brutal and serene, free and slave, self-
evident and baffling. These contraries only serve the point: that More does not desire to describe, 
reflect, or judge reality, as Burton does not. Nor does he desire to create an ideal as such. Using 
the space of Utopia as a dissection tool, he attempts to debunk all of these notions. 
Therefore, he does not describe an ideal society as such, but presents a conflict of 
contradictions progressing towards an ultimately unattainable horizon. Since More never intends 
for this society to exist, his story entails only the pursuit. What More evokes is what John Pickles 
calls in his A History of Spaces a “crisis of representation” (xvii). In this case that means: a form 
of art which does not identify itself as such. By deconstructing social hierarchies around the 
eccentric center of his own brand of radical communalism, More situates conflict as the best 
result of art. He allows his system of values to conflict with itself rather than resolve; there is no 
codebreaker for Utopia, since a suspension of the impossible is its only goal. Crisis is its 
representation. 
As Utopia allows contradictions to flow and conflict, the space between them is the 
utopic discourse, the “movements of dislocation in the apparent stasis” (Hill172). Descriptions of 
this movement support the expectation that reality is “linguistically constructed.” Therefore, just 
as More’s ideal is dislocated from itself, so too is the discussion surrounding it. The spatiality of 
More’s state, and thereby his aesthetics, must therefore come into question. The philosophy of 
“saying makes it so” is supported by Burton when he creates a body geographic, and by More 
when he creates a socialized body through such symbols as the structure of ownership, marriage, 
and wealth. These objects are often viewed as symptoms of More’s desire for contradiction. 
However, if no-place is put in space, as this chapter deigns to do, if More is observing reality and 
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responding to it whether he admits it or not, such symbols become code for a clear end: the 
placement of the individual as a being bound to the whims of others, an individual naturally out 
of place in his own art.  
By deconstructing mimetic representation in systems of power and systems of space, 
More establishes his no-place no-where. Along the way he rejects nearly every conceivable 
paradigm of his day, and leaves at his intellectual curbside each institution, authority, and person 
which could have reigned in power during his time of publication. If his intentions were purely 
political, he would not demonstrate a desire for contradiction. As he puts his no-place through a 
“polysemic generation of meaning” (Hill 167) evinced in textual spaces, he invokes the same 
philosophy which results in Burton’s proclamation of ubiquitous madness. As madmen have no 
truths, poly-meaning has no meaning. More’s end then is clear: proving the futility of objective 
judgment in the world.  
De-stabilizing Markers: Mapping Symbols in Utopia 
 
Thus, in describing “the most excellent people in the world” (More 524), Utopia takes its 
people from that world. This is not merely the byproduct of More’s analysis but its object and 
success—at once regulatory to its own people and uncompromisingly brutal to its enemies, 
More’s island state constructs an unlikely and baffling social order.  “Despis[ing] war as an 
activity fit only for beasts” (574) the Utopians yet find every reason to participate in it, and do so 
wholeheartedly. Hythloday remarks, “It is not easy to say whether they are more crafty in laying 
ambushes or more cautious in avoiding those laid for them” (578). As a further contradiction in 
the state of More’s ideal, the desire for epistemic conflict is mirrored in the portrayal of actual 
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war. Of war, the Utopians “collect the cost of it” from those they conquer (551). Though they do 
not value money they yet do not ignore its perceived value. As Hythloday states, they 
send abroad some of their own citizens to serve as collectors of revenue. Though they 
live on the properties in great style and conduct themselves like great personages, plenty 
of income is still left over to put in the public treasury, unless they choose to give the 
conquered nation credit. (551) 
 
Thus the activities of their neighbors are viewed by the Utopians as opportunities. They even 
employ the most “rough, rude and fierce” (576) to act as Utopia’s mercenaries for hire, 
especially when dealing with the Zapoletes, to whom Utopians harbor a genocidal disdain. “A 
hard race” and “unacquainted with any luxuries” (576), Utopians regard the Zapoletes by their 
lifestyle as barbaric and cruel. “They don’t till the fields but … survive by hunting and stealing,” 
(576) according to Hythloday’s account. This is reason enough to destroy them. For that matter, 
the Zapoletes disregard all values the Utopians hold as dear—this could be read as an opposition 
to the Zapolete way of life in favor of the way of life in Utopia. This misses the issue, however, 
as the thing which Utopians value most is that which they share with their author—valuing 
contradictions.  
Since the Zapoletes are of one kind—fierce, determined, brutal—the Utopians hate them 
not for the nature of their beliefs, but for having singular beliefs at all. As Hythloday remarks of 
the Zapoletes, 
They care so much about money that they can easily be induced to change sides for an 
increase of only a penny a day. They have picked up the habit of avarice, but none of the 
profit: for what they earn by shedding blood, they quickly squander on debauchery of the 
most squalid sort. 
 
Because the Utopians give higher pay than anyone else, these people are ready to serve 
them against any enemy whatever. And the Utopians, who seek out the best possible men 




Underneath a description of how much the Utopians despise monetary systems is a paradox—the 
employment of that system. The simultaneous rejection and use of money clearly works to 
Utopia’s advantage in Hythloday’s account, as it allows them distance from what they perceive 
as the spoiled evils of commercial enterprise while providing them with slave services from 
those who practice it. Utopians view the outside world as mad for declaring that value be given a 
concrete representation, like money, and for the possibility of individual ownership. A rich man 
is ill by Burton’s reckoning; by More’s ideal people he is ripe for genocide. Therefore, the 
Utopians take value itself as a product of contradiction only, by rejecting people of genetic 
difference and by using wealth to their advantage while simultaneously despising and devaluing 
it. As contradictions cannot exist, neither, to the Utopians, can value. 
As such, what is normally associated with great value and to which most societies (as 
Utopia’s neighbors) “fix their hearts” (558) is robbed of its value by Utopian contraries as by a 
terrible blight. In Utopia, symbols of wealth become a debased afterthought of existence (e.g., 
the use of gold in chamber pots) and the final disgrace upon social outcasts in the form of their 
slave’s chains. On these strange rejections of value, visitors to Utopia are baffled to find that in 
addition to the dis-individuation of bodily power through a prevalence of slavery, criminals there 
are forced “bear through life the mark of some disgraceful act” (558) in the form of silver and 
gold fetters. This would seem to imply that symbols in Utopia have a redressed standard of 
value. 
However, value is not reassessed in Utopia, as if something else were assigned 
meaning—value itself is disgraced and debunked. Those bedecked in the now devalued 
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representations of wealth are viewed as ignorant of the vain pomp with which they parade 
through Utopia, hoping for a show of submission to their wealth and power. The Utopians, 
... considered this pomp and splendor a mark of disgrace. They therefore bowed to the 
humblest servants as lords, and took the ambassadors, because of their golden chains, to 
be slaves, passing them by without any reverence at all. You might have seen children, 
who had themselves thrown away pearls and gems, nudge their mothers when they saw 
the ambassadors’ jeweled caps and say: “Look at that big lummox, mother, who’s still 
wearing pearls and jewels as if he were a little boy!” But the mother, in all seriousness, 
would answer: “Hush, son, I think he is one of the ambassador’s fools.” (559) 
 
At first such visitors believe the Utopians are stricken by poverty. On discovering the vastness of 
Utopia’s wealth, Utopia’s visiting neighbors are immediately rendered flaccid and benign. The 
visitor’s then “put away all the finery in which they had strutted so arrogantly” (559). Thus the 
rejection of value in Utopia is proliferated even by those who do not believe it—for the 
converted neighbors it is done in awe at such great wealth which the Utopians value so little. 
Utopians take delight in employing wealth to subjugate visitors by the extravagance of their 
devaluation of it. 
Utopians only value material gain to fund their victories in war and restrict their envious 
neighbors with icons of slavery or expulsion. Thus they take wealth at what they perceive to be 
its word by stripping it of its value and reconstructing it as a material means of enslavement. So 
the symbols of value take on a new form, enforced not by a value hierarchy that might give them 
value as such, but a form of complete de-valuation resulting from More’s dislocated 
communalism. Rather than form new values in the space left by empty thrones and absent troves, 
the Utopians actively destruct and de-establish representative value itself.  As visitors at first see 
Utopians stricken by poverty, the value degeneration in Utopia evinces a different, moral, 
bankruptcy, revealed through More’s establishment of social contradictions as norms. 
58 
 
Contradictive Re-presentations: Symbols with No Referents 
 
In the spirit of contradictions, the most meanly clad Utopians are the most decadent—
those who are valued are indicated so by the non-value of their appearance. Decadence in non-
decadence, value in non-value is the mantra of Utopian life. Yet, it is a miscarriage of More’s 
words to say that Utopians destroy the value of money—despite the fact that they proclaim to 
despise it, they use it for ends which they believe are beneficial to the state of their nation. Their 
princes are meanly clad not because money has been stripped of its value but because non-value 
has been raised up on a moral pedestal. They do not value slaves—they bedeck them in value. 
They do not value their enemies—they bestow them with value. Likewise they value their 
nation—they support it with their money, their non-value. As Yoran relates, Utopia’s “ritualistic 
debasement of gold is therefore a symptom of repressed desire” (12). By suspending a 
contradictive appearance, Utopians achieve their true end: denying individual desires by 
repressing their own in order to enslave value. 
Utopians create their economics, their government, even the very space of their society, 
by reformulating the idea of space into a linguistic product. Instead of discovering values by 
observing real space, Utopians generate the space itself. At the whim of their symbols with 
reterritorialized meanings, they can observe values however they desire them to be, even as non-
values. As such, despite being no-place, Utopia is located in space as a map. As Hythloday 
relates, 
The island of the Utopians is two hundred miles across in the idle part, where it is widest, 
and is nowhere much narrower than this except toward the two ends. These ends, drawn 
toward one another as if in a five-hundred-mile circle, make the island crescent-shaped, 
like a new moon. Between the horns of the crescent, which are about eleven miles apart, 




More describes Utopia’s location at great length, with an attention to the physical that reveals his 
artistic object as fundamentally territorial. Additionally, More’s interpretation of value is 
inseparable from his professed generation of this space. As King describes in Mapping Reality, 
“Map and territory cannot ultimately be separated" (1996: 17).  Without a separation, real and 
desired spaces blur in More’s corpus. Thus, the Utopians do not observe the world and find 
value, but create space with the only desire they have—to destroy value itself.  
Similarly, John Pickles in his History of Spaces, cites space as a product of a mosaic 
vision which descends from the map-maker onto the territory through his gaze. He quotes 
Thongchai who relates that in becoming “a model for, rather than a model of what it purported to 
represent … [the map] had become a real instrument to concretize projections on the Earth’s 
surface.”
32
 Thongchai’s and Pickles’ definitions conclude that the map does not approach reality, 
but synthesizes it through a social mosaic which is not indicative but productive of space. Thus 
claims of subjective reality-generation through map-making arrive at the same implication—a 
faux “reality” material sublimated by the human consciousness, denied a real existence by the 
perceptions and constructions of men. This non-real real is also More’s “no place.” Lefebvre 
says it succinctly: “(social) space is a (social) product” (26). Only by accepting these theories can 
Utopian space be understood—by just such methods, the Utopians attempt to rewrite value based 
on their desires. Only by professing to generate the space of a place can More debunk its 
existence as such and place it no-where. A contradiction in space creates a contradiction in 
value—just as More’s place, this cannot exist either. Reality is a prerequisite of value 
representation; Utopians deny both with their reterritorialized symbols. With social space, 
                                                 
32
 See Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation; cf. Pickles, 107. 
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Utopia destructs value. Discovering what is meant by “social space” and how social value is 
none at all therefore becomes the next topic.  
(Social) Space: Utopia’s Generative Consciousness 
 
The paradox of social space as Lefebvre relates it is its simultaneous omnipresence and 
invisibility. Space generated by consciousness must exist and not exist interchangeably, laws 
must re-transfix onto new standards built on the moment’s whim—A must be A and not A 
simultaneously.  Though consciousness creates the space, the space also facilitates the identity-
formation of the self-in-society, according to Lefebvre, apparently always-already thought into 
existence by the intimations of collective whims defined by “categories” of consciousness, such 
as the Utopians’ value de/ regeneration. In making meanings into poly-meanings and space into 
no-place, Utopians make one into many, the individual into a collective. They consign their 
“selves” to the pleasures of others, to “provide for our fellow creatures’ comfort and welfare,” 
for to the Utopians, “Nothing is more humane … than to relieve the misery of others” (562). By 
just such a consignment the Utopians (and More) establish the prime contradiction of Utopian, or 
collective, space: self through non-self.  
The ideal Utopian finds pleasure in bestowing comforts on others. Though not told to 
reject his self, for the individual owes himself “no less charity than to anyone else” (562), it 
exists as charity because Utopia’s standards of comfort are phantom values in a city which does 
not exist. Utopians grant value to the other-than-self equally as to the self, as valueless money 
employed to buy the values of neighboring states is of equal value to them as the money used to 
purchase chains for slaves. In order to maintain conflicting value contraries, an individual 
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Utopian must strip value and distribute it, to do whatever others value and proclaim it as “for 
himself.” He could not, for instance, attempt to own property, earn money, do what he deems fit 
for his self, or find a moment’s privacy. The collectivization of the individual body finds no less 
evidence in Utopian marriage, which anatomizes individuals to reject and enslave those afflicted 
with “deformity or blight” (570). The presentation of the bride and groom by some “respectable 
matron” or “honorable man” is administered to avoid the “risk” (570) of an unfortunate union 
between a pure and impure party. Such a ritual surveys and prescribes the spirit by its body, not 
by a person’s merit, but by a collective quality measurement. These examples of paradoxically 
judging the self with the collective as the standard of value describe Utopia’s defining feature, as 
Yoran paraphrased Stephen Greenblatt to say that “the Utopian social order produces subjects 
devoid of individuality, reflective capacity and inwardness, subjects who exist only insofar as 
they are part of the public realm” (7). In the last chapter I called this “public realm” a “social 
assemblage,” and in the current one thus far as Lefebvre’s “social space.”  
Having thus established the perfect dis-individualized political body—where the 
individual is an object to be informed, rather than a communicating, realized subject—More 
distributes power to the most finite elements of the Utopian community. While this absolute yet 
invisible authority utilizes an ideal of communalized property to achieve a “collective good,” 
described as the “comfort of the rest of mankind,” the true objective of such a system becomes 
clear when defining the “blight” itself. To Utopians, individual power, ownership, and value 
judgment are the great blights to be dissected from the social space. Such space is conceptually 
evident in the “ruling” structure of Utopia itself, where the city Amaurot means “phantom” and 
the prince Ademus means “without people.” Utopian life is restricted—from pastimes, clothing, 
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etc. to the restriction against dining at home as it is “not thought proper” (141). As Yoran relates, 
“The ultimate Utopian means of control is the all-penetrating gaze which renders Utopian reality 
transparent” (6). This gaze is the social construction which generates the space of Utopia through 
the Icarus above its map. As Hythloday observes, there are 
… no taverns, or alehouses, or brothels; no chances for corruption; no hiding places; no 
spots for secret meetings. Because they live in the full view of all, they are bound to be 
wither working at their usual trades or enjoying their leisure in a respectable way. (557) 
 
More’s subject being the suspension of contradictions, the people of Utopia perform their civic 
duty as if they are not being watched, precisely because they are. In other words, they are obliged 
to live for themselves because they have no self; the Utopian state forces them to be free. 
 Thus, the philosophy of Utopia comes into epistemic disarray, as “a man owns nothing 
but what the king, in his goodness, sees fit to leave him,” (540) and cannot spare his free hours in 
any service but to the collective good (even his own pleasure or good, is his good as it benefits 
the state of Utopia). Then, he is told this is his true self; he is told that abundance waits for him 
so long as he never achieves it; he is told at the very altar on which his mind was sacrificed for 
the non-state that the freedom of his mind depends on its destruction. As More’s reduction of 
economic icons to the mimetic representations of wealth instituted by normal society through 
money and value appropriation renders economic systems of power inert in Utopia, he dis-
individualizes the individual through exposure and surveillance. Through the removal of 
representative value, Utopia is an attempt to turn the mind into a mere symbol of itself.  
The true end of the Utopian doctrine becomes clear—the enslavement of self to self, the 
mind to its own processes, the theorization of a space which is both a reflection and a dissolution 
of the mind which made it. Such a space is destructive vis-a-vis the individual, trapping him in a 
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metaphysical cul-de-sac wherein he generates for himself all he claims to know; thus the Utopian 
map, as it was utilized by Burton, “proves” that he may know nothing, and simultaneously that 
he already knows all there is to know. This is the founding premise of subjective ideals in art as 
propounded by the hyper-realities of Kant and Lefebvre, and Deleuze & Guattari’s 
territorialization. The result is an individual—as an artist or subject—which cannot create 
idealizations in art, which cannot exist with itself except in endless struggle with Hegel’s notion 
that his purpose is sacrificial. The only cure comes from an acknowledgment of reality external 
to perception, which does not affect the individual except as the scene of his observations and 
actions, which does not depend on the mind any more than on the whims of its societies. In order 
to define such a space, Hill’s deductions from the work of Marin accentuate a vertical distance 
between Utopians and the understanding of their symbols in More’s Utopia, which symbols 
become their tools for extricating the reality from their space. 
Roving Symbols: More and Iconic Representation 
 
When Utopians dissociate objects from their meanings, they also reconstruct them—
More reterritorializes the meaning of value, wealth, and society on the cipher of their contraries. 
“Mapped” therefore is not a precise term when referring to More’s corpus. Its meaning follows 
the philosophy of Lefebvre, who links the map and mapped body to the social space. This single 
subject/ object produces as he relates “specialized works [that] keep their audience abreast of 
equally specialized spaces” (8). His description is opportune in examining the contradictions of 
space which More employs to suspend Utopia in an in-between. This space is considered at once 
spatial and temporal, a specialized conglomeration of the perceptions of space into the art which 
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becomes it, as Kant described, an organic unity through which man cannot know “things as they 
are,” since all he can perceive is what he makes by his perception.
 
This view of space follows the 
Utopian view of value—Kant describe spaces as emanating from the mind, space in non-space, 
as the Utopians fight value with non-value. 
Thus the simulacrum, according to Pickles, the perceived corollary of the artistic 
presentation, is “thematized in terms of [its] spatial relations” (80). He means that relations of 
space generate its products, as reality supposedly becomes into the space of its map. As More’s 
territory is inseparable from its view, it accentuates spatial relations through the vertical distance 
between his voice and the symbols of his society. Of the Icarian perspective, Joseph Nechvatal 
describes an “omniperspectivist ideal” (198) from which a complete worldview may be achieved 
by viewing the entire world at once. In other words, More becomes other than the space he 
observes—a spectator separate from real space—in order to transcribe it through his art.  
Likewise, More’s Utopia confutes descriptions of itself with itself—it defines space by 
removing its spatiality and replacing it with its icons. It displays life on Earth as ever-forming on 
the cipher of observation. In other words, the world is made in the viewing. Thus More 
transplants the forms of worldly existence onto the world-body with symbolic amenities such as 
wealth and marriage. Yet, by stripping them of their value, More evokes conflict through images 
of absences. Rather than presenting icons with correlations to the amenities of everyday life, 
More extracts the symbol for its, in Deleuze & Guattari’s term, “nomadic essences” (510). In 
effect, More creates nomadic meaning. This meaning is “the unformed, unorganized, 
nonstratified, or destratified body and all its flows” (Nechvatal 198). He views space as a body, 
assigns it inconsistency, and measures the conflict. Therefore the term “nomadic” describes 
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Utopian value structure—representation oscillating between value and non-value with such 
movement being passed off as true meaning. The nomad then is the body of More’s Utopia, in 
flux and out of place. This body is made nothing or no-where by the emblems of life, valued for 
devaluation, just as the space is rendered space-less by the river which is “no water,” the prince 
which is nowhere. 
Significantly, the nomadic essences of More’s Utopian symbols are viewed as from a 
map. More takes his prince and people from their place, from the symbols or essences of society 
which would occupy a normal map. We would be remiss to take Utopia at its word for an ideal 
with, as Hill relates, “a more or less realized possibility” (170). More transgresses an ideal as 
such in favor of the symbol, or an interplay of spaces, to accentuate the essence of the nomad and 
to place the “variables themselves in a state of continuous variation” (Deleuze & Guattari 28). 
Instead of transcribing constants from his observations, More cites constant or absolute value as 
the first casualty of his observation. Precisely, if precision could be applied, as the nomad casts 
off the chains of reference, More superimposes non-congruencies on the cipher of social icons in 
order to generate inconsistencies and discover his definition of meaning through the variations. 
He looks for meaning only through non-meaning; he accentuates ideals to prove their 
impossibility.  
As such, More’s subjective representations become symbols by the description of their 
territorialization. Though his referents are always ever-present, they are removed and returned 
from meaning repeatedly. The purpose of Utopia seems to be unhinging them entirely. As Marin 
described,  
[the] referential indication of a real term absent from the discourse as its signification 
signals the Utopian practice whose product is the Utopian figure: a practice which is the 
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force of production which the product as a completed figure occults and which the 
ideology of representation will absorb as a social ideality, an imaginary revery, or as a 




Marin accentuates the roving structure of More’s symbols, taking the movement of space, of his 
gaze, at the word of his own reference. Though More signifies objects of value in his discourse, 
he negates the reference to their ideology—where there is value, he professes to suspend it. 
Utopia is an ideology of non-ideology which rearticulates meaning as a fictitious ban on 
reference. Thus free of the “servitude to geography” (Marin 335) Utopia diverges from the 
allegorical into the symbolic. This is how Utopia disrupts normal value assessments through its 
cartography, and as it takes the center of Hill’s discourse in the work of painter Paul Klee, it 
becomes the current subject of this one. 
Hill and the Image of Meaning in Utopia 
 
In order to understand More’s symbolism, Marin offers a representation of the 
“figurative” itself through the works of Paul Klee. Of Klee’s paintings, Marin states that the 
images form “a redundance of the pictorial representation upon itself, by which it names itself 
for what it is: not an illusion, but a simulacrum.”
34
 In other words, by this definition Klee’s 
visual art is not a description of the real world, but a representation of it—a figure which 
generates “reality” by example. Continuing, Marin states that “he disjoins from the exterior that 
which gave the illusion of continuity and articulates it arbitrarily in the second surface which is 
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no longer entirely that of the picture, but is not yet our own.”
35
 The “illusion” is directly 
translatable to the social order of Utopia and how that order is always progressing to an “other” 
of space. Marin describes the flux in which More places reality, making of it a picture of men’s 
whims which is not yet a full whim, nor fully done being a man. More uses such illusions to 
reject any social logic—he simultaneously exemplifies and terrifies the order in Utopia. Thus, 
the island drifts towards a liminal horizon of irony, destabilizing itself on the cipher of its own 
map, in and by its own becoming. That is the nature of the “crisis of representation,” as Utopia 
constantly becomes into a referent but never settles, just as the works of Klee do not represent 
meaning but de-stabilize it—this recalls the essence of Utopian value structure, and likewise, 
More’s utilization of “nonsense” to describe his supposed ideal. 
Nonsense is that which Raphael Hythloday—or literally, “God’s speaker of nonsense”—
relates. As such, Utopia does not require an existential corollary to be proven—its perfect 
democratic condition can be illustrated only in the space between the imposition of the system 
and its de-establishment of the value binaries that make any system possible. Utopia reverses the 
ideal of meaning with a perfect democratic communalism based around the inherent 
“blightedness” of the human body, and the communalization of the individual body itself. 
Therefore, More deconstructs and denies hierarchy in its perception of “natural needs” (162), by 
the unraveling of mimetic wealth symbols and the dis-individualization of the body as described. 
Though it is with only an absent referent, as Hill stated, “happiness in indeterminacy” (173), 
Utopia accomplishes its end through nonsense. This nonsense is a representation of the space of 
Utopia itself, which Hill describes and to which we now turn.  
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In relation to More’s Utopia, Hill describes a truly symbolic progression, a “more 
complex figurative statement not readily amenable to paraphrase” (170). Utopia’s tendency 
towards mapmaking reveals a desire to make space in the pronouncement of it, reassuring its 
symbols not by logical reference, but by the utterance itself. It thus transgresses the possibility of 
reality, instead purporting the perceptual or subjective ideals as described by Kant and Lefebvre. 
As Marin observes, 
Utopian practice establishes itself in the distance between reality and its other; it traverses 
this discontinuity which is that of transgression itself by producing the term which neither 
reduces nor annuls the discontinuity as to a social ideal or a political project, but which 
dissimulates and reveals the discontinuity: the Utopian figure.
36
 
Thus the project of Utopia denies its own existentiality by proclaiming things non-things and 
establishing itself of but not in real space. This contradiction between speaking of Utopia and 
being there recalls Hill’s concept of the “neutral.” Such a figure describes Utopia’s non-
description—the simultaneous pronouncement and denial of value representation. 
 More rejects the place-ness of his place in order to explore how contradictions support his 
desired meaning.  He therefore approaches “the point of divergence from which all 
understanding … escapes from itself to expose itself to the neutral power of disarrangement” 
(172). The “neutral” here is a symbol which can become spatiality by suspending value 
contraries and calling them real, by taking disarrangement as an arrangement in itself, A as not 
A. According to Hill, “The utopic city is not an idea to be realized … a project … It is, in the 
realm of the imaginary, the fiction of the conditions of possibility” (330). In other words, the 
symbols Utopia employs in its social undertaking are only approaching a meaning, as a man 
trundles over a horizon toward the sun, never really expecting to reach it. Such a symbol is “a 
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‘cipher’ for something not yet manifestable” (Hill 170); instead of manifesting meaning, More’s 
“meaning” is to debunk it. The presence of “illusions of continuity,” especially between symbol 
and referent, are to More an imperial product to be de-established. As such, when More describes 
the city, the river, the prince, the people, and all of them contradictions of the things to which 
they should refer, he does not describe something “without a referent” but  a conflict which is 
ever-approaching one, an icon with an “absent” as its referent (175). More accomplishes this de-
substantiation of the very symbols he employs, parallel and in equal measure to the Utopians’ 
own disenfranchisement of that which they use to support their nation, through what Marin calls 
an obligation. He speaks of the Utopian desire to 
place ourselves outside of that practice, outside the institution, in order to perform the 
theoretical-critical work… But what is this ‘place out of place’ (lieu hors lieu) where 
another discourse … will have to be held, a discourse which—to avoid relapsing into the 
very object of its criticism—will have to theorize its own contradictoriness, to think 
through the circle in which it is caught, to constitute a theory of the neutral or a theory of 
utopic practice as the critique of the ideological scam (leurre) of institutional neutrality or 
of Utopia as something accomplished in a closed and coherent discourse?
37
 
The place More maps thus occurs not only beyond a system but beyond system itself. The ugly 
side of Utopia’s contradictory elements, such as employing mercenaries in war and creating 
slaves to wealth, Yoran’s “antimonies of the text” (8), extend the island into conflict and thereby 
into the realm of More’s observation. This observation is not absolute but neutral—not perfected 
but dislocated. More takes the non-A as the theory of Utopia’s greatness—the neutral becomes 
his absolute ideal, not depite the fact that this statement is a contradiction but because of it. 
According to Blanchot, Utopia thus becomes  
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… a space which is always only the approach to another space … but without 
transcendence as it is without immanence … a place of tension and of difference … a 





That plural mode is More’s denouncement of value, his use of contradictions in the stead of 
meaning,  his “anticipatory dialectic” (Bloch 169). Marin’s words anticipate the sightline of the 
utopic epistemology, crossing the horizon of the allegory and becoming More’s symbolic space 
mapped on its own dissolution.  
So to describe a plural mode Marin employs one, citing a space which is and is not, 
present and absent, real and imaginary. Thus he more or less realizes the possibility of More’s 
nearly-manifestable cipher, the meaning of which is clear in the Utopian lifestyle. As Yoran 
describes, Utopians live as examples of the purification of intrinsically evil human nature (10). 
As such, Utopia is incompatible, even by description only, with the life of the individual. By its 
dislocation the cultural framework rejects value in favor of plurality, the individual in favor of a 
collective whim. As Bloch relates, Utopia “specifies those nodes of the present which, in their 
very self-division mark the spot of an as yet unspecifiable transformation of the social world” 
(169). If Utopia intended to propagate meaning, it would specify the transformation, identify 
what is and describe what ought to be. Instead, its duality of observability and impossibility 
guards against what Hill calls the “temptation  ... to see the text as a mere pretext, or on the other 
hand to reduce the visual register to the merely fictional or illustrative” (168). In other words, to 
prevent the author’s judgment from asserting a single or absolute meaning. The idea that the text 
is a prerequisite of real space, congealing the visual into a whim of the composition, unravels the 
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nature of observation, judgment, and authorship. This idea may now be referred to as the true 
“neutral” and addressed directly to conclude this chapter. 
Neutral Ideals: Utopia’s Final Stage 
 
Instead of a traditional, political, or reasoned discourse, More practices a distance, a 
suspension. By its nature, More’s corpus maintains the contradictory within a discourse which 
cannot receive it; according to Hill the neutral is “supplementary, but not with the imaginary, the 
doubtful or the possible.”
39
 More never intends his ideal to be real. Rather, at the junctions of 
conceptual superstructures More makes conduits in the suspension—rather than reveal a solution 
or hide a blight (Hill 172) he accomplishes what Yoran termed an “ideal antidote” by assessing 
from a distance that which is not prescribable, except in observation. As Hill remarked, quoting 
Marin,  
With the theory of the neutral there could perhaps be constituted the theory of pure 
critique, the infinite polemic, since it would tend to make manifest the unlimited power of 
placeless contradiction within discourse, but underlying it as a productive power never 
fixed, never immobilized in one of its forms or one of its figures: a utopic practice which 
introduces, in the report of history and the exposition of geography, the sudden distance 
by which the contiguities of space and time are broken and through which is discerned, in 
a flash, before immobilizing itself in the utopic figure and fixing itself in the “ideal” 




More thus places contradiction as the goal at which representation aims, and the theme of his 
cartography—itself a contradiction. He designates the space of his Utopia without defining it per 
se (Blanchot 618), deviating from structures of language to indicate conflicts with absences, 
power with the absence of a ministry of defense, authority with the absence of a prince, value 
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with its refutation. He relates the theatricality, to use Greenblatt’s term, of ruling structures with 
a like perception of reality itself, “role playing” (35) space in the imagistic subtext of his 
conflicting contraries. The neutral is the antithesis of ideals, and More employs it as such, as his 
ideal. 
To found an economic premise More makes a metaphysical consignment, namely, the 
restriction of the individual body to its social components, the material of reality to the form of 
its vision. He rejects the supposed fantasy of referent or the “illusion of continuity” in favor of 
conflicting contraries. The interplay between the symbolic product of his vision would seem in 
its conflation of absences to separate itself from a producer as such.
41
 Thus even in his own 
ideology, More distances himself from the dissolving reflection of his utterances, much as in the 
previous chapter the introspective divert their gaze from the revelation of their interior. Simply 
by willing it so, More expects to strip objective meaning from the system of art, proclaiming 
judgment, meaning, and reality as improbable constructs of imperialist institutions, or errant 
dreams its wanton subjects. 
More thus denies himself the opportunity to concretize his judgments within his art—
according to Yoran, the structure of life in Utopia “renders the very idea of the Utopian poet 
absurd” (17). As it does not follow a structure of politics, there is likewise no possibility for 
rhetoric, business, art, or history.  In fact, the only reason Utopia has scholars at all is the fact 
that their ideal of a state without a state can never be achieved, and it thus falls to them to find 
“the least harmful solution to the problem” (Yoran 18). This is More’s self-imposed task, as 
words themselves deny the philosophy which he describes without their referents. He imposes a 
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conflict of all possible referents in its place. Still, Utopia must have scholars, A is still A—
Utopia exists in isolation and slavery, with an existence equal only to the degree in which it 
accepts this founding axiom. 
As such, there is no way to describe how Utopia becomes into its autonomy, even from 
allegory, without referring to More’s discourse through his established philosophical and spatial 
practices. Therein is the junction of all these subjects—the symbol, the neutral, and the Utopia. 
As Yoran stated, rather than an unchanging or substantial real space, 
Humanist discourse presupposed instead that the human world was a human artifact, and 
therefore that the meaning of human reality was not contingent upon its subordination to 
a transcendent realm, but was autonomous … Humanist discourse denied the existence of 
an ontological gap between the linguistic and the social, and perceived human reality as 
linguistically constructed … immanently symbolic … by definition meaningful. (19) 
 
Reality as an artifact generated by a collective whim recalls the structure of Lefebvre’s social 
space, subjective ideals as presented by Kant, and Deleuze & Guattari’s territorialization. All of 
these propose that the symbol is a consignment of the shadows of real forms to the whims of 
collective perception. In consigning reality’s material to its formal structures, More proposes the 
dream of a painting as equal to the paint, and the painting of a dream as good as the real space in 
which it might have been accomplished.  
In the case of these philosophies the gap closes between the dialect and the real, 
seemingly to afford humanity surrogate godliness over its own territory. To alter the very script 
of dialect, More himself relates that he “… should have thought it sufficient to master the nature 
of words, the force of propositions, and the forms of syllogisms, and at once to apply the 
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dialectic as a tool.”
42
 Despite the fact that the Utopians deny the advent of Aristotelian symbol 
dialectic, the very path to Utopia is conscripted by landmarks, as Hythloday relates, 
… even they themselves could not enter safely if they did not direct themselves by some 
landmarks on the coast. If these landmarks were shifted about, the Utopians could lure to 
destruction an enemy fleet coming against them, however big it was. (545) 
 
Here the symbol becomes not only their burden but their power as well—a weapon or “tool” to 
use against their enemies. Similarly they understand the value of money, employing it to the 
exploit of their ruder neighbors and the safety of their way of life, rejecting money but clearly 
not barring against its exploitation. To Utopians this aids the universal de-valuation, as they take 
that which their neighbors value and re-appropriate it into the symbols of criminality and 
expulsion.  
 Yet, defining the symbol this way rejects the fundamental assertion of an existence on 
Earth: that man possesses the volition to judge his surroundings and turn his conclusions into 
identifiable meaning through art. Chained to their own language, the Utopians have their 
processes generated for them in the space of their ignorance. “Value” itself is a contradictive 
term if the symbol does not refer to some real thing absolutely; if value itself is a contradictive 
term, the artist cannot assign the character of his own values to his art. Thus, the value More 
propagates is a non-value—he cannot relegate language to the whim of the Utopian social mind 
without first creating a perfect conflict of contradictories within its space. Since Utopia cannot 
exist on Earth, refuting definition and refracting value from the height of its cartographer, it 
wears its crisis of representation as its highest credentials. Utopia is a promised land where 
values exist only as non-values, its author a prophet of value degeneration. 
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However, there is no “crisis of representation” if the artist has the volition to project his 
value judgments into his art, if he may truly reflect, as Aristotle relates, not things as they are (or 
in this case not are) but as they ought to be. This faculty—the will to consciousness—is the 
solution to the crisis generated by Utopia’s suspension of symbolic contraries. The only 
argument against Kant’s subjective ideal must base itself on this will in reality, on the possibility 
of knowing things as they are. Its impossibility, as demonstrated by the dramatic concretes 
offered by Burton and More, can result only in contradictions—in Burton where the most 
knowledgeable become the greatest fools and in More where the most valuable becomes the least 
valued. Existence on Earth necessitates the faculty of reason as the guiding factor in value 
judgments. Reason in this case means—an acknowledgment of an observable reality, making 
emergent within it a choice to be conscious of that reality. The values determined by observation 
made possible by that choice are all that can be re-presented in art, and Utopia, in its self-
professed impossibility, does not attest to be an alternative to that assertion. 
 Utopia describes non-value as the height of its knowledge. A social and moral collective, 
then, becomes its standard of value. Hythloday relates that 
man ought to advance the welfare and comfort of the rest of mankind (there being no 
virtue more proper and peculiar to our nature than to ease the miseries of others, to free 
from trouble and anxiety, in furnishing them with the comforts of life, in which pleasure 
consists). (562) 
 
With the Utopian’s philosophy, the collective becomes the standard of value—or, in Utopia, of 
non-value. The individual in the fold of Utopia’s dissolving and multiplex argument cannot 
survive. This is the moral equivalent of space always-already social, built by suspended 
contradictions which somehow spontaneously generate meaning without observable reality—a 
world without the will to consciousness. More’s philosophy relegates the individual’s desire to 
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desire only that which benefits others, and to be content to do so no matter the cost in freedom or 
ambition, both evils in Utopia. More thus replaces crowns and Gods with collective value de-
generation. Utopia by its own admission is a non-value because it is a collective—symbols lose 
their single reference just as the individual loses the ambition which sustains his life. No better 
definition exists for the moral result of a “subjective ideal.” 
 More’s philosophical precept of idealizing collectives becomes Shakespeare’s dramatic 
concept in the following chapter. In More’s philosophy the material abstract and the moral 
abstract do not refer and the system cannot resolve, only progress. This is, in terms of its ability 
to observe and glean fundamentals for abstract belief, not a philosophy as such. Yet, why does 
this fact, known full well by More as well as the Utopians, become its highest credentials? The 
answer becomes clear in the relation between Utopia’s spatial reasoning and value 
reterritorialization with its moral practices—to consign the individual to the collective. It makes 
of the mind as it makes of the state—as a non-symbol of a symbolic God. For this purpose, or at 
least this result, Utopia purports a “reality” of non-value and a people of no will, and denies the 
reality in which man has a will to consciousness in his moral, and thus aesthetic, judgments. 
More institutes this impossibility of judgment in the world as the spatial precept for the morality 
of contradictions, in a more overtly cartographic mode than Burton. More concretizes a 
suspension of contraries into a map to suspend reality into its moral abstracts and refute the 
artistic concretes that may describe an author’s values. Shakespeare, to whom we now turn, 
bypasses this metaphorical approach to take the literal audience as his representational ideal—as 
the medium by which his words acquire meaning. Shakespeare makes of a real audience the sum 
of their perception—by approaching Shakespeare, we approach a representation of Kant’s ideal.  
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Reflective Passions: How the Self Views its Own Desire in Shakespeare 
 
Moore rewrites the rules of signification in Utopia—the result is a series of paradoxes in 
linguistic meaning which bind the means of perception to its content. In other words, eyes 
emerge as a byproduct of thought—sight becomes site-generation as the mind paradoxically 
makes the territory in which it exists by perceiving. The suspension of contraries by the 
connecting force—perception—makes Utopia an immanently Kantian premise, a “subjective 
ideal.” This view of cartography presents space as a conforming non-constant, subject to the 
whims of separate identities and the expectations of collectives. Shakespeare confirms this view, 
as his tragic view of man prepossesses the maps he makes for him to inhabit. Shakespeare 
confines his view of man to the inherent flaws he uses to represent him. Sight and site become 
causally linked in Shakespeare, as they are in More. Pickles’ A History of Spaces provides a 
basis for this relationship in equating simulations of existence to the production of the existence 
actual, representation with presentation—a philosophy consistent with the pseudo-reals of Kant 
and Lefebvre. Most often applied to systems, the same constructs narrow in Shakespeare’s vision 
to focus on a view of the individual man’s view, as through a mirror. The use of both actual and 
metaphorical mirrors in Hamlet, King Lear, and Macbeth draws Shakespeare’s audience into a 
dissembling glance at his portrait of his man, maps his reality on that image, and ultimately 
predicts Pickles’ contradictive visualization in his drama. 
For Shakespeare, the mirror is more than an object—it is a mode of playwriting. Hamlet 
writes a play with Shakespeare’s—“The Mousetrap”—to set the scene for the enigma of the 
entire experience. Visual barriers in Hamlet present a challenge for the actors and audience alike; 
we inevitably want to pierce the pervading mystery propagated in part by Hamlet’s own 
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emotional opacity, yet are offered only more questions, lenses within lenses and plays within 
plays. Such rhetorical refraction as Shakespeare employs in Hamlet presents a main character 
with impending, yet uncertain, madness. When the space of the castle becomes the space of 
Hamlet’s inner play in “The Mousetrap,” the audience’s view converges on the horizon of the 
play’s visual fragments joined by Hamlet’s view of views, as through a mirror. Thus, a view of 
“The Mousetrap” is a view of Shakespeare’s cartographer, abstract in the mirror-view presented 
in Hamlet, forcing the territory of the play to no-place.  
The abstract developments in Hamlet come to fruition as a graphic concrete in the 
imagistic portrayal of sight in King Lear. King Lear becomes a vehicle for a more progressive 
demonstration: an actual solicitation with reflections and a corporealization of the mirror as a 
literary figure. In King Lear, “Words … become events” (540) to use Goldberg’s turn of phrase, 
whose article, “Dover Cliff and the Conditions of Representation,” provides a visual basis for 
dissecting that scene late in the play. In that scene, Act 4, Scene 6, the loss of Gloucester’s eyes 
unbinds the cipher of visual transcription and reterritorializes it onto Shakespeare’s dramatic 
space. The result is a symbolic cartography, a transformation of representations—as such, 
meaning with corollaries in the real world—into presentations which reference only the 
audience’s imagination. Both the blinding scene and its sequel on the Cliffs of Dover unveil 
Lear’s new mode of seeing through the translucence of Shakespeare’s representation. 
In King Lear, blindness works as a simultaneous confirmation and conformation of 
Lear’s identity. In Macbeth, it evinces Shakespeare’s perception of man in his space—with 
perception disconcerted from its material, as purpose from its action. In place of the more 
commonly appropriated modus operandi of Macbeth—the unbound ambition for power—
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through blindness it becomes evident that an ingrown terror, a fear of petrification, is the 
overruling drive in his transgressions. “Transgressions” is particularly opportune, as it illustrates 
the visual crossing of barriers in engendered semantic constructions—each barrier Macbeth 
crosses is visual, and each results in self-dissolution. Therefore, the actions of Macbeth always 
lead him to the artifact under our gaze: Shakespeare’s mirror. Transgressing his view of his own 
actions and body, Macbeth paralyzes himself in Shakespeare’s mirror, as at the view of Duncan’s 
corpse and Macduff’s ethereal head, in both of which he seems himself. As that sight of himself 
is both his placement and his disillusionment—simultaneously his stasis and his new identity—
the element of petrification turns the mirror in Shakespeare into a Medusa figure. Shakespeare 
uses his own artistic medium as an instrument to deconstruct the concept of the king in religious 
and political dimensions, a concept discussed in visual terms in the opportune book by 
Armstrong entitled, Shakespeare’s Visual Regime. The visual struggle for identity—which 
occurs in the space Shakespeare reserves for viewing reflections only—reveals a cartographic 
insertion of reterritorialized roles based on his own expectations. 
Shakespeare’s intense suspensions of sense and belief, of real and imaginary, lead to the 
promulgation of a contradiction—to take the likes of Macbeth and Lear and transcribe an inner 
and dissembling fear of oneself, to open their chests with a knife and with a mirror present them 
with a paralyzing view never before seen. This view is Shakespeare’s alone, however, as if 
before the viewing he privately drew on the mirror the traits which he termed inherent in the 
man, to blow them up on the fresh cipher of his dissembled main characters. In Shakespeare’s 
corpus, as in Burton’s, self-views are terrible—to the point of petrification—and ultimately 
dissembling. Should the content of their minds remain separate from their means of viewing, 
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however, the reality of their forms in the universe would not dissemble them. When Shakespeare 
suspends the material world as a subject of human consciousness, terror becomes inherent in its 
creation—suddenly, all the horrors of reality become self-punishments for internal crimes, self-
sacrifices at the altar of the individual’s own mind. By planting the seed of what would blossom 
into Kant’s subjective ideal, Shakespeare assigns his men evil intentions and rends those men 
into an existence based only on those expectations, destroying them in the process.  
Men within Men: Self-Discovery in Hamlet 
 
The pivot of the tragedy in Hamlet is not where it should be, not centered on the 
predictable and comfortable knowledge of a brutal murder, but on precisely the opposite: the 
tension depends entirely on the fact that no one (besides Claudius, the murderer himself) is ever 
certain a murder even took place. Hamlet remarks, “There are more things in heaven and Earth, 
Horatio,/ Than are dreamt of in your philosophy” (1.5.187), as if to say that the dependence on a 
concrete murder is no longer the focal point of the more highly-conceived tragedy at hand. 
Rather, without a traditional visual focus in an event, the focal point of this play centers on 
views—Hamlet’s view of himself and the audience’s view of Hamlet. 
Hamlet’s means of knowing events therefore depend not on the facts of the murder, but 
on his view of them. His identification of evidence becomes misconstrued in madness—as 
through a mirror, his pursuit of certainty leads to a view of himself. Jacques Lacan provides a 
definition opportune to Hamlet’s distress. “Identification,” he states, is the “transformation that 
takes place in the subject when he [sic] assumes an image” (qtd in Armstrong 10). As Lacan 
describes, Hamlet assumes the image of his knowledge as his reflective passions become the 
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world which he inhabits. Identification becomes his reality. Thus, for Shakespeare, to view the 
world is also to map it, and to map the world is also to view oneself. 
The events which Hamlet maps are not those which take place in the form of any stable 
dramatic event, but which he sees in views and visions. His own body becomes a shadow of its 
material, as though viewed through a mirror. He expresses his impressions of in-corporeality to 
his friends, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, when he states,  
HAMLET O God, I could be bounded in a nutshell and 
count myself a king of infinite space, were it not 
that I have bad dreams. 
GUILDENSTERN Which dreams, indeed, are ambition, 
for the very substance of the ambitious is merely 
the shadow of a dream. 
HAMLET A dream itself is but a shadow. 
ROSENCRANTZ Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy 
and light a quality that it is but a shadow’s shadow. 
HAMLET Then are our beggars bodies, and our monarchs 
and outstretched heroes the beggars’ shadows. (2:2:273) 
 
Here Hamlet displaces his body from itself and into its shadow or reflection. In his mind, 
ambitious actions are less than aims.
43
 They are a “shadow’s shadow.” Such a belief foreshadows 
Hamlet’s response to the specter of his father—to “wipe away all trivial, fond records” from a 
mind “Unmixed with baser matter” (1.5.106-11). He unfixes his mind, the means by which he 
thinks, from its material in reality. Therefore, for Shakespeare thoughts and dreams do not occur 
within corporeal but incorporeal forms. As Shakespeare takes the shadow from its body, he takes 
the thought from its material mind. Individual ambition is based on nothing but itself in 
Shakespeare—no goals align with a real existence. 
                                                 
43
 According to Aristotle, the action or “praxis” was the “purpose or aim” to which the man was devoted; 
for Dante it was the “moto spiritual”; for Shakespeare it is nothing. 
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Without a belief in stable physical forms, the pseudo-mind which remains in Hamlet’s 
head can identify only visions and shadows. This is the basic form of his madness, but also of 
Shakespeare’s identity as a cartographer. Upon viewing his father’s ghost, Hamlet becomes a 
template for his identity as a “beggar’s shadow.” His objective self (independent of his view in 
the mirror) dissipates before the specter of his “mind’s eye” (1.2.193). That which he sees, not 
that which is, forces Hamlet’s out-of-body experiences. As Lacan stated in his seminar, “Desire 
and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet,” “The image of the other … is presented here as 
completely absorbing the beholder” (qtd in Armstrong 14). In other words, Hamlet’s 
identification of his dramatic self, or as he is viewed by the audience, becomes his identity. 
Hamlet confirms his vision by conforming to it, making his identity through identification. The 
notion of mapping one’s self based on dreams and visions would become Kant’s philosophical 
ideal—in Hamlet, “The Mousetrap” reveals it as Shakespeare’s ideal in drama. 
Hamlet’s play within the play crosses barriers of representation to reveal deception as 
Shakespeare’s tool of choice to dissect the images in Hamlet. Hamlet renders a facsimile of real 
events, hoping to bait his uncle’s conscience with his view of the murder. He attempts to initiate 
discourse concerning his father’s death, such that his view, he hopes, will equal real history. As 
actor, director, and screenwriter, he uses his view of the drama to become his father’s avenger. 
Yet, the audience’s view of Hamlet becomes Lacan’s “other,” through which Hamlet finds his 
new dramatic identity. Through his deception, Shakespeare’s cunning diorama transfixes to a 
new vanishing point beyond the stage—through “The Mousetrap,” the audience’s view of 
Hamlet’s view takes precedence over the events themselves. What appears on stage then, 
normally a representation of an idea in mind, is a ploy on representation itself.  
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Through this shift in gaze, the audience, normally the viewing subject, becomes the 
object of the conflicted representation. “The Mousetrap” becomes a mirror reflecting both 
Hamlet’s view of events and Shakespeare’s view of the audience. As a symbol of 
representational drama itself, the optic event of the play within the play places both that which is 
symbolic of real events and that which is imaginary in the eyes of the viewer on the same visual 
plane—Hamlet’s view. As Armstrong relates, 
Within the optical field of drama, the ‘real’ enables the identification of yet another type 
of gaze. An imaginary vision founds and maintains itself according to the exclusive 
duality and illusory mastery of the mirror relation. The symbolic gaze of the Other 
disturbs this imaginary sovereignty of the optical field, by introducing that perspective 
from which the subject is surveyed as an object. (20) 
 
In Hamlet, therefore, Shakespeare closes the gap between viewing representation and viewing 
views or expectations. Hamlet no longer perceives a sovereign—or distinct objective—reality, 
but a suspended contrary as viewed through a mirror. That which represents real events and that 
which exists only in the mind’s eye become intraconvertible.  
 Thus, representation in Hamlet indicates an assault on the standard of representation—
that it represents something real. By suspending the divide which normally exists between what 
is symbolic or representative of something real and what is only imaginary, Shakespeare 
denounces that real as, to use Armstrong’s term, “phantasmal” (19), just as Hamlet does when he 
unfixes his mind from its matter. Without the standard of observable concretes as the basis for 
representation, Shakespeare’s dramatic cartography becomes a map, not of reality, but of a view. 
The standard for representation as presented in Hamlet is like two opposing mirrors, a view of a 
view, without any clear indication of what would be exposed if one were removed. As the mind 
has thoughts without matter, and as men cast shadows without bodies, Shakespeare casts 
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representation without affirming the reality to support it. Thus, with no material to be conscious 
of, what Shakespeare displays is something less than consciousness—it is a purposeful 
contradiction, not unlike those discussed in previous chapters but attenuated to a higher ideal in 
fictional drama. 
 Therefore, without any real matter on which observations are based, with the ideal for 
representation being not a view of reality but the audience’s view of a view, what would be 
Shakespeare’s ideal observer? Someone completely undistracted by the “shadows” of what some 
call reality, someone able to cross the schism between the actions of the play and the audience 
beyond it. In short: a blind man. According to this standard of representation which unhinges 
itself from the burden of true symbolism, the removal of sensory perception elevates the 
perception of the spirit. In Hamlet, representation bypasses material symbolism to take a shortcut 
via “The Mousetrap” through the imagination of the audience. In King Lear, that imagination is 
given a concrete through blindness. “Identification” becomes a site of transformation at the loss 
of Earthly sight, as blindness becomes Shakespeare’s ideal for a pure presentation of a king who 
sees himself, less than the shadow of a beggar, the shadow of a fool. 
 Blindness as a Subjective Ideal: Sight and Site in King Lear 
 
 Shakespeare’s representation prioritizes the audience’s view of a character’s view over 
the events themselves. As such, the priority in Hamlet is not whether a murder took place or 
whether one can be proven, but whether the title character can exploit his otherworldly vision to 
reveal guilt in the murderer. The action or event of murder happens off-stage and out of time, 
supplanted in the drama by Hamlet’s view of it in “The Mousetrap.” Shakespeare’s 
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representation dismisses symbolism in favor of suspending representation as, in Derrida’s words, 
“a double that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not itself already double” (1981, 206; 
qtd in Armstrong 30), which double-view of representation climaxes in Hamlet with “The 
Mousetrap,” where the view of a view of an event is given a concrete. It reveals a mind already 
made double by the tragic flaws Shakespeare imparts on it. The audience’s view then takes on a 
personage in the drama by viewing this new concrete. That personage is an “Other” of sight 
which capitalizes Shakespeare’s anti-symbolism. Its ideal is blindness, which rears its head in 
King Lear as a literal blindness evoking an innate feminine interior in the ruptured identity of the 
king. This contradiction resituates the vanishing point of King Lear’s visual spectrum into the 
real audience by forcing a view which cannot see, or a view of a reflection, to take 
representational precedent over the real world.  
The Willing Blind: Gloucester’s Desire in King Lear 
 
To prevent Regan from finding Lear and with her “cruel nails/ pluck out his poor old 
eyes” (3.7.50-57) Gloucester undergoes the procedure in his stead, an act worse than death, as it 
implies that the character is not only crippled but nonexistent in the space of representation. The 
audience cannot be delighted or even horrified, but are instead skeptical of the implications. As 
Johnson stated, the blinding is a state “too horrid to be endured in dramatic exhibition, and such 
as must always compel the mind to relieve its distress by incredulity” (qtd in Wimsatt, 126). 
Lashing out against Gloucester as a vain surrogate for the anger she reserves for her father, 
Regan initiates the most dramatic visual shift in the play, such that in accordance with Johnson’s 
description the audience enters a state less of horror than of disbelief. The audience’s view of a 
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man losing his sight calls their own site into question, for if dramatic representation no longer 
has any material corollary, where, the audience must ask, are they? Even if they discovered it, in 
keeping with Johnson’s assertion, they would not believe it. 
Taking Shakespeare’s cartography as a mode of representation without a corollary, as a 
description of a reflection, the audience does indeed view from somewhere—namely, in-
between. The audience enters a perceptual flux by Gloucester’s punishment of the visual—not 
only in the clear deprivation of the sense organ itself, but in the act of removing him from the 
standard of representation. In order to transpose the visual focal point of the play onto a new 
point beyond the drama, Shakespeare attacks his character with a conspicuous and 
transformative punishment. Left “dark and comfortless” (3.7.103), Gloucester has to “smell/ His 
way to Dover” (3.7.93). The audience becomes equally blind—where they should be viewing 
representations of actions on-stage, by blinding Gloucester Shakespeare re-transposes the map of 
his drama onto their imagination, as somewhere in-between the reality they perceive and the one 
they desire. 
 To further reduce the stable on-stage representation, Gloucester’s form on-stage enters its 
own kind of flux—the loss of sight becomes a symbolic loss of manhood. At first it seems that 
Gloucester is punished, however, his blindness is a self-stigmatization accepted and even desired 
in defense of his king. By sending Lear away from the “eyeless rage” (3.1.8) he fully expects to 
embody it by becoming blind. The reduction of his manhood is a result of his desire to barter 
with his worldly sight. Freud states (of Oedipus) that “The self-blinding … was simply a 
mitigated form of the punishment of castration” (1985b, 356). Gloucester perversely desires this 
castration to go beyond sight as a means of reasserting his place in Lear’s kingdom as an 
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embodiment of the disquiet which has brought on the tragedy—his role is an equivalent one in 
the representation of the drama.  
 His desire for blindness is a desire to embody the flux Lear’s chaotic nature has made of 
his kingdom. He states in Act 1, Scene 2, 
We have seen the best of  
our time. Machinations, hollowness, treachery, and  
all ruinous disorders follow us disquietly to our  
graves.] (1.2.112-121) 
 
As an enunciation of the disorder and unnatural chaos which is “disquieting” the kingdom, 
Gloucester proclaims his role in it. At first merely the object of the renouncement of natural 
bonds, as those between father and son, Gloucester finally protects his king, his last bastion of an 
old and reasonable order, by remanding his self to the darkness to become like the “disorders.” 
He does so through blindness, as Shakespeare’s final step into the representational chaos 
emulated by the ideal of a blind man’s inconstant substitute for symbolism. How blindness 
serves this end becomes evident when Gloucester’s sightlessness is compared to the figure in the 
painting by Antoine Coypel entitled, “The Error.”    
As Lear seeks the mother’s presence through her absence, Gloucester seeks a beyond-
sight through blindness, even at the risk, to paraphrase Derrida, of falling from a cliff (Memoirs 
of the Blind). In “The Error” the central figure’s eyes are veiled by a white fold. A question 
arises: why does the man not undo the fold himself? The title indicates not a tragedy but a 
choice, not a matter of circumstance but of volition (though self-deceiving). With this 
understanding, the central figure becomes a man who unwills himself with his will, who defeats 
his senses with the belief in their futility. More than a blind man, the man in Coypel’s “The 
Error” becomes an icon of all possible blindnesses. With outstretched hand, he seeks the sense 
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world on another plane, as his being becomes as invisible to him as much as visibility, the thing, 
is to everyone. This ideal of a blind man’s senses realizing a representation beyond sense is a 
dramatic concrete of Shakespeare’s cartographic vision. In Hamlet, it surfaces as a shift in 
identity for the title character as he re-focuses on the audience’s view of his own representations. 
In King Lear, the shift occurs at the climax of Gloucester’s desire for the blind man’s sense to 
protect Lear, who mimics Gloucester’s literal blindness with his own tragedy. They convene on 
the Cliffs of Dover, which will conclude this section. The source of this desire, however, and its 
corollary to a cartographic gaze, is triggered by Act 1, Scene 1, through Lear’s rhetorical battle 
with his self and with his daughters—this becomes the current subject. 
Give Me the Map: Lear and Cartographic Identity 
 
 Gloucester’s desire for blindness reflects the play’s progression toward a reconstituted 
form of representation. As his blindness began the section on King Lear, it will conclude it. 
However, how the shift in Gloucester’s perception indicates a cartographic aim is clearer in light 
of the play’s beginning, in which Lear incites his own tragedy when he accosts his daughters, not 
merely for an evaluation of their paternal love, but for an enumeration of their identity through 
that love. As Gloucester found his new self at the loss of his sight, in Old Tom’s words, Lear 
demands reinforcement for an identity which exists only through rhetoric. His daughters’ 
response appears to Lear as what Julia Lupton calls a “reflective mirror” (124). This mirror is the 
dissecting tool through which the daughters’ niceties become a reflecting and even a duplicating 
element in the king’s narcissistic evaluation. Through the daughters’ superlatives and 
comparisons, their language beyond sense and value, Lear’s daughters incite the danger of 
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narcissistic seduction—by it King Lear succumbs to the image of himself as reflected by his vain 
daughters. This re-mapping or re-territorializing of Lear’s identity displaces the terms of 
representation from what Lear actually is onto what he believes himself to be, a transformation 
which does not become a concrete image to the audience until blindness transforms the drama’s 
visual identity to match that of the king.  
When Lear presents the territory of the kingdom as an object upon which its desirable 
subjects may be mapped by the king, he literally relates the rhetorical transformation in Act 1 
Scene 1 with cartography—“Give me the map there” (1.1.38), he states. His political theology 
traces the affinities and antagonisms between politics and people, by attempting to transcribe the 
kingly political identity onto his daughters. However, as Lupton’s mirror reveals, this results in 
Lear’s self-identification as his cartographic tampering invokes an awkward equation of 
theatricality and naturality, or, a conflict between the body of the monarchial performance and 
the body of the real man. Kantorowicz describes this schism in The King’s Two Bodies when he 
calls Shakespeare’s dismemberment of the kingship “a violent separation” of the political and 
natural bodies of the monarch (41). As a political work, King Lear draws on visually divisive 
marks to simultaneously emphasize the anatomy of the kingdom and its patchwork construction 
out of the expectations its subjects have for their king’s body. The issue of power over the kingly 
identity, or the “Corporation in himself that liveth ever,” (qtd in Kantorowicz 24), is an issue of 
visual identification which Lear makes overtly about crossing visual barriers. 
With the map, Lear conscripts his daughters based on his expectations. “We make thee 
lady … Be this perpetual” (1.1.72-73) he says as he points to the proposed area of the map. The 
solicitation here—between land and body—is enough historically instituted to come as no 
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surprise. Observing the monarch’s power through the rhetorical mirror of Lear’s expectations, 
however, more as a visual scheme than a political one, breaks the barrier between the play on 
and off-stage. To this effect, Shakespeare inserts a schism into the presence of the king, a neither 
here nor there identity out of which Lear becomes into his two bodies. The division reveals an 
inherent duality in kingship itself, a cipher for decoding Shakespeare’s political rhetoric. When 
proclaiming “give me the map here,” Lear attempts to transcribe his daughters’ identities onto 
the blank slate of their answer. Yet, because they are driven by the King’s mirrored expectations, 
nothing which they say can respond reasonably to a coherent meaning. The only referent their 
speech possesses is abstract: Lear’s expectation for their own emotive reflection. Daughters 
Regan and Goneril receive Lear’s call for love with wordiness to match his patronizing 
intentions. “Dearer than eyesight,” Goneril hastes to reply, for she loves him “Beyond what can 
be valued” (1.1.62-63). In other words, she trades her sights for the identification of Lear’s 
kingly identity. Through Gloucester’s blinding, Shakespeare’s value representation begins to 
assume a reordered presentation of dramatic symbols—here Goneril enacts a similar effect 
through transformative rhetoric. 
Lear’s self-identification becomes concrete following the enucleation of Gloucester. 
Lear, despite the blind man’s efforts, enters into the raging storm “which of the king would 
‘make nothing of’” (3.1.9). From this nothing, the sublime trodden-on eyes of Gloucester initiate 
Lear’s identification of his reflective self, generated through rhetoric with his daughters at the 
play’s beginning. The presence of the map as a generative or dissecting tool reveals a startling 
truth: that of Lear’s own femininity. The claim that Gloucester’s blinding reverses his manhood 
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has this corollary in Lear’s rhetoric, just as the loss of sight unhinges Gloucester from the 
dramatic representation as it separates the king’s two bodies.  
Cordelia: From Nothing, All 
 
The revelation of Lear’s femininity occurs when Cordelia confronts the king with her 
“nothing” in Act 1, Scene 1. When asked to give rhetorical consecrations of her fatherly love, 
Cordelia gives him an absence. This proclaims her love, however, as she says, 
CORDELIA Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave 
My heart into my mouth. I love your Majesty 
According to my bond, no more nor less. (1.1.100-103) 
 
She does not grant Lear the narcissistic reflection freely offered by her sisters—for this reason 
Lear seeks only Cordelia in the heart of his tragedy. The “nothing” confronts Lear with the 
absence of his wife, and rhetorically situates the gap within his own psyche. At first, his response 
is violent, condemning Cordelia for her transgression. Rene Girard describes this anger in 
Shakespeare and the Theater of Envy when he relates that “the no or the nothing that the child 
sends back to the father resounds as a terrible condemnation …  a real excommunication hangs 
over him/ her” (168). For Lear, while his children support his kingly identity, the “nothing” from 
his favorite wracks him to his royal core. With his manhood thus challenged, Lear attempts to 
reassert his fatherly power with condemnation. According to Girard, this becomes a construct of 
Shakespearean drama, this condemnation initiated by nothing. However, Lear’s assertion only 
accentuates the power of Cordelia’s nothing, and consequently brings to light the mother 
enunciated by the intense absence in Lear himself and in the play. 
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The confrontation with Cordelia’s absent/ present love enunciates a feminine complex in 
Lear as a mirror to the castration of Gloucester later in the play. Though the mother seems 
absent, as Copelia Kahn remarked, it is just such an absence which reveals her imminence, or 
“points to her presence” (242). The mother’s hidden form comes to light in Lear’s anger, as a 
silhouette beneath a veiled figure. Rather than a mother per se, however, Lear more accurately 
embodies a “birther,” specifically of illusions. This specific aspect of motherhood signals the 
cartographic discourse in King Lear in its ability to take expectations and re-form bodily 
territories in their image. In his anger, Lear attempts to re-map his own genealogy, relinquishing 
his “Propinquity, and property of blood” (1.1.126) as he condemns that which he loves most. He 
does so with images of engorgement, as “He that makes his generation messes/ To gorge his 
appetite, shall to my bosom be as well neighbored” (1.1.130-132). The consumption of one’s 
enemies holds barbarous significance in subscriptions to genetic memory, i.e., eating the body 
one gains its knowledge. Lear equates the line of one’s consumption to the line of one’s blood 
with an unsettling sexual desire to feed his narcissism while keeping his favorite daughter close 
by engorging her. The “reverse birthing” is a direct result of his daughters’ reflective rhetoric, 
which enunciates this paradoxically protective/ destructive feminine identity in the angry king.  
 The transformation in Act 1, Scene 1 is rhetorical, a result of the king’s and his 
daughters’ inconstant value system. As Goneril stated, 
Sir, I love you more than word can wield the  
matter,  
Dearer than eyesight, space, and liberty,  
Beyond what can be valued, rich or rare,  





Lear’s gender becomes intraconvertible only when value becomes merely an abstract of his 
desires. As Goneril indicates, what can be valued has no sway over his affection. Lear’s affection 
is based entirely on the identities he desires for his daughters, and which he initiates through 
cartographic means. For Goneril and Reagan, none of the symbols or real conditions of beauty, 
like words or values, can represent love. Of course, Lear comes to understand this value-less 
representation only too late. He suspends the relationship between love and value—he demands 
to be courted by “more than word” through words. Cordelia offers him the only rational cure 
when he asks her to court him beyond even her sister’s means and she responds, “Nothing, my 
lord” (1.1.96). To defy her and continue projecting his inconstant philosophy, Lear assumes an 
image of femininity. This image is the connection between the “nothing” Lear receives and the 
blindness it represents—his transformation occurs not through the genitals but through their 
representation in the eyes. As he cries “hot tears” (1.4.314) Lear promises rather than to cry 
again (as his feminine self) that he will “pluck” out his eyes and “cast” them away (1.4.319-20). 
Thus, his metaphorical castration at the hands of his feminine interior results in blindness. 
 Gloucester’s blinding is an act of violent substitution which brings the visual spectrum of 
the play into a literal encounter with Lear’s inconstant gender. Eyeballs and genitals confer at the 
surge of “vile jelly” (3.7.101) or sperm. With his “precious stones” (5.3.226) of sight now lost, 
Gloucester gropes towards Dover, where Kent promises that he may “see Cordelia” (3.1.46). 
This foreshadows the result of Gloucester’s blindness—a “sight beyond sight” which serves to 
accentuate Lear’s gender transformation and suspend the play’s visual encounter with the 
“nothing.” The loss of his eyes as a sensory castration becomes to Gloucester as to Lear a “full 
cause of weeping” (2.4.325). Despite being crown-fallen and woeful over his daughters, 
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however, Lear does not weep. He endures the succession of tragedies as his worldly eyesight 
begins to leave him—as in Lamentations 5, “for these things [his] eyes are dim.” Gloucester tries 
to shoulder his burden, but instead provides it a concrete in Shakespeare’s scheme of 
representation. On the Cliffs of Dover, this scheme reaches its climax as the exhibition of the 
core feminine element at the sight of the fiend and its justification in Old Tom’s sermon. 
Words Become Events: Dover and Representation 
 
Old Tom’s words come to create space in Shakespeare’s representational scheme. To use 
Goldberg’s phrase, his “words become events.” Representations become presentations in a 
rhetorical transformation of dramatic scenes into imaginary spaces. When Gloucester arrives at 
Dover, he believes himself not to be on a cliff by the sea but on level ground. This is no less true 
for the audience, for whom language would provide the location and action of the drama no 
matter its nature or what play to which it referred. Shakespeare’s goal of representation seems 
not, as it would be custom in playwriting to conscript real images in the text, but rather “to take 
to take what the mind makes as the goal at which representation aims” (Goldberg 540). Dover is 
a place of illusionistic representation where the audience incites its own collective mind’s eye 
into the recreation of a place which becomes an optic event—space is no longer represented by 
words but presented by rhetorical events.  
The voice of Poor Tom generates the spectacle for Gloucester, as Tom gives a visible 
presence to his demonic double. To view himself, Tom ascends the imaginary cliffs and 
retroactively places himself at both the crest and valley of his image to emerge as a new pictorial 
space only the blind can perceive. He enables the representation which “seems” and “shows” and 
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“appears” in the fashion most useful to his aim, both a metaphysical and a sensory 
reduction.  Tom’s illusion requires subjects to be reduced, dismantled, and deleted. He incites the 
place in which we must “stand still” to acquire the correct view (vanishing) point. From above, 
all below seems “too small for sight,” which in turn comes to mean more than size, as he reveals 
his opinion of sight’s “deficien[ce]” (4.6.28)  in the viewing of such sublime illusions. As 
Coypel’s central figure, blindness has the potential to generate beyond sights and new sites. 
Without Old Tom’s guidance, the man in the painting commits the eponymous error—groping 
for the material world in blindness, his representations failing him. “Nature’s above art in that 
respect” (4.6.105), Lear told Edgar/ Tom. Gloucester successfully senses Tom’s “graphic echo,” 
to use Gleyzon’s phrase, on the grid which Tom lays over Dover in Gloucester’s mind (37). In 
Shakespeare’s scheme, the most ideal world is thus, an echo of the senses—the blind man’s 
perspective become into the generating force of representation.  
 Therefore, Gloucester’s blindness equips him to recognize the image itself as language.  
Old Tom uses sightlessness as a cipher to decode the cliff in the mind’s eye of the audience. The 
fiend doubles Tom’s presence into the audience’s imaginary space, as Lear’s self-reflecting 
rhetoric makes an image of his feminine self. Both act as a mirror which leads the blind men to 
dissembling female gazes—both become a castrating force. “Proper deformity seems not in the 
fiend/ So horrid as in woman” (4.2.60-61) Lear exclaims, considering his daughters objects of 
beauty and of destruction, at once paralyzing and reflective. The figure of the Medusa thereby 
becomes an active visual force in Shakespeare’s representational ideal. The conjuration of the 
fiend is inward and yet presents itself as a foreign element to the body—it is a specter of the 
beyond-sight, a monstrous figure of feminine power. This figure ultimately petrifies the sightless 
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into an image of themselves. With its masculine protrusions and feminine absences, the 
“thousand noses” and “horns whelked and waved” (4.6.87-88), the Medusa presents Lear with 
his own inconstant gender. Gloucester finally realizes Derrida’s fear as he is thrown from the 
cliff to ascend with his gaze back into the startling form of the figure beyond space, sight, and 
value perched on the cliff above. He closes the gap between images and language with one 
uncanny result: petrification. 
 Though the Medusa becomes concrete at Dover, its presence permeates the entire drama. 
Lear describes Goneril in Act 2, Scene 4 as having “struck me with her tongue,/ Most serpent-
like, upon the very heart” (2.4.180-1) complimenting the reflective nature of his daughter’s 
words with an allusion to that mythical and dissembling gaze. He thinks of himself at once as a 
man losing his kinghood and becoming into the image of his feminine other. As Scott Wilson 
writes, 
But what beyond (or perhaps before) ‘radical alterity’ does 
this ... fiend signify? . . .[T]he three main elements—the 
two moons, the “thousand whelked and horny noses” and 
the sea itself—suggest both feminine and phallic 
significations reminiscent of Medusa....[T]he image of the 
fiend denotes the radical alterity of the gaze of the Other, 
since the interpellative power of Medusa’s gaze was so 
strong it turned individual subjects into concrete. 
(qtd 37) 
 
Before this gaze, Gloucester “stand[s] still” to acquire the proper view, petrified by the change in 
his perception of images. Tom projects the fiend onto our gaze as a radical and uncanny specter 
of suspension. Such suspension forces Gloucester to experience an unsettling combination of the 
beyond-self and the self, a combination of both genders and both views. The ultimate result is a 
figurative, imagistic petrification. He longs for the illusion of satisfaction, desire, rest, and thus 
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resigns his self to blindness, i.e., to stasis. Taken more literally by his gender displacement, Lear 
subjects himself to a chiasmic self-identification. As he laments in Act 1, Scene 4, 
LEAR Does any here know me? This is not Lear.  
Does Lear walk thus, speak thus? Where are his  
eyes?  
Either his notion weakens, his discernings  
Are lethargied—Ha! Waking? ’Tis not so.  
Who is it that can tell me who I am?  
FOOL Lear’s shadow. 
(1.4.231-237) 
 
He cannot identify his self as such—it splays across the play’s events as a beggar’s shadow, a 
reversal of identity which leaves him metaphysically petrified and prone to tragedy. 
 The things which make Lear a proper monarch—manner of speech, walk, his noble 
mien—become “lethargied” at the detection of the “other Lear.” As Lacan relates,  
The fundamental position of the ego confronted with its image is indeed this immediate 
reversibility of the position of master and servant … keep[ing] it at a distance from what 
is fundamentally at stake, namely the recognition of desire. (1988, 265-6; qtd. in 
Armstrong 42) 
 
Shakespeare opens Lear’s chest and presents the view as dissembling. As Lear struggles to 
recognize his self, reflections become errant symptoms of his onset madness. “I fear I am not in 
my perfect mind,” he relates in Act 4, “For, as a man, I think this lady/ To be my child, Cordelia” 
(4.7.78-9). Unable to accept that desire is possible for him on Earth—for nothing did he desire so 
much as to see his once-more favorite daughter one last time—and yet seeing her before him, the 
only possible conclusion must be madness.
44
 As a conclusion to Armstrong’s reversal, 
Shakespeare makes of Lear’s self a slave to its self. 
                                                 
44
 As it is for Burton, who proclaimed that “if thou shalt either conceive, or climbe to see, thou shalt soone 
perceive that all the world is mad” (1:24). 
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 The terms by which he accomplishes this are cartographic. By substituting Lear’s noble 
self with its viewable double, Shakespeare re-maps the dramatic scene into a graphic reflection.  
As Armstrong relates, 
In visual perception … the uncanny would occur when the gaze crosses over to, becomes 
inscribed upon, or maps across, the image of the subject’s ego, which may take the form 
of its reflection in the mirror, or of another subject with whom it has a specular 
relationship … which creates the uncanny double (Armstrong 44) 
 
By suspending gender, Shakespeare’s characters subscribe to the impossibility of a stable 
identity. The relationship between the king and the fiend, between the substance and this 
shadow, is dictated principally by fear—the only mode through which the king can hope to grasp 
his existence. Though he desires to see his self, Shakespeare gives him in its place what Lacan 
calls a “tired lure of the shadow as if it were substance” (Lacan 1977b, 315-16). Indeed, the sight 
of substance’s shadow takes precedent over substance in Shakespeare’s cartographic magic 
show—Dover is the prestige in a three-part rhetorical act which began with Cordelia’s 
“Nothing.” The result is a shift in representation: from acts of symbolic drama to events of 
imaginary vision. Lear’s and Gloucester’s minds are made subject to the views which they 
experience, just as the audience cannot help succumbing to the imaginary space Shakespeare 
makes for them in their own minds. The fear of unveiling one’s essential self rears its head as the 
Medusa figure on the Cliffs of Dover and gives Shakespeare’s representational aim a form. That 
figure claims the most significance in the dissembling visage of the king’s corpse in Macbeth, 





In Sight of the Heart: Actions and Aims in Macbeth 
 
 The sum of Macbeth studies could be re-writ as a declamation of fate’s cruelty to the 
ambitions of a still crueler man. Here, the premise of Shakespeare’s representational 
revisionism—or, the use of cartographic shifts to bring about reflective and dissembling 
identities—provides a study in the desires of the man, rather than speculation on the whims of 
nature. As a man perhaps most cognizant of his actions out of the three works discussed, 
Macbeth’s illusion of his self reflects most clearly. On the aegis of his actions, two events rear 
the dissembling head of his identity: the viewing of the armed head and the viewing of King 
Duncan’s body. Here Macbeth’s ambition is not taken at the whim of fate. Rather, through 
Shakespeare’s reflective gazes Macbeth’s identity rests at the generative power of his fear.  
 Macbeth’s fear does not move him to flee, but attempts to make him impenetrable. He 
becomes at once vulnerable and armored, open and closed, much as the armored ghost in 
Hamlet, a dichotomy of presence and absence. His fear takes the definition offered by the The 
French Academie: 
Feare is not onely a fantasie and imagination of evill approaching, or a perturbation of the 
soule proceeding from the opinion it hath of some evill to come, but it is also a 
contraction and closing up of the heart …  
(1594 p. 261) 
 
The duality of his heart—closed to feeling yet afraid of his ambition—causes Macbeth to deflect 
the very volition which moves him to action. If action were the purpose of a man, as the 
philosopher states, or what Fergusson called “a movement of the will in the light of the mind” 




Stars, hide your fires; 
Let not light see my black and deep desires. 
The eye wink at the hand, yet let that be 
Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see. 
(1:4:57) 
 
This clearly is not a man driven by unbridled ambition, who fears to know his own heart equally 
as he fears his heart to see the actions of his hands. Moreover, ambition implies motivated 
success, and Macbeth acts contrary to his own good, even purposefully fashioning his own 
downfall as he kills powerful allies as indiscriminately as enemies.  Though Macbeth claims to 
“dare do all that may become a man” (1.7.43), his most clear aim is spiritual absolution from the 
actions he supposedly cannot control.  
 Therefore, both Macbeth and his Lady ignore the act of murder in favor of the fear which 
succeeds it. Shakespeare representation in this case, as in those previously discussed, prioritizes 
images over actions. Lady Macbeth’s does not obsess over the moment or event of murder, but in 
its visual markers. She laments in Act 5, Scene 1, 
Out, damned spot, out, I say! One. Two. 
Why then, ’tis time to do ’t. Hell is murky. Fie, my 
lord, fie, a soldier and afeard? What need we fear 
who knows it, when none can call our power to 
account? Yet who would have thought the old man 
to have had so much blood in him? 
 (5.1.37-42) 
 
Were she a foolish victim of her own unbound ambition, she would regret the act itself. Instead 
she fixates on the aftermath of their murderous motivations, propounded by its grisly image. She 
did not anticipate the psychological blood on her hands, and finds herself after the act in a 
moment of uncertainty. Thus, the bell and portentous knocking arrange her fears in a mythicized 
pattern—an idea—whose persistence in her mind will prove her own dissolution. As for 
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Macbeth, though his uncourageous statement “if we should fail” (1.7.68) successfully rests his 
fear, it does not do so because it permits him some moral conclusion, but because he has turned 
an idea into an act, a sight into a form. He can deal with the stabbing, but not the blood, the 
action but not the idea. 
 To establish this contrast, Shakespeare presents Macbeth from the onset as a man of 
frequently venerable action. Act 1 presents Macbeth of-stage with a sort of mythic reverence, as 
it acclaims, 
The multiplying villainies of nature 
Do swarm upon him …  
And Fortune, on his damnèd quarrel smiling, 
Showed like a rebel’s whore. But all’s too weak; 
For brave Macbeth (well he deserves that name), 
Disdaining Fortune, with his brandished steel, 
Which smoked with bloody execution, 
Like Valor’s minion, carved out his passage 
Till he faced the slave; 
Which ne’er shook hands, nor bade farewell to him … 
(1.2.13-23) 
 
Here at the play’s beginning Macbeth seems a straining and physical man, bound by action and 
the conscript of knightly valor to be brave for his king, and he succeeds in this aim. However, 
when presented with fate, even profitable, he sets out on a path of suspicion and fear. If action 
does not bring him to his destiny, Macbeth will not trust or understand its motivation. Therefore, 
feeling inextricably driven to the actions portended him, he becomes suspended within himself. 
At the destruction of the normally causal relationship between a man’s actions and his fate, 
Macbeth retreats into his interior. He fears the reflection of his own shadow, no longer under the 
binding control of his motivation. When approached by the Three Sisters with the prodigious 
promise of thanedom and kingship, fear overwhelms him. He states in Act 1, 
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If good, why do I yield to that suggestion 
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs 
Against the use of nature? Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings. 
My thought, whose murder yet is but fantastical, 
Shakes so my single state of man 
That function is smothered in surmise, 
And nothing is but what is not. 
(1.3.147-55) 
 
He will use this fear to anaesthetize his nature in favor of his supposed obligation to this 
prophecy. It comes to represent the most human part of him. As Lady Macbeth remarks, 
Duncan’s blood now on her hands as well, 
My hands are of your color, but I shame 
To wear a heart so white. 
(2.2.83) 
 
She speaks as if to absolve his heart of his hands’ deeds by calling the murder too decisive for so 
cowardly a man. By this time, ambition has no sway in the matter.  This finalizes the schism 
between Macbeth and his own bodily actions.  
 This schism is a self-anatomization. As Charlton relates, “If head and heart and hand are 
out of unison, the state of man is disrupted and the self suffers anarchic dissolution” (qtd Hyman 
9). Dissolving or dissembling the bond between Macbeth’s actions and aims provides a concrete 
image of Shakespeare’s own decision to separate language from its images, and reality from its 
space. Shakespeare presents a man at once reveled and horrified by the sight of his interior. In 
Macbeth Consulting the Vision of the Armed Head by Fuseli (1741-1825) the portrait of Macduff 
is at once a consultation and a reflection. Though only one face appears in Fuseli’s 
representation, it becomes immediately evident that that one face is duplicated within the work—
Macbeth sees himself in the specter of the armed head. In Macbeth then, as in King Lear, 
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Shakespeare presents a man’s inside as becoming an “other,” an alterity of his anatomy. For 
Macbeth, the sight of his own self simultaneously draws him into his own chest and to the knife 
in his own hand. His view of himself reveals a prophecy of his desires—the sacrifice of that self, 
as Hegel intends. The ocular thus becomes the oracular, a transformation which evinces itself 
symbolically in the dissection and presentation of King Duncan himself as the “new Gorgon.” 
Masterpiece: Duncan’s Gorgonic Body 
 
The vision of the armed head provokes the site of Macbeth’s own imagistic revisions as 
he reshapes his identity to suit the sisters’ prophecy. As Fuseli himself stated, “What would be a 
greater object of terror to you if, some night on going home, you were to find yourself sitting at 
your own table . . . would not this make a powerful impression on your mind?” (Hamlyn). The 
armed head foreshadows the image—Macbeth confronts this “object of terror” in the creation of 
the King’s corpse. On viewing his work on the body of King Duncan, Macbeth declares, 
“Confusion hath made her masterpiece” (2.3.59). The corpse becomes a striking graphic 
presentation of the suspension present throughout the play—at once a thing of horror and of 
beauty. He sees also an image of apocalypse, e.g., “great doom’s image” (2.3.72) in the form of 
Banquo’s ghost. In the Banquet scene, apocalypse occurs in Macbeth’s mind as fear contracts his 
sense of self. In this decree of the visual, Macbeth loses the self which strutted nobly across 
battlefields at the play’s beginning by suspending it in a visual confrontation with his new fear.  
As Tassi stated,  
Macbeth’s warrior violence on the battlefield and his homicidal violence in domestic 
quarters are on a continuum, both unnaturally and uncannily figured through acts of 




Therefore, his actions are acts of creation. As Lear transcribes his expectations onto the map of 
his daughter’s bodies, Macbeth generates the image of his identity on the visage of the King. 
Through this image Macbeth unveils his self to itself. 
For Macbeth to see the body of the King—normally an object of mythic religious 
significance—transfigured into an object of death, fear, and reflection is altogether dissembling. 
The masterpiece of the corpse is an imagistic mirror which shows Macbeth the view of his view 
of himself and his deed, as the armed head fixed with his own face. As Tassi continued, the sight 
of Duncan’s body is an “Estranging of memory, understanding, and will” (Tassi 157). The terms 
by which Macbeth understood his motivation abandon him at the petrifying sight of his own 
deeds. He wills himself to commit a deed which according to Tassi destroys his will. Therefore, 
that reflection makes his self a force of self-imprisonment ruled by what Mack called “The 
internal tyranny of self-will” (131). When Macbeth re-territorializes King Duncan’s corpse with 
his own identity, he becomes as Shakespeare’s ideal: a self without a body. 
While the body of the king may be destroyed, the image of kingliness prevails. As Mack 
relates, “Killing the king is almost inevitably to be attempted and yet almost inevitably 
unperformable” (130). He echoes Macbeth’s psychological obsession to create the fate given 
him—for Shakespeare, murder and tragedy are an inevitable result of Macbeth’s flaws. Without 
any surprise or suspicions of good, however, “tragedy” hardly applies. Only good men in bad 
circumstances experience tragedy and the revelation of Macbeth’s black inner core is 
unsurprising. The self-bedazzlement of Macbeth’s fear is petrifying for the fact that Macbeth is 
acquainted with it already.   
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The concrete of this fear—King Duncan’s corpse—becomes a Medusa figure in 
Macbeth’s eyes. Upon viewing the masterpiece in its chamber Macduff exclaims, 
Approach the chamber and destroy your sight 
With a new Gorgon. Do not bid me speak: 
See and then speak yourselves.” (2.3.65-67) 
 
As Macduff relates, petrification before the corpse prevents those who see it from speaking. 
Shakespeare initiates a paradox of representation when he represents a figure in words which is 
impossible to represent, speak of, or perform. The Gorgon creates an in-between space similar to 
Gloucester’s site on Dover remade in the imagination of the audience. The immortal king 
appears dead—Macbeth provides the catalyst for a paradox. His deed veils the king, the symbol 
of life, in what Vernant calls the “otherness of death” (qtd Tassi 158). The space of death and the 
space of rule converge on Macbeth’s actions and the knowledge of their ubiquity in his own 
character—this corpse becomes Macbeth’s mirror. Shakespeare thus presents the mirror, this 
dissolving artifact, as an ultimate anatomy, to dissect Macbeth from his own identity through the 
view of himself, viewing himself. 
Visual or ocular presences reveal the mirror as the ultimate source of Macbeth’s 
masterpiece. Macbeth states in Act 4, 
From this moment 
The very firstlings of my heart shall be 
The firstlings of my hand. And even now, 
To crown my thoughts with acts, be it thought and 
Done… This deed I’ll do before this purpose cool. 
But no more sights!  
(4.1.166-176) 
 
His fear of the visual, the idea versus the action, recalls Gloucester’s petrification on the cliffs 
over Dover. Each encounter a symbolic double and “stand still” as that representation takes the 
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place of their own dramatic bodies. If action is the body of Macbeth, then plot is the spirit 
(Fergusson 68)—the deed drives Macbeth to the revelation of his own identity. The mirror 
breaks down this revelation. The result is a schism between the actions and desires of the self—
Shakespeare paradoxically undermines the realization of a noble human spirit by prescribing 
none of its traits to the characters which supposedly struggle in pursuit of their passions.  
 Shakespeare’s metaphysics—which idealize impossible yet inevitable passions—have the 
same result in his men as his cartography has on his scheme of representation.  Macbeth is not a 
man acting, but a man imitating an act, an idea rendered on the semblance of an impassioned 
outburst. Traits which Shakespeare assigns to tragedy become inevitable in his drama. He relates 
to Burton in this way, with his own diagnosis of madness on a foolscap globe. Though for 
Burton madness occurred through the body (action), it appears in Shakespeare through the spirit 
(plot). Shakespeare’s representation crosses a barrier to re-assert itself in the audience’s mind’s 
eye. What’s more, it takes this new view as representation itself. His dramatic acts do not 
represent a real corollary any more than Macbeth’s actions indicate a real desire. Simulation 
becomes the means and the end of the spirit in Shakespeare’s scheme. 
 The result in Macbeth is a futile existence, driven by an irreparable and inevitable 
conflict of purpose between the mind’s matter and its thoughts. Macbeth cannot act as himself, 
as his self paradoxically undermines the realization of his own spirit. The omnipotence of his 
ideological eye drives his natural hand to extinction. The same truth applies to Shakespeare’s 
space. As a dissolute individual spirit is not even an event, but a pre-extant for Shakespeare, 
Kant’s notion of space as subjective in a collective mind’s eye founds the climaxes of his drama. 
Shakespeare’s visual scheme attacks the constructs of representation which should make re-
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presentative art possible, namely, its corollaries in the real world. The double-mirror asserts 
Shakespeare’s view and his space, with the reflection of a reflection as his ideal. He uses blind 
men as ciphers to decode this view for the audience. With this view, he would seem rather to see 
a noble man petrified by the emergent woman in him than permit the possibility for fearlessness 
and success. The mirror reveals a space in which the sight of the individual body becomes the 
site of its undoing. Reflective surfaces are as epistemological torture devices in Shakespeare, 
which re-assert gorgonic myths the better to un-assert the possibility of a noble self in the real 
world.  
 Visual suspension asserts Shakespeare’s ideal spaces, or spaces in-between perception 
and desire. Views of views and plays within plays serve as its dramatic concretes—in Hamlet by 
restructuring events against the new vanishing point in the audience’s view of “The Mousetrap,” 
in King Lear by suspending imagistic illusions on the aegis of Lear’s unraveling femininity, and 
in Macbeth by the explicit schism between a man’s thoughts and acts, his eye and hand. Self-
assertion dissipates in Shakespeare’s drama, as the ability to assert passions effectively becomes 
impossible in inconstant spaces. If Burton would denote the literary space as the realm of 
madness, and Moore of complacence, the self’s struggle in Shakespeare takes as its ideal another 
emotion entirely, which pervades each character and acts for Shakespeare as the paradigm of the 
human visual scheme: self-lessness.  
 A world which only exists in the audience’s mind places the individual’s identity in 
flux—as stated in Chapter II, a consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction. 
Attempts to assert a desire-action continuum in Shakespeare’s characters must begin with a re-
assertion of a world in which this contradiction is not upheld. As they are, Shakespeare’s 
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characters cannot succeed—the tragic flaws they incur from the futility of their own desires 
make their happiness impossible. They have no will to consciousness. Without an ability to 
confer their desires with their actions, they are more driven by Shakespeare’s insistence on self-
destruction than on ambition. The pace of Shakespeare’s drama affirms the space in which no 
self can exist as such, in which space itself is a construct of consciousness, as Kant concludes. 
Shakespeare seems to raise the audience’s perception as his re-presentative ideal: the result is a 
renouncement of the individual’s power to assert his own desires. A collective perception 
becomes his standard and, much as for More and Burton, results in no individual will, no 
consciousness, and no reality. Therefore, in order to present volition as a viable outcome in 
fiction, space must be re-asserted as objective and real. John Milton’s authorial identity, and an 
insistence on traversable cartographic spaces, asserts a possibility for volition (and therefore for 
self-happiness) by accepting space in the pre-text of conscious beings and not, as Shakespeare 
would demonstrate and Kant would deign to prove, the reverse. Milton’s partial affirmation of 
this space—the greatest in his time, in any case—becomes the subject of the last chapter, to 









An Invocation of Self: John Milton’s Authorial Identity as a Preface to 
Objective Cartography 
 
 Shakespeare creates a truly self-defying corpus, a body (of work) which belies the in-text 
individual’s success and happiness. Inevitable misery becomes a pre-condition of having desire 
in Shakespeare’s corpus. The source of this metaphysical change is spatial—a shift in the visual 
vanishing point of the drama which refocuses on the audience’s imagination as the aim and 
source of that drama. With the mental product of an image thus prioritized over its 
representation, Shakespeare invokes Kant, who “treated man as an exclusively cognitive being” 
(Wallace 190). In other words, in Shakespeare’s discourse, man becomes subject to his own 
cognition. As such, in Shakespeare’s corpus perceptions of events become representational 
ideals—where the representation of a real sea might have transpired, he abandons “deficient 
sight” for a scene beyond representation. A blind man becomes his ideal observer, able to will 
beyond material and simulate the perception represented by a world-less cartography, which 
results inevitably in destruction.  
For John Milton, authorial identity forms the sine qua non of his poetic trajectory, the key 
by which his map may be deciphered. His prophetic, even revisionist, maps distinguish him 
among Renaissance authors in his persistence on historiographical, rather than imaginary, space, 
as the measure of the dramatic journey. While voices and perspectives conflate to present his 
unique theology, extant historical spaces rein his prophetic and poetic voices to his fixed identity. 
As Catherine Belsey said of On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity, the poem possesses a divine 
“presence,” and what it “seeks to realise depends precisely on eliminating the difference of 
which it is composed” (1998). Belsey speaks rightly, as his poems serve as theological 
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reductions resolving the differences, paradoxes, and seeming contradictions in his Christian 
doctrine internally and in the context of a multi-faceted worldview. He takes measures to remain 
prudent before the orthodoxy and the history it protects, while with an audacious authorial 
identity cleansing that history “on the shrine of itself,” to paraphrase his words to Diodati.
45
 His 
distance from the authors thus far discussed is a matter of ideology—his spatiality is the only of 
those mentioned which permits the possibility of a self in the world with attainable 
understanding and happiness. That he accomplishes this feat with a comparable shift in 
representation, that is, one towards blindness, only aids the connection. 
Milton’s historical perspective is inherently cartographic—On the Morning of Christ’s 
Nativity takes place from a range of distance rather than time, as Milton runs across history to 
greet the sovereign in his own fashion. Likewise, his objective in Paradise Lost to “Justify the 
ways of God to men” (ln. 26) asserts the force of his will to judge based on what he observes in 
the world. The difference between his prognosis and Burton’s is that while An Anatomy of 
Melancholy preaches a truth that all men’s truths are mad falsehoods, the act of writing Paradise 
Lost itself nurtures the unique perspective of an attainable understanding, even beneath heaven. 
This near-blasphemous point of departure serves as the insertion point of Milton’s moral 
dissection of the Christian doctrine. With this incision, he imbeds himself within that doctrine, as 
the one who “to be first” at the nativity discounts the wizards’ fame, traverses historical spaces, 
and rewrites theology in his image.  
                                                 
45
 Milton spoke in a letter concerning On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity to his friend and confidant 
Charles Diodati, that his purpose in inserting the pagan idols into the Christian doctrinal canon was to “sing the 
starry axis and the singing hosts in the sky, and of the gods suddenly destroyed in their own shrines” (The Complete 
Poetry and Essential Prose of John Milton, “Elegia sexta”). 
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Milton achieves his unique purpose, like Shakespeare, by changing the conditions of 
perception in his poetics. His prophecy occurs through sensory blinding—as Gloucester reaches 
Shakespeare’s seemingly ideal representation by losing his sight of the material world, Milton 
observes light as a transition to discovering his sight beyond site. Milton, as Derrida relates in 
Memoirs of the Blind, “received blindness as a blessing, a prize, a reward, a divine ‘requital,’ the 
gift of poetic and political clairvoyance, the chance for prophecy” (128). Milton trades the 
worldly measure of sight—as one would see “nature’s works” (Paradise Lost 3.49)
46
—for the 
revelatory light of God, the “spiritual sky on the inside” (Derrida 112). Milton refers to this 
spiritual interiority as he deigns to approach those “things invisible to mortal sight” (3.55), with 
which he imbues his poetic works with prophetic light, adopting the dual role which Lewalski 
assigned him, an observation integral to this chapter. This method which Milton employs 
parallels that of his contemporaries and does not reinforce this paper’s notion of an objective 
cartography. Viewing these doctrines from this trans-historical perspective, however, reveals a 
single change in epistemology effected by Milton, which though he employs as proof of a 
transcendental, the result in-text becomes as self-affirming as any in his time. Where for 
Shakespeare blindness serves as a visual dissolution of the self, it serves Milton’s self as its own 
reckoning. Milton never prioritizes a second-hand representation—the mind’s eye of a 
collective—advocating instead his authorial enlightenment. This is the first step towards 
affirming an objective cartography; the Christianity of his prose is secondary to that fact. 
A potent authorial insertion marks Milton’s doctrine, setting it apart from More’s re-
valuation and Shakespeare’s visual tampering. Prophetic power in Milton rests with the author 
                                                 
46
 Hereafter all citations in this numerical style will be taken as implied from Paradise Lost. 
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and not the audience—only he himself can run to his sovereign. Milton observes from the Earth 
with the most fervent identification of individual identity in the authors discussed, as near a 
champion of authorial volition as the Early Modern period could produce. As opposed to 
Burton’s ubiquitous prescription of madness, More’s boot-stamp on representative meaning, and 
Shakespeare’s deconstructive dissection of individual will, Milton’s corpus announces the birth 
of the author’s identifiable judgment in his work. He does this through a visual scheme which 
shares the means but rejects the ends of his contemporaries. His cartographic space reveals itself 
in The Nativity Ode. Then, as blindness becomes visible in Paradise Lost and Samson Agonistes, 
Milton’s identity as a man on Earth becomes the key to his cartographic spaces, and the 
revelation of himself as an observer in reality. 
The Nativity Ode and Authorial Insertion 
 
In The Nativity Ode, Milton inserts himself not only into his own work but into religious 
history. As history arrives on the familiar scene, Milton “runs” to “have the honor first, thy lord 
to greet” (ln. 26). He beats not only his contemporaries to the literary quick, but also the span of 
history which he believes treated the child-king unjustly. Milton’s ode prescribes his voice with a 
two-fold identity—that of author and prophet, or as Lewalski describes, his self-assigned “role of 
bardic Poet-Priest” (Life of John Milton). Milton communes with the Christian doctrine by 
closing a distance, not in time but in space, as though it were a physical journey to his 
enlightened prose which he must physically traverse over the literary space. Thus he “re-maps,” 
or reterritorializes as I have described it, the nativity scene, purging it of traditional witnesses to 
access the reader directly. Milton directs his new space with conscious moral judgments, in the 
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assumption that his work surpasses all before it. As Dante relates, “L'acqua ch'io prendo 
giammai non si corse.”
47
 For Milton, his theological novelty initiates his confidence as a 
prophetic mapmaker.  
Instead of a re-enactment of the religious status quo, Milton becomes into his own 
authorial theology. Reisner called it “a sect of one” (371)—indeed, Milton presents his ode 
simultaneously as a conglomerate and a challenge of tradition, alluding to Isaiah but in 
affirmation of his poetic voice as he proclaims to “join thy voice unto the angel quire,/ From out 
his secret altar touched with hallowed fire” (The Nativity Ode, ln. 29-30).
 48
 With this 
affirmation, Milton asserts his authorial voice retroactively into theological canon, speaking of 
his own voice as at a distance. This affirmation becomes a place for Milton “with no middle 
flight” (1.14), as he states in Paradise Lost. Such a statement implies his confidence to fully 
perceive his goals before God, and an ability to transcribe its truths. He writes On the Morning of 
Christ’s Nativity from a seat of historical judgment with this confidence firmly in hand. In his 
third stanza, he addresses the established doctrine directly by saying, 
Say Heav'nly Muse, shall not thy sacred vein 
Afford a present to the Infant God? 
Hast thou no vers, no hymn, or solemn strein, 
To welcom him to this his new abode, 
Now while the Heav'n by the Suns team untrod, 
Hath took no print of the approchinglight, 
And all the spangled host keep watch in squadrons bright?  
(15-22) 
 
Milton scorns the history between his own work and the traditions it addresses. At once the 
inadequate poetics of his and previous ages and the pagan idols it represents, this “Muse” he 
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 See Paradiso, 2:7: “The sea I sail has never yet been passed.” 
48
 See Isaiah 6:6-7. 
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scorns dissipates before Milton’s revisionism. An accusatory opening becomes the insertion 
point for Milton’s own authorial identity; establishing his disdain at the current ideological 
response to Christ’s birth, he presents his “humble ode” paradoxically as the greatest tribute 
possible to his lord.  
Humility thus surfaces as a paradoxical signpost to Milton’s confidence in addressing the 
orthodoxy with prudence and authority. In what seems at first a paradox of motives, Milton 
exuberantly crosses historical bounds to beat the “Star-Led Wisards” to Christ and present his 
ode as the primary gift for the Earth-born god. In the opening stanza he states,  
O run, prevent them with thy humble ode, 
And lay it lowly at his blessed feet; 
Have thou the honour first, thy Lord to greet, 
(24-26) 
 
The first-ness accentuates an identifiable confidence in Milton’s humility, the source of a 
lingering paradoxical tone in his ode. Rather than simultaneously proclaiming confidence and 
admitting inadequacy, however, “humble” in this case describes his demeanor toward God, not 
that which he holds to his fellow poets. His own voice “has the honour first,” and thus also the 
authority first, to rewrite the scene in a new author’s image. Milton’s cartographic presence in 
reterritorializing Christian history presents an image of a man lifting his robes to trot defiantly 
passed the traditional spectators at their historic posts and the poets thus far inadequate to 
describe the scene, to offer (in comparison) the first honor to God. Moreover, the ode is less 
concerned with Christ’s body or birth than this running, which places Milton’s quest for an 
identity as poet-priest at a distance of space. The ode’s humility indicates simultaneously 
Milton’s passion to cross this space and the poem’s observable constancy in re-transcribing the 
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events around it based on an understanding granted through God, before whom he is indeed 
humbled. 
As such, Milton presents a judgmental spatiality. Milton centers his view of a reformed 
Christian doctrine on the possibility of fundamental values existing in the world, not, as hitherto 
stated of Kant, of a world shifting to match the changing values of its observers. Milton observes 
the world and chooses to insert an ideal into its space in the form of his poetics. For Milton, the 
view of the author in re-presenting his moral observations in a concrete work of art allows him to 
assume a cartographic identity—not of the material of reality to make “a subjective ideal” based 
on whatever is verifiable at the time, but of the form of his art to make an objective one. Such an 
objective premise—as Milton offers when he crosses the space of time to insert artistic judgment 
into history—affirms the space in which an author’s judgment occurs, yet on which it possesses 
no generative power. The insertion of a Kantian contrast here defines the cardinal directions on 
Milton’s ideological map—on one pole, the re-presented beliefs of an author based on 
observations in real space, and on the opposite the presented new space reterritorialized by the 
sum of human subjection. In Milton’s own life, his real-world blindness challenged the notion of 
his perception. Yet, here it provides a clear poetic definition of the boundaries which he crosses 
to ultimately acquire it. Blindness would define the mode by which he would eventually bring 
his historical mapping to fruition, and the sight of light as an image in his later work defines his 





Milton’s Light: Blindness in Book III of Paradise Lost 
 
In Paradise Lost, light amounts to God. Milton describes barriers between existential 
zones in Paradise Lost with the search for light, and aims his Satan at the sun/ son with his 
natural and metaphysical animosities. “Hail holy light,” begins Book III, as Satan descends 
towards Earth in search of the “fountain” which shone “before the sun” (3:8). Both Satan and the 
young Milton seek the “eternal coeternal beam” (3:2) with eyes only—that is to say, with post-
lapsarian gazes. Satan’s eyes “roll in vain/ To find thy piercing ray, and find no dawn” (3.23-24). 
His gaze cannot see beyond his sight, which sees only darkness, and the real Milton surpasses 
him in this way with his revelatory blindness. By “dim suffusion veiled” (3.26), the Light of God 
in paradise dims through Satan’s sight, “imprisoned” as Derrida remarked, when “entrusted to 
the exteriority of the body” (109). As Derrida takes the outward world as a sensory prison, 
Milton reaffirms internal sight in Book III as he relates that 
So much the rather thou Celestial light 
Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers 
Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence 
Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell 
Of things invisible to mortal sight.   
(3.51-55) 
 
As Milton’s sight fails him, he throws his art on the funeral pyre of his external senses to 
continue in a perception beyond sight. From this passage, the “things invisible” he transcribes 
occupy the semblance of a presence on Earth, but become his new stimulus for a new sight/ site. 
His poetic persona, both in form and in material, becomes into the prophet of myth. As such, 
Book III of Paradise Lost serves as a progression into blindness by its description, not only of 
light, but of Milton’s perception of it. Though the rejection of external sense perception seems to 
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deny the premise of objective cartography, a blind man may make an objective map—it is the 
enunciation of his volition, his power to see and tell, which has Milton take the single step across 
history towards the new cartography here described. 
Milton briefly describes his journey from sight as a flight—blindness reconnects with the 
Icarian gaze present in an essentially cartographic text, revealing his journey as one which 
affirms his site in his text. As he relates,  
… in my flight 
Through utter and through middle darknessborne 
With other notes then to th' Orphean Lyre 
I sung of Chaos and Eternal Night, 
Taught by the heav'nly Muse to venture down 
The dark descent, and up to reascend, 
Though hard and rare: thee I revisit safe, 
And feel thy sovran vital Lamp … 
(3.1.15-22) 
 
“Lamp” is not used purposelessly—to explicate his sense of darkness and unravel the apparent 
paradox within its visibility, Milton imagines the light he seeks with a source as such, to which 
he ascends as Icarus to the sun. The descent of Satan and his crew is not merely “dark”—this 
word becomes a suspended figure in Milton’s corpus. For he describes Hell 
As one great Furnace flam'd, yet from those flames 
No light, but rather darkness visible 
Serv'd onely to discover sights of woe, 
(1.62-65) 
 
This “darkness visible” is an explicit prelude to a blind man’s sight, concerned not with sights 
but with the way in which one perceives them, the idea of perceiving.
49
 To say a torch or source 
of light is “dark” is different entirely than for light itself to be called so. As such, he asserts what 
                                                 
49
 This concept serves as W.J.T. Mitchell’s point of departure to replace the study of images with “the idea 
of imagery, perceiving, etc.” (2), and is the subject of his work, Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology (1986). 
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Edgeworth calls a “palpable darkness which extinguishes light … wherever it reaches—a 
powerful negation of light, and not merely a light which is weak or fitful … a positive, almost 
tangible thing” ” (97-99). Milton’s visible darkness emerges as Edgeworth relates, not only as a 
tangible entity, but as a medium through which Milton sees.  
Through descriptions of light, Milton becomes into his own poetic blindness, especially 
as seen by Derrida. Milton’s response to light is a “conversion,” as Derrida relates, the 
“experience of the interior gaze turned toward the light at the moment of revelation” (112). An 
identifiable experience of self sets Milton apart from Gloucester. For Milton, darkness becomes 
the impression of God in his authorial perception, an individual enlightenment which does not 
take as its standard the reader’s view of his sight. In Book III, the activation of the term “light” 
illuminates Milton’s paradigm of “darkness visible” (1.63) and through it the unveiling of his 
prophetic self. In his conversion, Milton becomes into his new sight, which allows him to 
converse with his two authorial voices, as Lewalski relates, to meet “his desire to attempt the 
highest subjects and to take on the role of bardic Poet-Priest" (38). For Milton, darkness reveals 
the impressions of things higher and unseen through its present absence, and reflects these sights 
into his own interiority, his own prophetic, or visionary, voice. He imagines himself coming of 
age into his individuality through God, and not, as his contemporaries, illuminating the futility of 
individuality through a perceived primacy of collective interpretation in matters of art.  
Darkness Visible: The Conflict of Descent in Book III of Paradise Lost 
 
Satan mirrors the conversion of exterior to interior light in his descent, evident in the 
subtext of the word “light” itself. Milton conflates poetics themselves with light, and thus with 
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vision, as “at the voice/ Of God, as with a mantle didst invest” (3.9-10) the creation of the 
universe against the “formless infinite” (3.12).  For Milton, light is rhetorical, already 
multisensory as it simultaneously emits from God and is inherent in the world. As such, he 
redeems his authorial identity rhetorically through blindness, re-transcribing the power of his 
words onto the cipher of his yet-to-be-manifested paradise. His words become light—this light 
he describes as “thyself invisible” (3.375) and “dark with excessive bright” (3.380). The seeming 
paradox is Milton’s platform to establish a visionary blindness. As heaven’s beings “Approach 
not, but with both wings veil their eyes” (3.382), he takes his own loss of sight as a similar veil; 
he throws it off to reveal his prophetic self, his ascension to an inner vision, his temple of self 
and his poetic joy. Through it he ascends, as he declares in Book XII, “Up to a better Cov’nant, 
disciplin’d/ From shadowy Types to Truth” (12:302-03). His recognition of rhetorical power 
initiates his view of history. 
To look on God directly would be impossible for Milton, as it would render God’s Light 
merely a stimulus for the eye. As Chambers relates, “The irony of Satan’s visible darkness is that 
he sees nothing in it” (164), neither the presence of God nor his self. He derives strength from his 
new sight out of necessity, for as the archfiend relates, “to be weak is miserable” (1.157). Milton 
would take his blindness as an awakening through darkness, mirroring that of the fallen angels 
when he relates in Book I,  
His swift pursuers from Heaven-gates discern 
The advantage, and, descending tread us down 
Thus drooping, or with linkèd thunderbolts 
Transfix us to the bottom of this gulf?— 





“Awake,” he tells himself, not from blindness but into it. Here Milton experiences, according to 
Brown, “an ejectment of that stunned inaction which had resulted from his blindness” (90) as he 
calls himself to order, into the sight possible in his new perceptual location. Milton’s 
cartographic eye provides him a deeper sense of his authorial identity and its place on his 
historical map. His mode of perception is not a coincidence, but a decision and advancement in 
his identity as a poet. 
To conclude Book III, Milton establishes a rhetorical contrast in the word “light,” which 
inserts his blindness into his poetic canon. He opens with a direct contrast to “Hail holy light” in 
the form of a rejoinder by Satan who “on Niphates’ top he lights” [emphasis mine] (3.742). In 
the contrast between the words light/ lights, Satan seeks an eternal Light in a physical realm. He 
expects to see God this way, but Milton begins and ends with different “light” to emphasize 
Satan’s trajectory, as Quint relates, to contrast “the invisible realm of heaven with the visible 
world” (229). Thus the darkness visible both illuminates the Light of God in Milton’s own 
interior and “create[s] the ‘shadows of heaven’ in order to present the truth to Earthly sight” 
(Morsberger 6). Milton renders the presence of God on the cipher of darkness, as an impression 
in shadows. He does not reject the notion of sensory perception, but names it as the first step to 
enlightenment. Though he cannot justify God himself, he may justify his mode of perception.   
The loss of vision converts Milton into a visionary, able to do so. Milton veils himself in 
blindness to parse the visible invisible darkness for the impressions of God, left like sun spots on 
the eye. He claims himself to be “not only safe from man’s injuries, but, as it were, sacred and 
immune” (Bush 112), thus becoming an oracle whose darkness provides him sight. As he states, 
he thus, “Arrive[s] so cleerly to the knowledge of God and things invisible, as by orderly 
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conning over the visible and inferior creature.”
50
 “Darkness visible” at once materializes and 
dispels Earthly light, rendering it against the light of heaven as so much physical darkness to 
initiate Milton’s prophetic voice and discover interior Light. As the perfect and binding negative, 
Satan becomes the greatest tool at Milton’s disposal to evince the absence of God, the impression 
of the spirit rendered on the interiority of the prophet—a darkness in which Milton acquires a 
vision of his art. As Edson describes, “[W]hen the Earthly paradise no longer appears on the 
world map, we have a new mapping tradition, more devoted to the physical measure of space 
than to its transcendent, theological meaning” (qtd in Tally 21). In other words, Milton incises 
his identity into a premise which takes for its motif a proto-objective art—though he uses 
blindness to create a rhetorical cartographic persona in the pursuit of his spiritual realm, his 
judgment is one judgment, and not a collective anatomy lesson. The space between his 
historiographic images and those re-transcribed by his authorial identity becomes a space on 
which the territory of his vision may take its representative form in art.  
In Samson Agonistes, Milton presents the most literal literary form of his blindness. In it, 
modern Miltonian scholars falsely doubt Milton’s veracity in blindness, proclaiming the tragic 
life of Samson as autobiographical. Rather, through the subtextual use of “light” as shown and 
through his own general perception of blindness evident in his life and work, Milton displays a 
strident enthusiasm for his blind prophet persona, acceding neither to self-pity nor to guilt as a 
result of his “loss.” True losses are without gain, and as Milton exchanges one sight for another, 
he comes out, in his mind, well in the black. The result is his coming to order as a cartographer. 
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On External Sight: Samson Agonistes as Milton’s Autobiography 
 
Though Milton becomes sightless, he also gives up its necessity. “Milton’s blindness,” 
according to Borges, “was voluntary” (qtd. in Derrida 34).
51
 Milton seems paradoxically to 
attenuate his being in the world for his work, as described by him in On Christian Doctrine when 
he states that “things invisible, at least to us, are the highest heaven, the throne and dwelling 
place of God, and the heavenly beings or angels.”
52
 He was not yet blind at that point; Quint puts 
it in context of his condition, relating that “blindness may be the best condition from which to 
describe a blinding God” (242). Therefore, Milton’s loss of sight is his acquisition of the vision 
which calls his identity as a Christian artist to order. 
Thus Milton paradoxically pursues light through blindness. Yet, he does not seek external 
light, such as that from an audience—the sight of invisibilities occurs through the conversion of 
individual external experience into internal revelation. Milton accepts the world he sees (or saw) 
and concludes his blindness from it. As Derrida relates, “In order to enlighten the spiritual sky on 
the inside, the divine light creates darkness in the Earthly sky on the outside” (112), and it is in 
this sky that Milton finds his aesthetic response to paradise. Losing the sense world attenuates 
Milton to a higher one, according to Derrida, as he becomes “bedazzled” (112) by the revelation 
of blindness. However, though he pursues a holy realm, Milton does not believe himself a party 
to it, as he is material, and thus a pre-extant material must be acknowledged. The discernibility 
of the objects of Milton’s faith proofs them against his existence. Whether he seeks a 
transcendental or not, he does not as Shakespeare assign seeing men futile ambitions and 
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 “Blindness,” trans. Eliot Weinberger in Seven Nights (1984), 115; cf. Memoirs of the Blind, 34. 
52
 Excerpted from The Complete Prose and Essential Prose of John Milton (2007), 446.  
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conflicting sights/ desires, thus forcing blind men to relinquish value representation in the pursuit 
of a new dramatic viewpoint as seen by a collective. Milton contrarily accentuates the 
observable world through a loss of sight. His work reflects, not the futility of observation, but 
how he perceives the result of its ambitions. This is not the final but merely the first step in the 
revised cartography here described. 
Blindness is Milton’s revelation—it could also be seen as his abdication from the 
material world.  As Samson asks, “Why was the sight/ to such a tender ball as the eye confined?” 
(ln. 94-95). However, Milton’s God is clearly not a crisis of representation but an explainable 
and identifiable phenomenon which he views differently through blindness but from which he 
does not abdicate. As he opens Book I of Paradise Lost,  
And chiefly Thou O Spirit, that dost prefer 
Before all Temples th' upright heart and pure, 
Instruct me, for Thou know'st; Thou from the first 
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread 
Dove-like satst brooding on the vast Abyss 
And mad'st it pregnant: What in me is dark 
Illumin, what is low raise and support; 
That to the highth of this great Argument 
I may assert Eternal Providence, 
And justifie the wayes of God to men. 
(1.17-26) 
 
Milton presents God as bodily—a concrete being from which the material of the world was 
generated by material, fleshy and feminine.  Milton’s God does not assign himself or speak unto 
himself his corporeality. Rather, there is no discussion on the matter and all, reminding the 
reader in metaphor that Milton’s universe is by a body born. By concretizing God he may place 
his own spirit in a bodily world. He places his own mind in real space, for “justifie” refers to an 
act of normative judgment in an observable world. Shakespeare proactively invokes Kant by 
124 
 
subjecting Gloucester’s world to the audience’s view of his view of it—treating man “as an 
exclusively cognitive being” (190). Milton does the opposite with his own blindness, asserting 
himself as a body born of a material world in clear possession of his own cognition.  
 For Milton, man’s eyes are not the blinding force as they are for Kant; through blindness, 
Milton presents a visionary interiority to ascend his poetic into his prophetic voice. Samson was 
“with blindness internal struck./ But he though blind of sight,/ Despised and thought 
extinguished quite,/ With inward eyes illuminated” (1.1686-89). Such statements encourage 
Miltonian scholars to declaim Milton as a pauper of ambition, broken by his condition. As Bailey 
relates of Samson Agonistes,  
Into this strange drama so alien from all the literature of his day, Milton has poured all 
the thoughts and emotions with which the spectacle of his own life filled him … And he 
himself, who had as he thought so signally borne his witness for God, sits blind and sad 
in his lonely house, “to visitants a gaze Or pitied object” with no hope left of high service 
to his country and no prospect but that of a “contemptible old age obscure.” (219) 
 
The portrait of a lonely Milton cannot be supported by his own text. Bailey’s statement illustrates 
a misconception in Milton’s authorial premise—that blindness weakens Milton and this is what 
brings him close to God. Even in biographical history, the despondent prophet complex Bailey 
assigns to him fails to stand on its own. According to Brown, 
Some of his old associates may have ceased to call upon the poet in blindness, but such 
former associates would hardly be worthy of his friendship and would therefore be little 
missed by him … even Charles II viewed with favor this indomitable spirit. (90) 
 
Through what “seems to transfigure light itself” (Derrida 112), Milton reasserts his authorial 
identity through his blindness. Rather than let himself not be changed by change, Milton accepts 
his new observational mode and reaffirms his cognitive ability to make concrete re-creations of 
his premises.  Had Milton accepted the premise of his contemporaries, that his blindness was a 
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punishment, “an affliction … that was a divine judgment” (Bush 112), he might have been as 
Samson in the play’s beginning, “dark in light exposed … dead more than half” (1.75-79). His 
assertion of judgment is evidence enough that Samson Agonistes is not an autobiography. Bailey 
illustrates the importance of Milton’s authorial strength (though in reverse). It will be the tool by 
which his cartography occurs. 
For Milton, accepting physical being as a blight on his perception of it—as it became for 
Gloucester—would have been a miscarriage of his intellect. He cannot deny flesh—in fact, he 
makes his God from it. Thus empowered by his authorial identity to observe physical forms, he 
re-creates them selectively in his art, to “justifie” them in the face of Christian belief. Blindness 
decodes those physical forms to his spiritual eyes. He states in Book V that “Earth/ be but the 
shadow of heaven, and things therein/ Each to other like, more than on Earth is thought” (5.574-
76). Though he thus places emphasis on divine realms as the ends of observation, he assigns 
primacy to the physical world at least in his observation of it—in a modern, objective 
cartography, only this primacy would remain true. The notion of a divide between real and 
cognitive space is a rarity in the Early Modern period, for as discussed Burton, More, and 
Shakespeare seem to invoke Kant’s subjective ideal space by linking them. The unique 
distinction between real world space and the consciousness which observes it empowers Milton 
to insert his authorial voice into history with the precondition of his cognition but not, as Kant 
would have it, with the ubiquity of his mind over the world it observes. Milton’s consciousness 
does not possess generative, but assertive, power. Milton does not proclaim himself ideally mad, 
complacent, or tragically flawed; his corpus is fresh with his own intellectual volition. The will 
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to his observations in the world becomes his will to cartography, which with his example will 
conclude this study. 
Conclusion: Cartography of the Self in Milton’s Paradise  
 
 Milton’s blindness reshapes a disabling into his ennobling state. He imbeds images of 
light in imagistic subtexts which he describes through blindness. The seeming paradox allows 
him to establish a bodily image of God, an image seen. When Samson proclaims, “I dark in light 
expos’d” (ln. 75) he laments blindness as a sensory handicap, which Bailey attributes to Milton 
himself. However, Milton retains his authorial voice throughout his corpus, elevated, not 
destroyed, by his changed senses. He cannot be called, as Rosedale insists,  
in old age poor and sad, yet strong and eager for the work of fighting for what he 
conceives to be national righteousness, and willing to die to promote the freedom of his 
country; all this characteristic of Samson, he insists of himself. (159) 
 
Though politically charged, Milton continued to write from blindness, naming it as a prophetic 
gift as mentioned, and continuing in old age to exalt his God and his work. He retains his voice 
as a means to his cartographic insertions, and could not be called “poor and sad.” History 
becomes space, flat and complete before him. From an Icarian’s view, the roads to and from 
Christ become illuminated like the veins and sinew of a body, yet he never loses the common 
touch—his religious proclamations are anatomies, but they are performed alone, always re-
directing our gaze to his confident authorial assertions. 
 In Paradise Lost Milton creates the image of a prelapsarian world. He aims not to present 
but re-present Paradise, to “tell how, if Art could tell” (4.236) how the world appeared. This 
distinction places Milton with authority over the nature of the Paradise re-presented but 
127 
 
distinguished from the Paradise which actually existed. He does not presuppose his observation 
to reshape the nature of Paradise, but only to represent the view which he can acquire. Thus, he 
employs similar metaphorical tactics as his contemporaries, anatomizing Paradise. In Book IV he 
states, 
… for God had thrown 
That Mountain as his Garden mould highrais'd 
Upon the rapid current, which through veins 
Of porous Earth with kindly thirst up drawn, 
Rose a fresh Fountain, and with many a rill 
Waterd the Garden; thence united fell [ 230 ] 
Down the steep glade, and met the neather Flood, 
Which from his darksom passage nowappeers, 
And now divided into four main Streams 
(4.224-233) 
 
Milton maps the body of Paradise from its highrais’d head to the neather of its anus. Detectable 
downward motion indicates the gravitational flow of Eden’s processes, as those down the 
functions of a human body. Between its two ends streams branch out, as veins plotting the 
material Earth with the surgeon’s diagram of God’s Paradise—the representation is an image 
through Milton’s postlapsarian eyes. Milton views Eden as a body from the ideal position of 
absolute surveillance, upon the face of which history is identified, described, dissected, and even 
concealed, as a feature on the map of Paradise. 
To construct this image, Milton assumes a role which in a literary context is more 
omniscient than even God—viewing even divine interactions from his place of observation not 
above but within the Earth. Glucksmann’s assertion that “The Icarian view is the point of origin” 
(27) becomes literal in this context, as God’s surveillance of Paradise is the literal origin of the 
universe. However, Milton’s cartographic eye is the origin of his imagistic God. As a 
postlapsarian observer himself, how does Milton accomplish a perfect view of Paradise? He 
128 
 
solves the dilemma of representing something completely beyond the Earth by mapping Paradise 
with its error intact. The potentially volatile reaction between the assertion of a Christian faith 
and the blasphemous reduction of its tenets to a normative art describes how Milton may be used 
as the first step towards a new cartography. 
When Milton inserts the error into Paradise, he really inserts his own authorial identity 
onto a map which had hitherto been considered divine and thus unknowable. The climax of the 
sinners’ actions in Paradise do not result in calamity, but in predictable change—when 
punishment sets in, no surprise passes Milton’s voice, as “Eden were no Eden thus exposed” 
(9.341). His Paradise is thus a landscape—the life force of Paradise remains in constant motion 
through the texture of the land’s skin, the channels of the map, the veins and appendages of the 
body, from the shaggy head down to the nether regions of bodily expulsion. Likewise, Milton 
mirrors this flowing motion in his assessment of the human body, as when he views Eve top-to-
bottom, her hair “as a vail down to the slender waste/ Her unadorned golden tresses wore/ 
Disheveled, but in wanton ringlets wav’d/ As Vine curles her tendrils” (4.304-307). He 
approaches her form as though he were surveying a mark of the land, or a botanical feature of 
Eden itself. He incites his whole visual scheme when he presents the body (both of land and of 
man) as veiled and with distinct downward motion. His art becomes a signpost to a cartography 
which takes the world as knowable—despite the fact that he affirms himself as a prophet, his 
observational volition is unique for his time. 
This veil, this blank space on the cipher, obscures the bodily map and provides the visual 
ammunition to support Milton’s quest for divine blindness. The veil on the countenance of Eve 
becomes—as his allusion to cosmetics on the garden’s body “Shadowie sets off the face of 
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things” (5.43)—the final piece to Milton’s map of Paradise. He incites this dark zone on his 
bodily map, out of which the aesthetic emergence of the authorial body becomes possible. As the 
unveiling would be “in vain/ If none regard” (5.44), the map must be identified, “quantif[ied] and 
spatializ[ed]” (Griffiths 96) to exist. For Milton, the body must be viewed to be valuated. 
 Milton uses the veil to provoke the viewer to gaze into this flawed Paradise, to tear down 
boundaries part-by-part and reveal uncharted areas of the bodily map. As Glucksmann relates, in 
addition to revealing “Maps also conceal through the idealization of boundaries and difference” 
(30). As such, revelation verifies the body’s existence, and this occurs through concealment even 
more than through sight. The topography of Milton’s bodily ideal becomes an image of God, “set 
before man [as] a provoking object, ever almost in his eyes” (Areopagetica I. 793), as not quite 
seen, the map of Paradise unveils its cartography with coquettish delay. Thus Milton de-
territorializes the Paradise body, taking its historical precepts and re-territorializing it as a “trans-
aesthetic” ideal (Glucksmann 61). In other words, it becomes not a symbol of beauty as such—
which must be seen in a normal aesthetic sense—but a veiled diagram of Milton’s authorial 
identity, identified in its transcription by the view of his cartographic eye as art beyond 
presentation.  
 Milton denies the cognitive ubiquity around which Shakespeare, More, and Burton 
construct their maps. By acknowledging his inability to present Paradise perfectly he reaffirms 
art’s capacity to represent an artist’s normative judgments. Though his judgment directs him to 
divine perspectives, the social subjective space made by any wanton perception, such as that 
proposed by Kant and Lefebvre, forms the very distance from his Christ which he traverses in 
The Nativity Ode in order to incise his own authorial identity into the doctrine. He acknowledges 
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that his art is a re-presentation in Paradise Lost in order to assert his ability to judge based on his 
observations. Blindness therefore allows him to observe the divine as real and not, as in 
Shakespeare, to shift the focus of representation from the world to the audience’s subjective ideal 
of it. Thus in Samson Agonistes, autobiographical parallels drawn by Bailey prove false. Space 
does not disappear or change into an epistemic badlands in keeping with Milton’s blindness—the 
world is not a bluff of the seeing. Such a prescription belongs to Burton, who can see only that 
which he sees through, namely, madness. As if in answer, Milton asserts his true self in Samson 
Agonistes, not as the title character but as the Chorus. He proclaims,    
Just are the ways of God, 
And justifiable to Men; 
Unless there be who think not God at all, 
If any be, they walk obscure; 
For of such Doctrine never was there School, 
But the heart of the Fool, 




Milton identifies the fool, and therefore leaves the option for non-fools, of which Burton could 
not conceive. For Milton, the purely cognitive being, who proclaims to create his territory by 
thinking it, is as a Doctor operating on himself. His scalpel is a dependence on the whims of 
collectives, whether in the form of society or space. Milton cannot see all that which may be 
seen. His accession to blindness however clearly affirms his ability to see all that he can 
understand. This ability discerns his identity from his critics’ interpretation of it, and makes of 
him a heretical consciousness, seemingly unafraid to challenge faith by proclaiming God as real. 
Empowered by his condition, God becomes the sign which asserts Milton’s belief that all 
man’s faculties are inextricably connected. This brings him into a proactive conflict with Kant 
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who, according to Wallace, having “Ignor[ed] the common origin of the various faculties … left 
their radical unity to appear as an undersigned and unremarkable coincidence” (190). In other 
terms, man’s various perceptions were for Kant based on a fluid space—no stable faculty of 
existence permitted a discernible unity of consciousness. In direct opposition, Milton takes all 
perceptual faculties as the result of a conscious pattern—through this decision he asserts both the 
existence of God and the possibility of judgment in the world. His moment of virtuality brings 
him to spiritual conclusions unavoidable in his time and not supported by this paper. Yet, he 
destructs the argument from faith by asserting its reality, as opposed to Kant’s destruction of 
reality by an argument from faith, and this is the stepping stone after which this chapter strives. 
The result in this discourse, with the liberty of removing God from the standard of its 
representation, is a cartography based on a concrete reality which cannot change through the 
perception of it. Of all authors discussed, Milton alone tends towards an objective rationality—
an ability to observe the world and apprehend concepts from it. Despite becoming blind, his 
judgments are ascertainable through his art. Burton professes to see the world’s madness as all 
that is; More destructs it to re-form a spatial impossibility, suspended on a society equally 
impossible; Shakespeare assigns man traits he believes to be the only ones present and proclaims 
that caricature all that is possible. Milton renounces each of these in turn with a devotion to his 
self, to his identifiable judgments built out of an identifiable space. Rather than the control of 
mind over matter, Milton takes the mind in the matter with judgment which, as Brown asserts, 
“Does not indicate a quality in the thing, but primarily a relation between the act of apprehending 
it and the general conductions of human thought” (90). This means that Milton conducts his 
perception of reality to form concepts in his mind and not, as Kant would have it, to form 
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concepts from nothing and thus conduct space. His map-making accomplishes the reverse of 
Kant’s subjective ideal and Lefebvre’s social space, both of which assign primacy to the 
consciousness of the audience over the judgments of the author. Milton thus emerges as the Early 
Modern period’s best figure of volitional liberty, able to apprehend concepts from observed 
concretes as an author in reality, though that reality for Milton inescapably includes God. 
Final Remarks 
 
 Maps have features which in the Early Modern Period were dependent more on the 
cartographer’s view than on science. The viewing perspective changed the motif of the 
landscape, altered its aesthetic personality, and skewed its vantage point. In the sense that 
mapmaking is a scheme of representation with its cartographer’s judgment as the motif of its 
design, literature is an imminently cartographic art. Each author uses observation to respond to 
the fundamentals of their existence. Here particularly, Early Modern anatomical and 
deconstructive visual schemes in Burton, More, Shakespeare, and Milton reveal a tendency 
towards visual reductionism—maps which reflect views.  
For Burton, More, and Shakespeare, the effect is a fundamental shift in value 
representation. Modern semiologists take after Kant, who proclaims that the forms of what we 
call “space” are the collective delusions of consciousness, and Lefebvre, who labels every space 
as a purely social phenomenon. The seed of this philosophy as seen by the current trans-
historical discourse takes root in the visual schemes of Early Modern literary cartographers, for 
just as the modern interpretation of space cannot grasp a reality which exists without the human 
consciousness to perceive it, the works discussed suspend representation to deny its referents. In 
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Burton, the maddening impossibility of truth took the reality out of referents. In More, the re-
assignment of value schemes to represent no value at all took the reality out of referents. In 
Shakespeare, the primacy of the audience’s perspective of an event over the event itself, the 
consciousness over the material, took the reality out of referents. A single referential is required 
for symbols to retain meaning in a stable and objective reality, and only therein can authors 
possess the single faculty of observation and the volition to cognitively assert the fundamentals 
discovered in their art. Of all authors discussed, though he makes that single referential God, 
only John Milton can claim to even partly share this understanding.  
In Milton’s corpus, his perception of space realigns on the scheme of his judgment. His 
observational power becomes clear when presented as an authorial identity with the will to run 
and be first, to challenge the theological constants with his own assessments. The notion which 
he challenges is not at its core the nature of Christ—that is merely the contextual incident of the 
defining force behind his corpus. As his art reflects his perception of space, it necessarily cannot 
generate space, as Kant supposes. If it were so, he would not justify the ways of God to man, as 
God would merely be a waking dream of man, a collective delusion inadmissible to justification. 
Milton assigns God a body in space which he affirms as real enough to justify with his 
judgments in it.  Then, he runs to it. This single act, an act of historiographic cartography, 
defines Milton’s corpus by the fact of his authorial presence within it. Mapping the normative 
judgments of his experience defines his conclusions, many of which seem to refute the material 
world, or make of it a shadow dangerously similar to that of his contemporaries—as such, this 
paper does not support these conclusions, here viewed as necessities of his time, as much as the 
inkling of a self-centered epistemology which asserts them.  
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Through the enunciation of his self, Milton claims responsibility for his own 
consciousness, an act which Burton deems impossible, which More deems futile, and which 
Shakespeare deems as ultimately depraved. By placing his mind in space, Milton offers a 
glimmer in the epistemological darkness generated by his contemporaries, sown by the German 
Romantics, and reaped to this day. That glimmer is of a self in reality, with volition in its 
consciousness not despite, but precisely because he has no such volition in his existence. 
Disparate time periods and seemingly differing philosophies unite under Kant’s rationale, to 
denote space as a construct of consciousness, and thus, existence as a choice. In the prose 
described, the result of this theory becomes into Hegel’s ideal: existence remote from the self. 
The first authors describe desires to elevate collectives to a plane of moral and philosophical 
superiority—Burton by generalizing reason out of truth, More by creating a society in which 
collectives actually hold value, and Shakespeare by instating the institution of the audience’s 
mind’s eye as the standard for representation. By these doctrines, cartography becomes a 
generative act, which places primacy on man’s consciousness in the determination of his 
existence. By these doctrines, the subject becomes God.  
In Milton’s audacious discourse, his authorial identity holds assertive rather than 
generative power in his observations, and the conclusions of a consciousness conscious of 
something beyond itself. This primacy of reality, a reverse of Kant’s subjective ideal, allows 
Milton to construct the potential for a reasonable doctrine, one which from this perspective 
assaults the tenets of faith by proclaiming its content to actually exist. His approach to his own 
identity at least in part utilizes an objective cartography—one which holds existence as an 
insertion point for his judgment. Artistic re-presentations, then, which must be based on 
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something formerly presented, acquire something of a proper consciousness through Milton’s 
philosophy, in this sense, unique in his time. This paper views the insistence on God and the 
denial of material, as incidents of the time in Milton’s corpus, thus accentuating the singular seed 
of rational thinking which did not exist in the work of his contemporaries, and which allows him 
in this context to serve as a partial example of a volitional liberty in an artistic corpus. 
The final word is this: by acknowledging objective reality, an artist may assert his 
consciousness in the re-presentation of observed fundamentals. Following Milton’s example, 
such an artist would have to possess volition in his consciousness based on a prerequisite 
existence: a consciousness aware that it is real. Diverting from Milton’s example, however, a 
truly objective cartographic author would not direct his understanding towards a transcendental 
God, nor deny material in the pursuit of another site. Taking only Milton’s will to observe and 
judge, the nearest corollary to inductive science in Early Modern literature, such an author may 
assert the existence of his existence, and therefore the possibility of being conscious of it, using it 
to observe, and interpreting those observations in normative concretes which describe his view of 
things as they ought to be. Only this may be called “art.” Without this acknowledgment, art itself 
becomes as barren as Kant and his post-modern disciples suppose—without referent as without 
value and thus, with an agenda of debasement and destruction against the possibility of an 
individual within it. In other words: a moral and spatial blank, which this work has identified and 
addressed at length and largely disjointed from historical time, not for that it exists in itself now 
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